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RELIGION AND RESISTANCE: INTRODUCTION[1]

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This special issue brings together several articles that have originated as papers presented at the annual conference of the *Commission Internationale d'Histoire et d'Etudes du Christianisme* that took place at the University of Tartu from 11 to 13 June 2012. The topic of the conference was "Religion and Resistance in Europe from the Middle Ages to the 21st century". Each of the six papers presented herein, which range from medieval England to late Soviet society, deal with the topic of resistance in their own way. While it is impossible to offer a comprehensive overview of resistance throughout the whole of church history in this special issue, we believe that these six articles provide rich and thought-provoking material for historians to reflect upon.

Resistance often has positive, even heroic connotations, yet it defies precise definition.[2] There is a profound ambiguity about the Christian understanding of resistance. The condemnation of resistance to an evil person (Mt 5:39) stated in the Gospel is counteracted by the call to "resist steadfast in the faith" (1 Peter 5:9). Christianity had amplified the discourse already in use in Antiquity that non-retaliation, mercy and love of one's enemies were ethical imperatives. The early Christians "knew that zones of peace could be established, that models of non-retaliation could be created, and that victory over demonic bestiality could be hoped for, not only through the victory of the cross ... but also through the power of human love."[3] In this sense resistance can be understood as resistance to the logic of this world that values the heroic (and violent) struggle against

[1] The research on which this article is based was supported by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, targeted financing project SF0180026s11 and the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence CECT).

[2] Ian Kershaw as cited in Priit Rohtmets' article.

[3] François **Bovon**, "The Child and the Beast: Fighting Violence in Ancient Christianity" – *Harvard Theological Review*, 92/4 (1999), 371.

oppression. The problem of non-violent resistance is, of course, not specific to Christianity. Gandhi's concept of Satyagraha (literally "holding on to truth"), arising from religious and philosophical sources, was a powerful instrument of non-violent resistance to the British colonial power that had given a sense of higher moral superiority to the Indian national movement.[4]

Broadly speaking, the articles in this special issue deal with three types of relationship in which resistance can be located: the relationship between religion and the state; the relationship between the established church and various dissenting or non-conformist groups and, finally, the relationship between secular society and religion. Historically, Christianity had given a powerful impetus to resistance to various oppressed groups. The early Christian communities resisted the Roman state; women embraced Christianity and the ascetic way of life in defiance of the social expectation to be good wives and daughters; slaves and other oppressed people found a message in the Gospel that responded to their innermost longings. The established church that began to enjoy the position of the state authority's partner in power since the Edict of Milan in 313 had certainly lost much of its earlier non-conformist spirit. However, despite political dependence on the state, at certain historical periods the church and its representatives stood up to state power and challenged its authority.[5]

Yet, would it always be correct to associate domination with power and control, and resistance with the weak and powerless?[6] Traditionally, the established church had been presented as an institution that was in possession of diverse instruments of power to control and keep in check various expressions of dissent, heterodoxy and popular religiosity. Thus dissent was normally presented as a form of resistance to orthodoxy, and

[4] Shanker Raj points out that the principle of satyagraha was "a vindication of truth not by inflicting suffering on the opponent but on oneself". Alaj Shanker **Raj**, *Gandhian Satyagraha: an analytical and critical approach* (Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2000), 36. On the Christian sources of Gandhi's thought see Uma **Majmudar**, *Gandhi's Pilgrimage of Faith: From Darkness to Light* (State University of New York Press, 2005).

[5] Notably, such clerics as St. Thomas Becket, Patriarch Nikon and others lost their positions and often their lives in confrontation with sovereigns.

[6] James **Scott**, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (Yale University Press, 2008).

popular religion as resistance to more elitist forms of Christianity. The attempts of the church to penetrate further the broader masses, to bring people into the fold and reform their religious habits would often encounter resistance, which despite minor dogmatic differences was fairly massive and dramatic.

Robert Swanson's article sets out the notion of resistance understood in the logic of bottom-up resistance, as formulated by James Scott: "Relations of domination are at the same time relations of resistance".[7] Professor Swanson offers his article on the late medieval Lollards as a testing ground for the notion of "reciprocal resistance" that could be applied to other internal conflicts within religions in different periods of history. The dissenting Lollards' resistance to orthodoxy has not always been "heroic" and blatant, but instead hidden, passive and low key. Similarly, orthodox resistance cannot be narrated in terms of "control" and "repression" and reduced to the shameless exercise of power through detection, trial and punishment. Reciprocally, it could be characterised by the appropriation of "the hidden transcript of heresy" and the adoption of alternative spirituality. Thus this new understanding of resistance as reciprocal places a different emphasis and evaluation on both dissenters and orthodoxy, shifting the categories of resistance and domination.

Even though the Edict of Milan had formally legitimised Christianity as a state religion, the relationship between church and state has not always been amiable. The church resisted the state's claims to the political upper hand. The competition between the Emperor and the Holy See (pope) for the title of "Vicarius Filii Dei", the struggle between the church and the state for the leading role in the "Imperium Christianum" had accompanied the development of the Latin church. In the East, despite the principle of symphonia, the church too had to defend its identity and sphere of influence. The conflict between "Josephites" and "non-Possessors" in the Russian church raised the problem of the church as an owner of estates. It seems that even in this period, the state already preferred to have an economically and politically dependent church, a development that some powerful hierarchs resisted.

The political theology of the Reformation distinguished between two

[7] James C. **Scott**, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (Yale University Press, 1990), 45.

types of government on earth, the "realm of the spirit" and "the realm of the world". In practice, the Reformers called upon Christians to obey their secular rulers, while most reformed churches eventually accepted the right of secular authorities to act in religious matters.[8] While the movement of Pietism in late 17th and 18th-century Europe did not deviate in essence from the Reformed doctrines, it caused many conflicts with orthodox religious and civil leaders. Pietists (or nonconformists) sought to enhance spiritual engagement and strengthen religious commitment within Protestant circles, instituting devotional circles for prayer, Bible readings, etc. The resistance of orthodoxy to Pietism took various forms: some Pietist leaders were expelled from congregations, and their teaching was criticised and mocked. In his study of Dutch Pietist minister Theodor Undereyck, Jan van de Kamp focuses on the tempestuous relationship of Pietism with the civil authorities. To start with, van de Kamp re-defines the vague notion of Pietism as "nonconformism", proposing instead to use a more neutral term, "religious dissidence". The author then challenges the widespread notion that the civil authorities resisted Pietism as religious dissidence, perceiving it as a subversion of religious orthodoxy and social order. While the activities of the dissidents quite clearly appeared scandalous and subversive to some, that was not the case for others. Thus the city council of Bremen patronised Undereyck and supported him in his clash with the Ministry. In comparison with the more expected reactions, such as that of Count Wyrich at Mülheim, the support of the Bremen council must be explained. According to van de Kamp, the reasons for such patronage were local power struggle, pietist beliefs shared by some members of the council, envisaged economic benefits, the moral influence of pietism on youth and the aristocratic origin of Undereyck himself. Therefore the relationship between dissidents and the representatives of power were always historically specific and contextualised.

The third type of relationship in which resistance can be encountered is the relationship between secularising society and religion. When the medieval and early Modern churchmen used the expression "the secular realm", they referred to the sense of the separate sphere of life, a semantic equivalent of the "world", which was not yet opposite to the kingdom of Christ, but had other non-spiritual functions. The new semantic meaning

[8] Euan **Cameron**, *The European Reformation* (Oxford University Press, 1991), 152–153.

of the "secular" as opposed to religion, had emerged in the course of the nineteenth century, "after a long period of rivalry about the true understanding of religion".[9] Yet, according to Charles Taylor, secularisation can be understood as an emergence of modern social imagery, which transformed ideas about community and the individual in the moral order. The "Age of Mobilisation" that began from the English Reformation led to the emergence of new structures and imagery, shifting people into denominations that functioned like "affinity groups".[10]

Eighteenth-century European rulers began a program of secularising church estates, causing resistance from some clergy, but this also led to the embracing of deeper spiritual engagement by the church. Despite the utopianism of some of its cultural programmes, the French Revolution shook the established churches in Europe through its pronounced anti-Christian ideology.

Hugh McLeod's article deals with resistance to the real and perceived threat of secularisation among the European Christian churches and communities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He defines four such strategies. The first strategy was to "work closely with governments and social elites to re-Christianise society from above". Strategy 2 led to the formation of a "sub-culture with which church members will be partly protected from hostile forces". Strategy 3, "embracing the *Zeitgeist*" was aimed at adaptation to the world of modern ideas and movements, allying Christianity with what was regarded to be progressive at a time. Finally, strategy 4, "Evangelisation From Below", focused on the impact of social change and on the inner reform of the church's methods and activities. Even though none of the above-mentioned strategies were completely successful and all had inherent limitations, they did enjoy temporary success and affected many people's lives. In the final analysis, McLeod argues that "there is no strategy either for promoting secularisation or for resisting it that is free from all disadvantages. Moreover, one of the salient features of modern European and American societies is their considerable degree of ideological pluralism. In a democratic society with freedom of religion,

[9] Lucien **Hölscher**, „The religious and the secular. The semantic reconfiguration of the religious field in Germany from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries" – *Religion and Secularity. Transformations and Transfers of Religious Discourses in Europe and Asia*. Eds. Lucien Hölscher and Marion Eggert (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 35–58.

[10] Charles **Taylor**, *A Secular Age* (Harvard University Press, 2007).

people will make a variety of religious and non-religious choices".[11]

Hugh McLeod's sweeping analysis allows us to reflect on the differences and parallels in the ways church institutions, leaders and broader communities across Europe reacted to the socio-cultural, ideological and political changes that could, under many limitations, be described as secularisation. The "four strategies" approach could serve as a trigger for further debates and historical elaborations on the theme of "secularisation and resistance".

The period that followed the First World War saw the rise of totalitarian regimes and mass ideologies that rivalled Christianity in a hitherto unknown manner. The ideologies of communism and fascism had offered new forms of secular community and secular salvation, whilst also employing coercion against the opponents. Even though Nazi Germany had not attempted to eradicate the Christian religion in the manner of the Soviet state, the implications of the Nazi ideology on the *status quo* between the secular authority and the church were quite comprehensive.

The next three articles in one way or another deal with the problem of resistance to totalitarian and illiberal regimes in twentieth-century Europe, thus focusing on two major facets of the issue, i.e. the relationship between religion and the state and the encounter between secularising society and religion. Priit Rohtmets focuses on the activity of the ecumenical church organisation entitled "The world alliance for promoting international friendship through the churches". Facing the dilemma of submitting or resisting to the rise of illiberal regimes, the Christian churches had managed to overcome their dogmatic differences and forge a common front to resist the "zeitgeist" and threatening political developments.

The resistance of this organisation can be understood on three levels: ideological confrontation, spiritual resistance (which is how the author defines resistance to violations of human and religious rights), and finally individual resistance by the members of the World Alliance to the policy of their own national government. On all three levels, the activity of the Alliance was not easy and straightforward: problems varied from the weak theological basis to the political obstacles to carrying out the declared work. Nonetheless, the impact of the World Alliance should not be

[11] P. 61 of this issue.

underestimated: to belligerent and narrow national totalitarian regimes it "offered an alternative and opposing ideology of Christian internationalism and peace".[12]

The Soviet state did not leave many choices to churches in periods of active anti-religious policy, yet at other times the lack of direct persecution allowed for a variety of tactics from underground resistance to active collaboration with the authorities. Immediately after the communist revolution and in the 1930s, a fierce attack was directed against religion in general, in which the Orthodox Church, as the largest and most influential organisation, was the main target.[13] The position of the Russian Orthodox Church was far from that of a victim: the church had tried to mobilise believers' resistance. The forms of resistance after 1927, when Patriarch Sergii expressed political loyalty to the regime, had been taking the form of illegal and semi-legal underground activities.[14]

A notable change took place in Soviet religious policy after the Second World War. The war and post-war reconstruction gave religious organisations breathing space. The Orthodox church, in particular, was initially in a favourable position.[15] However, even though some churches were more conformist than others, their position vis-à-vis the regime did not have much influence on the direction of state religious policy. Not even the interests of foreign policy could help to avert the severe atheist campaign of 1958–64 that aimed not simply to take power away from religious organisations but to replace religious belief with belief in communism, which only led to mass secularisation. In this period, the forms of resistance available to believers ranged from active struggle to passive protest. One might say that even the mere fact of being a member of a religious

[12] P. 63 of this issue.

[13] William **Husband**, *"Godless Communists": Atheism and Society in Soviet Russia, 1917–32* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2000); Nathaniel **Davis**, *A Long Way to Church. A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).

[14] Алексей **Беглов**, *В поисках «безгрешных катакомб»: церковное подполье в СССР* [Summary: In Search of "Ideal Church Catacombs". Church Underground in the USSR, 253–256] (Москва: Издательский Совет Русской Православной Церкви «Арефа», 2008); Михаил **Шкаровский**, *Иосифлянство: течение в Русской православной церкви* (Санкт-Петербург: Научно-информационный центр «Мемориал», 1999).

[15] Tatiana **Chumachenko**, *Church and State in Soviet Russia. Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to Khrushchev's Years* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).

congregation not bound by Soviet ideology was an expression of resistance to the totalitarian system.

The expansion of the Soviet state into the territories of Western Ukraine, Bessarabia and the Baltic States during the Second World War encountered robust resistance from the churches. Lithuanian scholar Regina Laukaitytė focuses on the Sovietization of Lithuania in the years 1944–53 and its implications for the churches. While the Soviet authorities aimed to subvert the strength of Lithuanian Catholicism, believers managed – at least to some extent – to play down these efforts by engaging legal methods and, when legal methods did not succeed, to retreat into the religious underground. The Lithuanian case, which differs from that of the two other Baltic States[16] because of its high ethnic and religious homogeneity, serves to demonstrate that the aims of the church and national resistance were largely one and the same. Perhaps this fact also explains the more severe treatment of the Roman Catholic Church by the Soviet authorities. The Catholic Church was also considered a political enemy because of the anti-Communist politics of Pius XII.[17]

While our special issue is primarily focused on Christian churches, resistance to the Soviet regime did not only originate from Christians. The vast field of non-Christian religions and spiritual circles in the last decades of the Soviet Union remains unexplored. The popularity of abroad variety of alternative cultures among the last Soviet generation was the background for the fascination with the oriental religions that Maria Petrova's contribution examines.[18] The implications of such fascination remain open to debate: according to Yurchak, these alternative cultures were able to exist within the Soviet system without openly trying to subvert it. In contrast, Petrova's article, which deals with the followers of Indian religions in Soviet Russia, who resisted the Soviet ideology and

[16] About Estonia and Latvia: Riho **Altnurme**, *Eesti Evangeeliumi Luteriusu Kirik ja Nõukogude riik 1944–1949* [Summary: The Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Soviet State 1944–1949, 309–315] (University of Tartu Press, 2001) and Jouko**Talonen**, *Church under the pressure of Stalinism: The development of the status and activities of Soviet Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church during 1944–1950* (Jyväskylä: Historical Association of Northern Finland, 1997).

[17] Peter C. **Kent**, *The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe*, 1943–1950 (McGill Queens University Press, 2002).

[18] Alexei **Yurchak**, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More. The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton University Press, 2005).

way of life by adhering to Buddhist and Hindu spiritual practices, shows the subversive potential of such circles.

Despite the long history of engagement between Russia and Asian religions, the late Soviet regime had perceived – with various degrees of intensity – that oriental circles were subversive. Nonetheless, attempts to keep control over religion had the opposite result. The suffocating spiritual atmosphere of the Soviet way of life led to the rise of a generation of spiritual seekers "whose protest against the lack of freedom and information developed into specific forms" that included both individual self-improvement and collective activities, including seminars, lectures, the publishing of *samizdat*, contacts with foreigners and underground dissident activity.

The limitations of this special issue do not permit us to explore the multiple meanings and forms of resistance in religious history. As mentioned above, a fuzzy concept of resistance allows for a variety of interpretations, none of which should be privileged over others. The broadly defined three "areas" or relationships in which resistance can be located within church history would surely be complemented by further research. There is, for example, a need to explore the gender aspects of resistance, its colonial and postcolonial context, in addition to its nature as a broad field of popular or folk religion. Furthermore, an additional effort is required in comparative history in order to build a model and typology of religious resistance. Finally, the problem of resistance and religion must be posed theoretically; that would surely involve questioning the definition of both religion and resistance.[19] But this, we hope, is a topic that will be addressed in future.

[19] Talal **Asad**, „The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological category"– *Man*, New Series, 18/2 (June, 1983), 237–259.

"LOLLARDY", "ORTHODOXY", AND "RESISTANCE" IN PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND[1]

Robert Swanson

As recent history has demonstrated, the concept of "resistance" is more ambiguous than is often acknowledged. Resistance is usually, perhaps traditionally, and to some extent emotionally, placed in opposition to domination, with its opponents (and the forces which it itself opposes) being seen as oppressors.[2] In the past few decades, however, the appeal and language of "resistance" have been vigorously appropriated and transformed into a legitimate tool of power to defend societies, economies, and political structures against threats and subversion: resistance validated as *counter*-terrorism and *counter*-insurgency.

This transition merely gives overt expression to an enduring reality. There is nothing novel in the possibility that both sides in a dispute may claim to be engaged in resistance – to the point where it is not unreasonable to view many conflicts as manifestations of mutual or reciprocal resistance. Nor should the idea of reciprocal resistance be restricted to political or armed conflicts: it is characteristic of many other fields, and to instances of prolonged social tensions as well as episodic crises.

Within the history of Christianity, it can be argued that reciprocal or mutual resistance is characteristic of many of the religion's internal conflicts, especially contests focussed on doctrinal evolutions and challenges

[1] The text published here is essentially that delivered at the CIHEC conference in Tartu in June 2012, with references added. It is a substantially reduced version of a much longer paper which would have been too long for inclusion in this volume. That fuller (and, at the time of writing this note, still incomplete) version will, I hope, appear in print at some future date. I thank the School of History and Cultures at the University of Birmingham for funding my attendance at the Tartu conference.

[2] This implicitly bottom-up monopoly of resistance is encapsulated in the dictum that "Relations of domination are, at the same time, relations of resistance": James C. **Scott**, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (Yale University Press, 1990), 45.

– those in which the victors define orthodoxy, and the defeated are condemned as heretics or are cast out (or break away). In such conflicts, the key point at issue is not simple power (although power and status are often aspects of the dispute), but theological truth and, ultimately, individual and collective salvation.

This paper examines and applies this notion of reciprocal resistance through the mutual antipathy of dissent and orthodoxy in England from around 1370 to the Reformation, as the ecclesiastical authorities grappled with what they perceived to be a subversive movement advocating ideas derived from the thought of late-fourteenth-century Oxford academic John Wyclif.[3] These dissenters – generally labelled as "Lollards", with their ideas bundled under the label of "Lollardy" – resisted hegemonic catholic orthodoxy as doctrinally and spiritually flawed; orthodoxy resisted their perceived threat and challenge as spiritual terrorism.[4]

It is immediately questionable and inherently problematic to identify Lollardy as a "resistance movement", especially as a single phenomenon lasting from the 1370s to the 1530s. Whether Lollardy even existed as a movement, of resistance or anything else, is a subject of intense debate. It is only necessary to contrast Anne Hudson's magisterial reconstruction of a coherent Lollardy seeking a "Premature Reformation" with the rather dismissive approach of Richard Rex to appreciate the academic divisions the subject still provokes. Between their opposing stances, current

[3] As used here, the idea of "reciprocal resistance" to some extent incorporates, but also goes beyond, the idea of "reverse discourse" postulated as a strategy for establishing differences between Lollards and their opponents in relation to "Lollard" texts by Helen **Barr**, *Signes and Sothe: Language in the Piers Plowman Tradition* (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1994), 98–103; or the more pointed starting point of "reverse accusation" advanced (with a different focus but similar outcome) in Carolyn **Dinshaw**, *Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Postmodern* (Duke University Press, 1999), 67–68, 97–99.

[4] The scholarly debates over Lollardy and the identification of Lollards remain an academic minefield; here the labels of "Lollard" and "Lollardy" will be used simply as indicative terms for those identified, regardless of by whom or why, as in conflict and confrontation with "orthodoxy". This is admittedly imprecise, but it is the only way to avoid the repetitive qualifications that would otherwise be needed to identify where individuals might be placed on the spectrum of religious stances, insofar as such positioning can validly be attempted. Definitional difficulties and traps are well summarised in A.E. **Larsen**, "Are all Lollards Lollards?" – *Lollards and their Influence in Late Medieval England*. Eds. Fiona Somerset, Jill C. Havens, and Derrick G. Pitard (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), 66–72.

scholarship identifies and increasingly populates a "grey area" of imprecise religious allegiances, in which texts drift uncertainly on or over the edge of unorthodoxy; communities function without being quite sure of – or rather, not explicit about – how their religious allegiances should be defined; and unorthodoxy itself mutates over time. Accordingly, while Lollardy can sometimes be reconstructed as a local or regional phenomenon, and some more extensive networks or linkages can be established, virtually no evidence suggests solid co-ordination, much less a national organisation.[5] In their own resistance to this imprecise threat, the forces of orthodoxy perhaps gave "Lollardy" more coherence as a programme and movement than it actually possessed, and thus stimulated a more coherent, comprehensive and anxious institutional response.[6]

Whatever it really was, "Lollardy" perhaps originated in opposition – resistance – to changes and a hardening of "official" attitudes in contemporary religion. One key factor was anxiety about vernacular thought and vernacularised theology, with its potential for unsupervised and unmediated discussion of the core principles of religious theory and practice.[7] This challenged the magisterial interpretative authority of the clergy, and the clergy (or their leaders) resisted.[8] The primacy of understanding of the Eucharist in the accusations at heresy trials points to growing rigidity in the official understanding of "transubstantiation", which quashed the freer thought (perhaps especially at a popular level) of earlier decades.

[5] Anne **Hudson**, *The Premature Reformation: Wycliffite Texts and Lollard History* (Oxford University Press, 1988); Richard **Rex**, *The Lollards* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). For the "grey area", see note 44. The possibility that local versions of Catholicism might merge into Lollardy is encapsulated in the "pared down devotional and pious aesthetic" associated with the chapel of Small Hythe in Tenterden parish in Kent: Robert **Lutton**, *Lollardy and Orthodox Religion in Pre-Reformation England* (Woodbridge and Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press, 2006), 103–129 (quotation at 129). For changes in "Lollard" beliefs over time, see J. Patrick **Hornbeck II**, *What Is a Lollard?* Dissent and Belief in Late Medieval England (Oxford University Press, 2010).

[6] Cf. Robert N. **Swanson**, *Church and Society in Late Medieval England* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, 2nd Ed. 1993), 333–335; John A. F. **Thomson**, "Orthodox Religion and the Origins of Lollardy" – *History*, 74 (1989), 39–55.

[7] "Vernacular theology" has become a debated and value-laden concept in literary studies of pre-Reformation England. I use it here with the very simple meaning of writing which conveyed a theological or doctrinal message in the English language.

[8] For this evolving context, see Fiona **Somerset**, *Clerical Discourse and Lay Audience in Late Medieval England* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. 1–17.

Such policing was resented and resisted.[9] A third factor may have been the increasing official emphasis on the priest's sacramental authority as the mediator of salvation through confession, absolution and Mass. An elevation in theoretical status (with an increasingly evident gap between theory and practice) perhaps provoked resistance to so-called "anticlericalism" and more individualistic spirituality.[10] A final strand of resistance possibly derived from contemporary economic changes, as a crisis in clerical incomes produced a more exploitative and extractive church and clergy, whose demands were resisted in deeds and in alternative theorisations of the economic relations between clergy and laity.[11]

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What Lollardy resisted can be reconstructed in part from the records; what it advocated is less clear. A coherent and fully elaborated programme to create a clear alternative to the structures and practices advocated by orthodoxy may not have existed. Even if their forms of resistance were similar, the goals of the resisters might not have been.

Despite occasional early overlaps between politics and heresy, Lollardy lacked a real political dimension.[12] Its "resistance" must be under-

[9] The pre-eminence and primacy of the question about the nature of the Eucharist in the lists of accusations (and the responses to them) in heresy trials is unsurprising, but still remarkable: for trial records, see below, note 28. For the evolving doctrine of the Eucharist in the late middle ages, and the complex intellectual gymnastics of its contemporary analysis, see Gary **Macy**, "The Dogma of Transubstantiation in the Middle Ages" – *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 45 (1994), 11–41; Gary **Macy**, "Theology of the Eucharist in the High Middle Ages" – *A Companion to the Eucharist in the Middle Ages*. Eds. Ian Christopher Levy, Gary Macy, and Kristen van Ausdall. Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 26 (Brill, 2012), 365–398; Stephen E. **Lahey**, "Late Medieval Eucharistic Theology" – *ibid*., 499–539.

[10] This is the background evoked for Wendy **Scase**, *Piers Plowman and the New Anticlericalism* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[11] Robert N. **Swanson**, "Payback Time? Tithes and Tithing in Late Medieval England" – *Studies in Church History*, 46 (2010), 131–133.

[12] The political dimension of early Lollardy is assessed in Margaret **Aston**, *Lollards and Reformers: Images and Literacy in Late Medieval Religion* (London: Hambledon Press, 1984), 1–49. For the Oldcastle revolt of 1414, frequently seen as a Lollard rising, see Edward **Powell**, *Kingship, Law, and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 148–167, and the very different analysis denying its Lollard character in Paul **Strohm**, *England's Empty Throne: Usurpation and the Language of Legitimation, 1399–1422* (Yale University Press, 1998), 65–86. A further "Lollard revolt" in 1431 was nipped in the bud (Aston, *Lollards and Reformers*, 31–38, 44–46); and for a subsequent scare, John A. F. **Thomson**, "A Lollard Rising in

stood in other terms. Its main weapons seem more like those which James C. Scott has called the "weapons of the weak".[13] They range over the broad gamut of "the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, … feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage" and the "backbiting, gossip, character assassination, rude nicknames, gestures, and silences of contempt which, for the most part, are condemned to the backstage of [social activity]".[14] Possible examples include the fire which badly damaged Rickmansworth Church in 1522, which was at least spun as the work of heretics.[15] "Rude nicknames" derided popular shrines by altering their place-names into abusive words. The major shrines at Canterbury, Walsingham, and Woolpit became "Thomas of Cankerbury", "Our Lady of Falsyngham", and "Our Lady of Foulpitt".[16] Dissimulation and false compliance – the appearance of orthodoxy masking a reality of dissent – might be widespread; but desertion, the refusal to attend church, was maybe too public an act of resistance for most. Flight would, however, count as open resistance, even if in response to an accusation of heresy.[17] Mere absenteeism from church was a possible tactic; but distinguishing between "Lollards" and other parishioners absent for other reasons might be difficult.[18] Dissimulation through continued church attendance might be more disturbing, but this would only carry real force if it also threw down a challenge. A refusal to

Kent: 1431 or 1438?" – *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 37 (1964), 100–102.

13 See James C. **Scott,** *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (Yale University Press, 1985). Much of the discussion in this essay is inspired by Scott's analysis, reinforced by Scott, *Domination*. The approach is necessarily adapted for the very different contexts under review, notably being here transferred to power relations within a religious system rather than social structures and what Scott identifies as class relationships.

14 Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, xvii, extended discussion at 29–35.

15 Margaret **Aston**, *Faith and Fire: Popular and Unpopular Religion, 1350–1600* (London and Rio Grande, OH: Hambledon Press, 1993), 231–233, 247–260; Robert N. **Swanson**, *Indulgences in Late Medieval England: Passports to Paradise?* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 477.

16 Norman P. **Tanner** (ed.), *Heresy Trials in the Diocese of Norwich, 1428–31.* Camden Society, 4th series, 20 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977), 14 and refs.

17 E.g. Maureen **Jurkowski**, "Lollardy and Social Status in East Anglia" – *Speculum*, 82 (2007), 138.

18 See the comments on absenteeism in John H. **Arnold**, "The Materiality of Unbelief in Late Medieval England" – *The Unorthodox Imagination in Late Medieval Britain.* Ed. Sophie Page (Manchester University Press, 2010), 83–84.

participate in services would then become a sign of disdain, but might be difficult to respond to.[19]

Resistance tended not to be overt; it was mainly individual and personal. Groups did exist, and there were instructional gatherings identified (perhaps mainly by their opponents) as "schools", but the general impression is of a rather loose structure (if it was a structure at all), in which the groups did not coagulate into a full movement or sect.[20]

These people generally kept their heads down: Lollards were always a minority; open exposure was dangerous. Unlike other types of power relations and structures of domination, here the binary of "us" and "them", "heretics" and "orthodox", exists primarily in the mind and in the system of belief. This makes the "basic antagonism of goals between dominant and subordinate that is held in check by relations of discipline and punishment"[21] much more complex. The "hidden transcript" of Lollardy usually had to be kept hidden; it was shared with some peers, inferiors, and

[19] E.g. Andrew **Hope**, "Lollardy: the Stone the Builders Rejected?" – *Protestantism and the National Church in the Sixteenth Century.* Eds. Peter Lake and M. Dowling (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 14–15; Margaret **Aston**, "Corpus Christi and Corpus Regni: Heresy and the Peasants' Revolt" – *Past and Present*, 143 (May, 1994), 35–36, 42–43. The interpretative challenge here might make a response problematic: was failure to honour the host a denial of transubstantiation, or a purist (and quasi-orthodox) refusal to cross a line into idolatry? (See comments of Aston, "Corpus Christi", 42). Such problems lie behind the paradox of William Colyns of South Creake, Norfolk, who had wished to perform his public penance in his parish church before the reserved sacrament rather than a Marian image, and was therefore called a Lollard: Tanner, *Heresy Trials in Norwich*, 89–90. (However, Colyns was not an innocent victim: he admitted and abjured a number of charges, but these were not "standard" Lollard beliefs: *ibid*., 91–92.

[20] Tanner, *Heresy Trials in Norwich*, 28–30**.** Hudson, *Premature Reformation,* 168–171, 175–195. Margaret **Aston**, "Were the Lollards a Sect?" – *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life.* Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff. Eds. Peter Biller and Barrie Dobson. Studies in Church History subsidia, 11 (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1999), 163–191; Jeremy **Catto**, "Followers and Helpers: the Religious Identity of the Followers of Wyclif" – Biller and Dobson, *The Medieval Church*, 142–143, 159–160; Richard G. **Davies**, "Lollardy and Locality" – *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 1 (1991), 191–212. For suggestion of more structure in East Anglia, Tanner, *Heresy Trials in Norwich*, 30. The ambiguities are perhaps encapsulated in Derek Plumb's frequent reference to the Lollards as a "sect", which seems to sit ill with his statement that they were "not separatists": Derek **Plumb**, "A Gathered Church? Lollards and their Society" – *The World of Rural Dissenters, 1520–1725*. Ed. Margaret Spufford (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 148.

[21] Scott, *Domination*, 193.

superiors, yet concealed from others.[22] Most Lollards seemingly merged into – or concealed themselves within – their communities without any difficulty, and were not seen as a problem by their neighbours. "Resistance" was chiefly passive and low-key. Dissent in introspective rural communities could resist detection through a combination of silence and dissimulation in response to enquiry. Dissenters among local elites might thereby refuse to reveal themselves, and use mechanisms of power to lessen the likelihood of their being revealed by others.[23]

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These forms of "resistance" do not amount to a "strategy", nor do they have the coherence of a "campaign". Arguably, such a strategy was needed only when individual Lollards became embroiled in direct confrontations with orthodoxy and had to defend themselves. Their resistance might be purely defensive, seeking to avoid confession and formal identification as a heretic; but it might be more active, rebutting or subverting the claims and authority of the "orthodox". This was a dangerous option, but was not unknown. One man who was required to abjure in 1511 was sentenced to go on annual pilgrimages to Lincoln. In 1512 or 1513 he seemingly used these trips to continue to broadcast his views (notably his derision for pilgrimage), without incurring any immediate penalty – but he was burnt as a heretic in 1522.[24]

More intriguing – and more subtle and strategic – is the evidence of defensive resistance, seeking to rebut accusations without actually denying dissent. Here the schedule of questions used in heresy trials could be undermined by using evasive "model answers" to deflect the attack, such as those proffered in the tract itemising the "Sixteen Points on which the Bishops accuse Lollards".[25] The responses usually appear to affirm and accept the particular doctrinal point which had supposedly been denied, before adding obfuscations and qualifications that undermine

[22] Here, while the dynamics of the reciprocal resistance are as set out in Scott, *Domination*, 192–193, the contextual pattern he posits at 193 does not actually hold for quasi-voluntary religious structures, where subordinates may well buy into the norms of the dominant to secure the salvation promised by the religious beliefs.

[23] Jurkowski, "Lollardy and Social Status", 150–151.

[24] Hope, "Lollardy", 14–15.

[25] Printed in *Selections from English Wycliffite Writings*. Ed. Anne Hudson (Cambridge University Press, 1978), 19–24; commentary at 145–150.

that affirmation and subvert the charge by suggesting that its unqualified acceptance would itself be a denial of catholic doctrine, or a legitimation of immorality.

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This seemingly impotent yet enduring Lollard resistance faced the power and forces of orthodoxy, offering their own reciprocal resistance. Here it may be appropriate to talk of a strategy or campaign of resistance, even if it was often fragmented. The orthodox resistance to Lollardy had to defend its own view of the church and of doctrine. Its focus on the Eucharist ensured that the notion of transubstantiation gained greater definition, so that only one understanding of it was considered acceptably orthodox. It defended the cult of saints, purgatory and many of the non-biblical additions to apostolic Christianity that Wyclif had derided. Here the whole armoury of orthodoxy could be deployed, ranging from the establishment of university colleges to train thinkers to oppose heresy,[26] through miracles like the survival without damage of the consecrated host among the wreckage resulting from the arson attack allegedly carried out by Lollards on Rickmansworth Church in c.1522.[27]

One version of this orthodox resistance developed as a kind of "shock and awe" campaign, in heresy trials. That took some time to develop, and appears surprisingly episodic in the surviving records. Effectively organised resistance to Lollardy as a national and nationwide counter-insurgency effort only began in the 1420s. This created a much more effective disciplinary system, which aimed to quell dissent by judicial action. England may not have had a formal Inquisition in the pre-Reformation centuries, but its mechanisms for dealing with heresy were firmly inquisitorial. These local investigations trawled for dissent, seeking both recantations and the hold over the future which such recantations conceded.[28]

[26] Alan B. **Cobban**, *The Medieval English Universities: Oxford and Cambridge to c.1500* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1988), 131–133, 235–237.

[27] See note 15.

[28] John A.F. **Thomson**, *The Later Lollards, 1414–1520* (Oxford University Press, 1965); Tanner, *Heresy Trials in Norwich*; Tanner, *Kent Heresy Proceedings*; Shannon **McSheffrey** and Norman **Tanner** (eds.), *Lollards of Coventry, 1486–1522.* Camden Society Publications, 5th ser., 23 (Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2003); Anne **Hudson**, *Lollards and their Books* (London and Ronceverte, WV: Hambledon Press, 1985), 125–136; Henry G. **Richardson**, "Heresy and the Lay Power under

This resistance to heresy was a joint clerical and secular enterprise: the crown and local rulers were throughout implicated in the processes of detection, trial, and punishment.[29] The absence of evidence leaves the full extent of the church's institutionalised activity unclear. There are trial records, some providing evidence of concerted campaigns, some targeting individuals or small groups, throughout the fifteenth and into the sixteenth century. The machinery was still in place, and still being used, in the early years of the Reformation.[30] The approach suggests a concern to control and contain more than to punish; to resist heresy by preventing its resistance to orthodoxy from becoming too overt and too vocal. Humiliating or constraining penalties were imposed rather than the death penalty: badges which marked the wearers as spiritual hazards; public penances to lodge the crime in the memories of spectators; written abjurations as potential future evidence of relapse; and the general assault on reputation brought by rumour.[31] Here the forces of orthodoxy could subvert the Lollard challenge. This orthodox resistance inverts the idea of subordinates' resistance through a "hidden transcript", as orthodoxy exposed and appropriated the hidden transcript of heresy, changing its meaning and undermining its appeal with recantations and public denigration. The overall stance was still one of domination and the defence of aspirations to hegemony, but justified as resistance to subversion and its threats.[32]

Alternatively, orthodoxy sought to win hearts and minds by providing

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Richard II" – *English Historical Review*, 51 (1936), 4–28; Ian **Forrest**, *The Detection of Heresy in Late Medieval England* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 35–59; John H. **Arnold**, "Lollard Trials and Inquisitorial Discourse" – *Fourteenth-Century England, II*. Ed. Chris Given-Wilson (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2001), 81–94 (see esp. 92).

[29] Richardson, "Heresy and the Lay Power"; Alison K. **McHardy**, *"De heretico comburendo,* 1401" – *Lollardy and the Gentry in the Later Middle Ages*. Eds. Margaret Aston and Colin Richmond (Stroud and New York: Sutton Publishing, 1997), 112–126.

[30] Alec **Ryrie**, "England's Last Medieval Heresy Hunt: Gloucestershire 1540" – *Midland History*, 30 (2005), 37–52; Kenneth G. **Powell**, "The Beginnings of Protestantism in Gloucestershire" – *Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society*, 90 (1971), 141–157**.**

[31] Norman **Tanner**, "Penances Imposed on Kentish Lollards by Archbishop Warham, 1511–12" – *Lollardy and the Gentry*. Eds. Aston and Richmond, 235, 237–238, 247; Aston, *Lollards and Reformers*, 97. The aburations recorded in McSheffrey and Tanner, *Lollards of Coventry*, 266–276, are pre-written forms with a gap left to allow the name of the abjurer to be inserted. They in fact bear multiple names, added at varying dates, and were clearly not tailored to individual cases.

[32] Cf. Scott, *Domination*, 57–58.

an alternative spirituality and by persuading Lollards back into orthodoxy: resisting Lollardy not by confrontation, but by challenging its appeal and its opportunities to be appealing. One version of this approach is exemplified in Nicholas Love's *Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ*, written in 1409. This devotional text offered readers access to an expanded life of Christ which incorporated many non-biblical details. Approved by Archbishop Arundel and containing a definite anti-Lollard message, it became a popular text of the fifteenth century.[33]

A riskier tactic was to resist Lollardy by theoretical persuasion. John Barton produced several anti-Lollard works in the early 1400s, including a debate with the catholic protagonist as its victor.[34] Some of these responses offered more formally reciprocal resistance by shaping the debate on bases acceptable to the opposition. In this spirit, Thomas Netter used only authorities accepted by Wyclif. Reginald Pecock went further, and sought to base his argument on reason alone, addressing his Lollards in ways which matched their own argumentative techniques, and he did so in English. Much about Pecock's career and writings remains unclear, including the extent of his engagement with actual Lollards. He was an advocate for orthodoxy, but possibly not for the hegemonic orthodoxy which others were urging. His willingness to compromise, or at least to

[33] *Nicholas Love: The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ, a full Critical Edition, based on Cambridge University Library Additional MSS 6578 and 6686 with Introduction, Notes and Glossary.* Ed. Michael G. Sargent (Exeter University Press, 2005); see especially intro, 57–75. On the text and its sometimes uncertain integration into the struggle against Lollardy, see Kantik **Ghosh**, "Manuscripts of Nicholas Love's *The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ* and Wycliffite Notions of 'Authority'" – *Prestige, Authority and Power in Late Medieval Manuscripts and Texts.* Ed. Felicity Riddy (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2000), 17–34; Michelle **Karnes**, "Nicholas Love and Medieval Meditations on Christ" – *Speculum,* 82 (2007), 380–408.

[34] On Barton and his works see Monica **Hedlund**, "Johannes Barton – *magister, medicus, hereticus purgatus*" – *Hortus troporum: florilegium in honorem Gunillae Iversen: a Festschrift in Honour of Professor Gunilla Iversen at the Occasion of her Retirement as Chair of Latin at the Department of Classical Languages, Stockholm University.* Eds. Alexander Andrée and Erika Kihlman. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis: studia latina Stockholmensiana, 54 (Stockholms Universitet, 2008), 281–289. His *Altercatio lolardi cum catholico* may have been circulated (if it circulated) in English as well as in Latin (see *ibid*., 286). I have not had access to the tract as edited in Monica **Hedlund** and Alf **Härdelin**, "Lollarden och katoliken: en kontrovers i förreformationens England" – *Libens merito: Festskrift till Stig Strömholm på sjuttioårsdagen 16 september 2001.* Ed. Olle Matsson. Acta Academiae Regiae Scientiarum Upsaliensis, 21 (Uppsala: Kungl. Vetenskassamhället i Uppsala, 2001), 179–93.

enter the debate in a spirit of compromise, clearly upset the hardliners.[35]

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It may appear misguided to read this anti-Lollard activity as resistance; a top-down vocabulary of "control" or "repression" may instinctively seem more appropriate. The intention clearly was to control and repress, but this required resistance, with goals both offensive and defensive. Orthodoxy had to be defended, and the perceived threat to it defeated. If seen as resisting "a profound threat to their society and salvation", these defenders of orthodoxy become "less repressive zealots and more educated ecclesiastics working methodically in an attempt to save the souls of their flock".[36] Their role, and possibly their moral and ethical standing, is subtly changed.

An assessment of the effectiveness of this anti-Lollard activity as resistance throws into sharp relief the challenges the ecclesiastical authorities faced. A simple binary of David (the Lollards) and Goliath (the Church) takes insufficient account of the realities and internal contradictions of the Church's own situation, real or perceived. Thomas Netter saw himself as David defending Israel against Wyclif as Goliath – presumably with the Lollards as Philistines.[37]

The church authorities clearly aimed and aspired to maintain their doctrinal and spiritual hegemony, resisting challenges that would also undermine the social, political, and economic structures associated with it. However, the desire to resist – or to control and repress – was

[35] Mishtooni **Bose**, "Vernacular Philosophy and the Making of Orthodoxy in the Fifteenth Century" – *New Medieval Literature, 7.* Eds. Wendy Scase, Rita Copeland, and David Lawton (Oxford University Press, 2004) 83–84. On Pecock and his project see e.g. Charles W. **Brockwell, Jr.**, *Bishop Reginald Pecock and the Lancastrian Church: Securing the Foundations of Cultural Authority*, Texts and Studies in Religion, 23 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1985); Kantik **Ghosh**, "Bishop Reginald Pecock and the Idea of "Lollardy" – *Text and Controversy from Wyclif to Bale: Essays in Honour of Anne Hudson.* Eds. Helen Barr and Ann M. Hutchison. Medieval Church Studies 4 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 251–265; Ian Christopher **Levy**, *Holy Scripture and the Quest for Authority at the End of the Middle Ages* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 222–231. Robert M. **Ball**, "The Opponents of Bishop Pecock" – *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 48 (1997), 230–251, avoids any mention of Lollardy.

[36] John H. **Arnold**, "Repression and Power" – *The Cambridge History of Christianity, volume 4: Christianity in Western Europe c.1100-c.1500.* Eds. Miri Rubin and Walter Simons (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 357.

[37] Bose, "Vernacular Philosophy", 83.

not matched by the ability to do so. Possibly the greatest success was to deflect evolving lay spiritual and devotional practices into the "traditional religion" that now provides the standard picture of lay Catholicism in pre-Reformation England.[38]

Basic organisational and structural weaknesses limited the ability of the authorities effectively to resist and annihilate the Lollard challenge – orthodoxy could not overcome or eliminate the logistical and practical weaknesses that reduced its real power over many of its claimed flock, no matter what their formal religious identities. There were too many gaps in the system for its aims and aspirations to be achievable simply through blunt power. This inherent weakness of orthodoxy may be part of its own "hidden transcript", "something to hide from the public gaze of subordinates", obscured by the way in which power was actually used to resist (or repress) the perceived threat of Lollardy.[39]

At mundane but important levels, the weakness of orthodoxy appears in its impotence when local communities closed ranks against the ecclesiastical authorities in response to accusations of heresy levelled against settled and prominent members, as probably happened at Lynn in 1429, when three prominent townsmen were arrested by the bishop's steward on heresy charges but were soon released.[40] Legal loopholes, their effect possibly compounded by misplaced readiness to accept abjurations at face value, allowed Lollards to evade punishment.[41] The retention of compurgation to refute charges and declare innocence allowed resistance to Lollardy to be subverted by collusion, or through local patterns of influence.[42] More strikingly, weakness appears in the Church's inability to enforce the

[38] Eamon **Duffy**, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400–1580* (Yale University Press, 1992; 2nd Ed. 2005); Jeremy **Catto**, "Shaping the Mixed Life: Thomas Arundel's Reformation" – *Image, Text and Church, 1380–1600: Essays for Margaret Aston.* Eds. Linda Clark, Maureen Jurkowski and Colin Richmond. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: Papers in Mediaeval Studies, 20 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2009), 94–108, esp. 104–105.

[39] Cf. Scott, *Domination*, 53 note 16.

[40] Jurkowski, "Lollardy and Social Status", 129.

[41] Catto, "Shaping the Mixed Life", 97–98. Thomson, *The Later Lollards*, 234–235, refers to "the trust which the churchmen appear to have had in their penitents", although in several instances this trust was clearly misplaced.

[42] Jurkowski, "Lollardy and Social Status", 133 (see also 145–147); Catto, "Shaping the Mixed Life", 97–98.

restrictions proclaimed in Archbishop Arundel's Constitutions issued for the province of Canterbury in 1409, which sought to control preaching and limit access to English versions of biblical texts. In their aspirations, they may merit their label as "one of the most draconian pieces of censorship in English history"; in reality they proved much less potent.[43]

The core weakness for "orthodoxy" was the difficulty in identifying precisely what it was resisting and what it was defending, and then setting a clear line between them. Beliefs and practices spread over a broad spectrum, and at some point were almost impossible to police; Lollardy and the acceptably orthodox overlapped and merged into one another. In some respects they were indistinguishable.[44] They used the same vocabu-

[43] Nicholas **Watson**, "Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval England: Vernacular Theology, the Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel's Constitutions of 1409" – *Speculum*, 70 (1995), 826. (The judgement appears more tempered in Nicholas **Watson**, "The Politics of Middle English Writing" – *The Idea of the Vernacular: an Anthology of Middle English Literary Theory, 1280–1520*. Eds. Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, Nicholas Watson, Andrew Taylor and Ruth Evans (Exeter University Press, 1999), 343–344; and for his most recent statement, Nicholas **Watson**, "A Clerke Schulde Have it of Kinde for to Kepe Counsell" – *After Arundel: Religious Writing in Fifteenth-Century England*. Eds. Vincent Gillespie and Kantik Ghosh, Medieval Church Studies 21 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 579–580, 582, 587.) For comments on the impact of the Constitutions, see Kathryn **Kerby-Fulton**, *Books under Suspicion*: Censorship and Tolerance of Revelatory Writings in Late Medieval England (University of Notre Dame Press, 2006)," 397–401; Catto, "Shaping the Mixed Life", 96–97; Fiona **Somerset**, "Professionalizing Translation at the Turn of the Fifteenth Century: Ullerston's *Determinacio* and Arundel's *Constitutions*" – *The Vulgar Tongue: Medieval and Postmedieval Vernacularity*. Eds. Fiona Somerset and Nicholas Watson (Penn State University Press, 2003), 152–154 (with comments on the policing intentions at 146–147); Michael G. **Sargent**, "Censorship or Cultural Change? Reformation and Renaissances in the Spirituality of Late Medieval England" – *After Arundel*. Eds. Gillespie and Ghosh, 65; Ian **Johnson**, "Vernacular Theology/Theological Vernacular: a Game of Two Halves" – *After Arundel*. Eds. Gillespie and Ghosh, 89.

[44] An important aspect of "Lollard studies" is the recognition of a "grey area" between heresy and orthodoxy, the parameters of which are uncertain. The idea of the "grey area", implying a "between" which is neither one nor the other is of course value-laden. It might be more productive to think of a central mainstream that at its margins (which are not necessarily of equal extent) shades off into "radical dissent" or "rigid orthodoxy", as competing extremes seeking to attract adhesion from the middle ground. For relevant comment see Jill C. **Havens**, "Shading the Grey Area: Determining Heresy in Middle English Texts" – *Text and Controversy*. Eds. Barr and Hutchison, esp. 337–339 and refs; see also Matti **Peikola**, *Congregation of the Elect: Patterns of Self-Fashioning in English Lollard Writings*, Anglicana Turkuensia, 21 (University of Turku, 2000), 23–37, with the pointed comment cited at 36 from an unpublished paper by Jill Havens that the "grey area" risks becoming "a black hole sucking up every text that doesn't fit into either camp" of Lollardy or orthodoxy. Cf. Stephen **Kelly** and Ryan **Perry**, "Devotional

lary; at the margins orthodoxy could be subverted by intellectual dissimulation, and by the way in which orthodoxy set the boundaries. Lollards might still spread their ideas without formally breaching the rules: if they "talked *within* power, within the accepted strategies power permits for the regulation of its subjects' positions and responsibilities" and "call[ed] upon a pre-existing discourse of legitimation", they might well wrong-foot their opponents, depriving them of the moral high ground and forcing them onto the defensive.[45] Lollards claimed to be "true" Christians, identifying their opponents with heresy and the Antichrist. They presented themselves as seeking to return the church to the purity that even their opponents often acknowledged it had lost.

If the clear definition of what was being resisted was elusive, so was a clear definition of what was being defended. The imprecisions in orthodoxy obstructed its effective defence. Changing religious practices meant that orthodoxy itself had to be policed. Traditional religion had to be kept in check, yet was constantly evolving. While some attitudes clearly hardened, orthodoxy remained fluid, and often close to Lollardy: fifteenth-century "orthodoxy" absorbed much which fudged the boundaries between itself and Lollardy. This included absorption of much of the academic Wycliffite reform programme (if it was an exclusively Wycliffite programme). Most strikingly of all, perhaps, orthodoxy absorbed the Wycliffite Bible.[46]

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Cosmopolitanism in Fifteenth-Century England" – *After Arundel*. Eds. Gillespie and Ghosh, 375–379 (n.b. 376 note 40). For a "grey area" in personal identifications, without using the phrase, see John A.F. **Thomson**, "Knightly Piety and the Margins of Lollardy" – *Lollardy and the Gentry*. Eds. Aston and Richmond, 95–111. For the contingent nature of such personal grey areas, see the remarks in Kelly and Perry, "Devotional Cosmopolitanism", 364–365.

[45] John H. **Arnold**, "Margery's Trials: Heresy, Lollardy, and Dissent" – *A Companion to The Book of Margery Kempe*. Eds. John H. Arnold and Katherine J. Lewis (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2004), 91–92. This is precisely one of the resistance tactics identified by Scott whereby subordinates subvert the claims of their rulers: Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 309–311, 335–40; Scott, *Domination*, 54–55, 94–96, 102–103, 105–106.

[46] Catto, "Followers and Helpers", 154, 160–161. See also Vincent **Gillespie**, "Vernacular Theology in England after Thomas Arundel" – *After Arundel*. Eds. Gillespie and Ghosh, 3–42 (see esp. 19, 21). For "absorbed" Lollard Bibles see e.g. Hope, "Lollardy", 18; Robert N. **Swanson**, "A Small Library for Pastoral Care and Spiritual Direction in Late Medieval England" – *Journal of the Early Book Society*, 5 (2002), 107–108; Ball, "Opponents of Bishop Pecock", 252**.**

The reciprocity of resistance between Lollardy and orthodoxy in the last 150 years of pre-Reformation England reveals the ambivalent place of resistance in the country's internal religious divisions. As a trial run for the application of the notion of reciprocal resistance, this discussion also indicates that further testing would be worthwhile in relation to similar internal conflicts within religions, and other instances where religion and resistance combine, in order to assess the wider utility and applicability of the idea of reciprocal resistance in analyses of such situations.

RELIGIOUS DISSIDENCE BOTH RESISTED AND PROTECTED BY POWER:

THE CASE OF THE GERMAN REFORMED PIETIST MINISTER THEODOR UNDEREYCK (1635–1693)

Jan van de Kamp

INTRODUCTION

Given its critical relationship with the mainstream of a religious denomination, one would expect dissident religious subcultures to be regarded by ecclesiastical and political authorities as a threat to the stability of society and the church.[1] It would be expected for the authorities to react by excluding the voice and influence of religious dissidence. However, historical examples of dissident religious subcultures show that this has not always been the case. The focus of this article will not be on the role of religion as an instrument triggering and mobilizing resistance to religious or political authorities, but on the opposite reaction: the reaction of those authorities to religious dissidence. I will consider the example of a pronounced religious dissident of the Early Modern era: German minister Theodor Undereyck (1635–1693). He was a key founder of the Reformed branch of Pietism, a dissident religious subculture in Germany.

Undereyck's case illustrates which factors influenced the reactions of the said authorities. Research into the Pietist era has often focussed on the theological and religious aspects, neglecting the political and social contexts that determine the chances of propagators of religious dissidence to attain their religious goals. Previous research into Dutch Reformed Pietist ministers in the 17th century has revealed the criticality of these factors.[2] With the exception of the case of a key figure in Halle Pietism,

[1] I would like to express my thanks to Alexander Thomson MA (Dordrecht, Netherlands) for revising this article.

[2] Cf. W. J. op 't **Hof**, "Het Nederlands gereformeerd Piëtisme en de Nadere Reformatie in relatie tot de (beeld)cultuur in de zeventiende eeuw", – *Documentatieblad Nadere*

August Hermann Francke (1663–1722),[3] these factors have not received much explicit attention in research into Pietism. This article will show how political and social factors could hinder or further the religiously motivated goals of a Pietist such as Undereyck.

Before progressing to an analysis of Undereyck, I consider it useful to define the concepts of "religious dissidence" and "Pietism". Dissident religious believers do not seek to conform to the prevailing cultural, social and religious norms, practices or rites of their environment, but to deviate from them. They regard this dissidence as a characteristic of true Christianity. Religious dissidents wish to distinguish themselves from an environment that they define as wicked, and aim by their way of life to reform church and society. Religious dissidence expresses itself in clothing, in forms of social intercourse and community, in a conscious bridging of class boundaries and in the rejection of mainstream cultural constructs such as opera, theatre, dancing, games and language patterns peculiar to the group, thus forming a sociolect.[4]

Reformatie, 28 (2004), 4–8; W. J. op 't **Hof**, "Johannes Hoornbeeck als theoloog van de Nadere Reformatie in zijn betekenis voor het reformatorisch onderwijs" – *Johannes Hoornbeeck. Reformatorisch onderwijs en de schat der eeuwen,* Eds. A. Moerkerken et. al. (Kampen: Kok, 2009), 42–43.

[3] Carl **Hinrichs**, *Preußentum und Pietismus. Der Pietismus in Brandenburg-Preußen als religiös-soziale Reformbewegung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971); *Gott zur Ehr und zu des Landes Besten. Die Franckeschen Stiftungen und Preußen. Aspekte einer alten Allianz. Ausstellung in den Franckeschen Stiftungen zu Halle vom 26. Juni bis 28. Oktober 2001.* Kataloge der Franckeschen Stiftungen, vol. 8. Ed. Thomas Müller-Bahlke (Halle: Verlag der Franckeschen Stiftungen, 2001); Johannes **Wallmann**, "Preußentum und Pietismus" – Johannes Wallmann, *Pietismus-Studien. Gesammelte Aufsätze II* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 362–395; Wolfgang **Breul**, *Generalreform. August Hermann Franckes Universalprojekt und die pietistische Neuordnung in der Grafschaft Waldeck* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, forthcoming).

[4] Previous research has used the term "nonconformism" rather than "religious dissidence". Cf. "Nonkonformismus" (Michael N. **Ebertz**) – *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd ed. Vol. 7. Eds. Walter Kasper et al. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1998), 898; "Devianz" (Gerd **Schwerhoff**) – *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit*. Vol. 2. Eds. Friedrich Jaeger et al. (Stuttgart etc.: Metzler, 2005), 953–956; Thomas **Hase**, "Criticism and Protest in 17th and 18th century Protestant Nonconformism. Religious Misfits on Church and State" – *Religion – Staat – Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für Glaubensformen und Weltanschauungen*, 8 (2007), 237–259. Wolfgang Breul has applied the concept of nonconformism to Pietism: "Pietismus. 1. Evangelische Kirchen" (Wolfgang **Breul**) – *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit*. Vol. 10 (Stuttgart etc.: Metzler, 2009), 12–17; Guido **Naschert**, "Breckling als Netzwerker des protestantischen Nonkonformismus" – *Friedrich Breckling (1629–1711). Prediger, »Wahrheitszeuge« und Vermittler des Pietismus im niederländischen Exil*. Eds. Brigitte Klosterberg and Guido Naschert (Halle: Verlag der Franckeschen Stiftungen, 2011), 3–18. However, the term "nonconformism" has historically carried

The term "Pietism" is generally used for the dissident religious subcultures in the Lutheran and Reformed[5] confessions in German-speaking lands (and also within Lutheranism in Scandinavia) that arose in around 1670 and lasted until the end of the 18th century.[6] However, Pietism also had parallels and connections with piety movements such as Puritanism[7] in the English-speaking world, the Further Reformation[8] in the Nether-

connotations that place it as a tendency within the Church of England in the 16th and 17th centuries that refused to conform to the prescriptions of the Church concerning clerical vestments and liturgy and rites, cf. John **Spurr**, English Puritanism 1603–1689 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 29–36. Moreover, the use of this term leaves unresolved the question of who was not conforming to whom. The term "dissidence", accompanied by the specification "from the mainstream of a religious denomination", is more specific.

5 Cf. Heiner **Faulenbach**, "Die Anfänge des Pietismus bei den Reformierten in Deutschland" – *Pietismus und Neuzeit, 4 (1977/1978),* 190–234; Johann Friedrich Gerhard **Goeters**, „Der reformierte Pietismus in Deutschland 1650–1690" – *Der Pietismus vom siebzehnten bis zum frühen achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Geschichte des Pietismus, vol. 1.* Eds. Martin Brecht et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 241–277; Jan van de **Kamp**, *"auff bitte und einrahten etzlicher frommen Menschen ins hochteutsche ubersetzet". Deutsche Übersetzungen englischer und niederländischer reformierter Erbauungsbücher 1667–1697 und die Rolle von Netzwerken*. Dissertation. Manuscript in the Faculty of Theology, VU University Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 2011), especially 360–361, 367–370.

6 Cf. on this and the next paragraph: Martin **Brecht** et al. (eds), *Geschichte des Pietismus*. 4 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993–2004); William Reginald **Ward**, *The protestant evangelical awakening,* (Cambridge University Press, 1992); **Ward**, *Christianity under the Ancien Régime, 1648–1789* (Cambridge University Press, 1999); **Ward**, *Early evangelicalism. A global intellectual history,* 1670–1789 (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Johannes **Wallmann**, *Der Pietismus*. 2nd revised ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005); Peter **Schicketanz**, *Der Pietismus von 1675–1800* (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlags-Anstalt, 2001); Martin H. **Jung**, *Pietismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005); Douglas **Shantz** (ed.), *Brill Companion to German Pietism 1600–1800* (in press).

7 Cf. John **Coffey** and Paul C. H. **Lim** (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

8 Cf. Johannes van den **Berg**, „Die Frömmigkeitsbestrebungen in den Niederlanden" – *Der Pietismus vom siebzehnten bis zum frühen achtzehnten Jahrhundert,* 57–112; Fred A. van **Lieburg**, „From pure church to pious culture. The Further Reformation in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic" – *Later Calvinism. International perspectives*. Ed. W. Fred Graham (Kirksville: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1994), 409–429; C. **Graafland**, W. J. op 't **Hof** and F. A. van **Lieburg**, „Nadere Reformatie: opnieuw een poging tot begripsbepaling" – *Documentatieblad Nadere Reformatie,* 19 (1995), 105–184; W. J. op 't **Hof**, „Die Nähere Reformation und der Niederländische reformierte Pietismus und ihr Verhältnis zum deutschen Pietismus" – *Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis*, 78 (1998), 161–183, there 161–180.

lands and Jansenism[9] in the Roman Catholic Church.[10]

Advocates of Pietism lamented the failure of the reformation of doctrine in the 16th century to effect a reformation in Christian life. Although most churchgoers outwardly professed Christian doctrine, Pietists were convinced that most had no inward commitment to the Christian faith, and that many even acted in flagrant denial of it in their daily life. Pietists criticized this situation sharply in sermons and writings, calling for a radical conversion and urging concrete proposals for a renewal of Christian life. Their two major hallmarks are the exhortation to read and study primarily the Bible (rather than dogma-based catechisms) and their holding of devotional meetings of small groups for committed Christians to discuss passages from the Bible and devotional books.

We now come to the protagonist of this article, Theodor Undereyck.[11] He was born in 1635 in Altstaden, near Duisburg, the son of a wealthy trader, who was descended from 16th-century Reformed refugees from the Southern Netherlands. From 1653 onwards, Undereyck studied theology at Duisburg and made a long study tour through the Netherlands, Switzerland, France and England. In the Dutch city of Utrecht he studied under Professor of Theology Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676), a zealous advocate of the Dutch Further Reformation movement. Undereyck attended the

[9] Cf. Hartmut **Lehmann**, Hans-Jürgen **Schrader** and Heinz **Schilling** (eds.), *Jansenismus, Quietismus, Pietismus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).

[10] It is a matter of scholarly debate whether or not we may extend the term across time and space beyond these parameters, or indeed across more confessional boundaries within Protestantism. Cf. the following historiographical overviews: Jonathan **Strom**, „Problems and Promises of Pietism Research" – *Church History*, 71/3 (2002), 536–554; Hartmut **Lehmann**, „I. Einführung – Glaubenswelt und Lebenswelten". Ed. Hartmut Lehmann. *Geschichte des Pietismus*, vol. 4. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 1–18; W. J. op 't **Hof**, *Het gereformeerd piëtisme* (Houten: Den Hertog, 2005), 17–23; Wallmann, *Der Pietismus*, 22–26; Wallmann, „Pietismusforschung. Gesamt- und übergreifende Darstellungen und Aufsatzbände (I)" – *Theologische Rundschau*, 76 (2011), 222–254; Wallmann, „Pietismusforschung. Gesamt- und übergreifende Darstellungen und Aufsatzbände (II)" – *Theologische Rundschau*, 76 (2011), 296–322; Lehmann, „Perspektiven für die Pietismusforschung" – *Theologische Rundschau*, 77 (2012), 226–240.

[11] Cf. Gottfried **Mai**, *Die niederdeutsche Reformbewegung. Ursprünge und Verlauf des Pietismus in Bremen bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Bremen: Verlag H.M. Hauschild, 1979), 77–115, 243–252; Do-Hong **Jou**, *Theodor Undereyck und die Anfänge des reformierten Pietismus* (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1994); „Undereyck, Theodor (1635–1693)" (Rudolf **Mohr**) – *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*. Vol. 34. Eds. Gerhard Müller et. al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002), 268–272; Kamp, *"auff bitte und einrahten …", passim*.

devotional meetings held by Minister Jodocus van Lodenstein (1620–1657). Moving in these circles, he experienced a religious conversion. In Leiden he studied under theologian Johannes Coccejus (1603–1669) of Bremen, who developed a theological framework known as covenant theology (*Foederaltheologie*), in which he describes the history of salvation as a succession of phases in God's covenant with mankind. In England, Undereyck may have stayed in Puritan households.

As an ordained minister from 1660, Undereyck was in a position to apply all of the influences he had absorbed during his studies and trips. He proved to be a dissident minister who did not accept the status quo within the church but instead sought to adapt it to the norms he found that the Bible prescribed. The manner in which he did so and the reaction of ecclesiastical and political authorities to his undertakings is the topic of the following overview of his ministry.

MÜLHEIM

Undereyck began his ordained ministry in 1660 in the Reformed congregation in the city of Mülheim an der Ruhr, close to Duisburg.[12] The ruler of the territory, Count Wilhelm Wyrich von Daun-Falkenstein (1623–1682), was a Lutheran who did not wish to give much support or freedom of action to the Reformed congregation, which made up the majority of the city's believers. Undereyck proved to be an ardent advocate of the congregation's independence. In 1661, he submitted 25 complaints to Count Wyrich, in which he petitioned for the formation of a consistory: a board comprised of ministers and elders from among the congregation to assume responsibility for preaching, pastoral care and church discipline. Count Wyrich rejected Undereyck's proposals. According to the Count, ministers should not be propagating new opinions and dangerous novel-

[12] Cf. on this section: Heinrich **Forsthoff,** „Theodor Under Eyck in Mülheim an der Ruhr, 1660–1668" – *Monatshefte für Rheinische Kirchengeschichte* [= MRKG], 10 (1916), 33–76; Forsthoff, „Ein verhängnisvoller Vertrag. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der reformierten Gemeinde Mülheim an der Ruhr" – MRKG, 10 (1916), 193–206; Forsthoff, „Theodor Under Eyck, der Begründer des Pietismus in der reformierten Kirche Westdeutschlands" – MRKG, 11 (1917), 289–310; Jou, *Theodor Undereyck*, 136–155; J. F. Gerhard **Goeters**, „Die Grafen von Daun-Falkenstein und ihre Bedeutung für den rheinischen Protestantismus" – *Monatshefte für Evangelische Kirchengeschichte des Rheinlandes*, 61 (2012), 21–36.

ties, nor should they generate bitterness within the church. As the congregation's patron, Count Wyrich permitted only churchwardens known as *Kirchen-Adjunkten*, whom he personally appointed.[13]

Throughout 1662 and 1663, a power struggle raged between Count Wyrich, who ruled the House of Broich, and the Roman Catholic Count Moritz von Limburg-Styrum (1634–1664), who was subordinate to Philipp Wilhelm (1615–1690), the Roman Catholic Count of Pfalz-Neuburg,. Undereyck was suspended from office for nine months because both houses claimed the right of patronage for his parish. The conflict ended with a compromise: Undereyck was invited by Styrum to accept the position of minister, but was also appointed Minister of Broich.

After this patronage conflict had been resolved, a consistory headed by Undereyck was eventually established in 1663. Faced with the great lack of doctrinal knowledge among many of his congregants, he undertook several measures: the intensification of catechism for the youth; the introduction of public catechism for the whole congregation; the division of the congregation into four neighbourhoods; ministers' home visits to congregation members prior to holy communion to examine whether they were leading a real Christian life; and finally a strict exercise of church discipline.

Count Wyrich was very dissatisfied by the fact that the consistory was exercising discipline over its members, and prohibited this under threat of a fine, but the consistory continued regardless. Finally Wyrich dissolved the consistory in 1667. Undereyck appealed to a higher authority, the Government of Brandenburg at Kleve. Count Wyrich called Undereyck's complaints false accusations and charged him with the introduction of forbidden novelties, "English Quakerism" ("englischer quaeckerey"),[14]

[13] These *Kirchen-Adjunkten* had the right to propose candidates for the ministry, but Wyrich reserved the right of appointment exclusively to himself, cf. Jou, *Theodor Undereyck*, 143–144.

[14] Jou, *Theodor Undereyck*, 150. The Quakers (Religious Society of Friends), that was founded in England at the end of the Civil War (1642–1651), constructed a denominational identity upon the teaching of George Fox (1624–1691). The Quakers insisted on going further in the purification of the Church of England than the Puritans. The term "Quaker" refers to the bodily quaking of the adherents of the movement when they said they experienced the power of the Holy Ghost falling on them. According to the Quakers, everyone has direct access to the Holy Ghost. The Quakers refused to pay tithes (church taxes), to swear oaths or to serve in the army. They were convinced that all people are socially equal: "Quäker" (W.A. **Cooper**) – *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*,

the changing of the existing order for his own satisfaction, and of fomenting grievance, temptation and unrest.

The intervention of the Government of Brandenburg in 1668 required Count Wyrich to acknowledge the independence of the congregation. However, in June 1668, Undereyck received an invitation from Countess Hedwig Sophie of Hesse-Kassel (1623–1683) to serve as a minister, which he accepted. The Countess was a sister of Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg (1620–1688), known as the Great Elector for his important role in European politics.[15]

KASSEL

An ardent adherent of the Reformed faith, Countess Hedwig Sophie had an anti-Lutheran inclination.[16] The Countess had an interest in Puritanism and the Further Reformation: her library contained many German translations of books from these movements. This did not imply that she actually practised a fully Pietistic lifestyle, as she followed the latest fashions and did not reject dancing.

Current research on Undereyck posits that he was not an ordinary, but an extraordinary chaplain at the court of Hesse-Kassel. In that office, which he held from 1668 until 1670, he had the leisure to produce a compilation of quotations in defence of his style of devotion, against all of the mockery of nominal Christians, as a living and powerful religion. The title was derived from Revelation 3:14–22 – *Christi Braut, unter den Töchtern zu Laodicaea* (The bride of Christ [the true Christians, JvdK] among the daughters of Laodicea [nominal Christians, JvdK]). Undereyck derived the quotations in this work from Scripture and older and more recent

vol. 28 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997), 35–41. Quakerism may have been associated by Wyrich with the disruption of the dominant social and political order.

[15] Another request in the grievances submitted by Undereyck concerned the obtaining of authorisation to send deputies to the *classis* of Duisburg, the regional gathering of deputies of all Reformed congregations. Initially Wyrich only granted the congregation the right to deliberate with and correspond with the classis. Only in 1667 did the ministers of Mülheim receive authorisation to be deputed to *classes* and to the church consultations of larger territories, the synods, cf. Jou, *Theodor Undereyck*, 144–145.

[16] Cf. on this section: Mai, *Die niederdeutsche Reformbewegung*, 89–90; Jou, *Theodor Undereyck*, 156–163; Kamp, *"auff bitte und einrahten …"*, 69–71.

theological works, mostly from Puritan and Further Reformation writings. The book was published in 1670 at Hanau in Hesse.

BREMEN

In April 1670 Undereyck was invited to serve as Pastor primarius (first minister) of St Martin's in the merchant city of Bremen in northern Germany.[17] There must, then, have been receptive ground for Undereyck's Pietistic views among the members of the congregation.[18] Undereyck's colleagues, however, suspected him of heterodoxy.

Almost immediately upon his arrival, in July 1670, Undereyck was interrogated by the board of ministers of the city, the *geistliches Ministerium* (Spiritual Office). The ministers of the city suspected Undereyck of being a follower of Jean de Labadie, the Wallonian Reformed minister at Middelburg in the Netherlands,[19] (1610–1674). De Labadie had established home devotional meetings, which eventually separated from the church, and was later stripped of his license to perform sermons. The suspicions expressed by Undereyck's colleagues may have been caused by the fear that Undereyck's ministry in Bremen would lead to a separation from the established Bremen church similar to that occasioned by Labadie. Undereyck denied that he had ever spoken to de Labadie, but doubts lingered. Undereyck's calling was confirmed only when, at the insistence of the congregation of St Martin's, the City Council ordered the Ministerium to do so. Quarrels had raged between the Ministerium and the City Council since the middle of the 17th century: both boards sought full control over the church. Each congregation was allowed to call its own ministers; the Ministerium was only entitled to examine

[17] Cf. on this section: J. Friedrich **Iken**, *Joachim Neander. Sein Leben und seine Lieder* (Bremen: Müller, 1880), 61–76, 272–279; Otto **Veeck**, „Die Anfänge des Pietismus in Bremen" – *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 25 (1904), 291–307; Mai, *Die niederdeutsche Reformbewegung*, 90–111, 243–251; Jou, *Theodor Undereyck*, 164–176; Kamp, *"auff bitte und einrahten …"*, 70–79.

[18] Goeters may well be correct in concluding that Undereyck was called to Bremen by the congregation of St Martin's with the deliberate aim of reforming the church: „Undereyck ist offenbar mit kirchlichen Reformabsichten nach Bremen berufen worden", Goeters, „Der reformierte Pietismus in Deutschland 1650–1690", 254.

[19] Cf. T. J. **Saxby**, *The quest for the new Jerusalem. Jean de Labadie and the Labadists, 1610–1744* (Dordrecht etc.: Nijhoff, 1987); Daniel **Vidal**, *Jean de Labadie, (1610–1674). Passion mystique et esprit de réforme* (Grenoble: Millon, 2009).

ministers whose appointment had already been voted on. The vocation ultimately had to be ratified by the City Council.[20]

Soon after their arrival, Undereyck and his wife began offering devotional meetings and catechism classes for various groups on Sundays and during the week. Undereyck organized meetings for young men; his wife, Margaretha Hüls (1633–1691), for girls and young women. At these devotional meetings members jointly discussed passages from the Bible. During these gatherings, people from across all social classes came together and discussed with each other in an uninhibited manner. The meetings were very popular with the townsfolk and were also visited by students.

In 1671, two proposals were raised within the Ministerium to introduce catechetical instruction, both for the youth (as preparation for their attendance at Holy Communion) and for the broader congregation. The instruction for the whole congregation was proposed to be held once a week in place of prayer meetings. Both proposals were accepted. Although Undereyck did not himself submit these proposals, he might have initiated the ideas.[21]

As a Reformed minister, Undereyck considered it a duty of government to further the kingdom of Jesus Christ, and he addressed the authorities accordingly.[22] Undereyck and those ministerial colleagues who

[20] Cf. Ruth **Prange**, *Die bremische Kaufmannschaft des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts in sozialgeschichtlicher Betrachtung* (Bremen: Schünemann, 1963), 173; Goeters, „Der reformierte Pietismus in Deutschland 1650–1690", 254; Herbert **Schwarzwälder**, *Das Große Bremen-Lexikon*, 2nd revised ed., vol. 2 (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2003), 65.

[21] Gottfried Mai, however, thinks that the aim of the Ministerium in introducing this catechetical instruction for the whole congregation was to take the wind out of the sails of Undereyck's devotional meetings, cf. Mai, *Die niederdeutsche Reformbewegung*, 98.

[22] For rulers and governors – as for all people – God should be the highest goal. They are to deny themselves, glorify God and serve the expansion of God's kingdom. This command applies in even greater measure to Protestant rulers and governors, because they have received God's revelation in its full clarity. They should not, however, use coercion, but persuade their subjects in an affectionate manner, cf. Theodor **Undereyck**, *Christi Braut, unter den Töchtern zu Laodicæa, das ist, ein hochnötiger Tractat, in diesen letzten Tagen. Darinnen die lebendige Krafft deß seeligmachenden Glaubens von allen Schmach-Reden der in dieser Zeit Christ-scheinender Spötter … gereiniget und verthädiget wird* (Hanau, Johann Ingebrand, 1670), vol. 1, [ ](8r]-2)(1r, 96; Undereyck, *Halleluja, das ist, Gott in dem Sünder verkläret. Oder, des Sünders Wanderstab zur Erkäntnüs, Geniessung, und Verklärung Gottes, alß des Höchsten Gutes*, vol. 1 (Bremen: Jakob Köhler, Hermann I. Brauer, 1678), 458; Undereyck, *Der närrische Atheist, entdeckt und seiner Thorheit überzeuget* (Bremen, Hermann Brauer 1689), [ ](7v]- 2)(3r-v, 3)(2r-3)(3r, 598–600. Undereyck dedicated his catechism *Der einfältige Atheist* to Bremen councillors Werner Köhne and Heinrich Klugkist with the request that they commend the work to

shared his views may have submitted individual reform proposals before then. Some proposals by the ministers have been found in the minutes of the City Council, submitted in 1673, in which they proposed that ministers should have the right to abridge the prescribed form of prayer for the next day of penitence and to choose an alternative Bible passage to the set text. They also urged measures against cursing, swearing and desecration of the sanctity of Sunday to be enforced.[23]

In 1679, together with his pupil and colleague Cornelius de Hase, he submitted a comprehensive church reform programme to the presiding mayor of the city, Johann Harmes, a friend of Undereyck's. Undereyck and de Hase made three main requests in this manifesto: the right not to admit non-believers to holy communion;[24] not to admit to baptism the children of non-practising parents; and the establishing of a presbytery (college of elders) to be responsible for church discipline, particularly in regard to the villagers surrounding Bremen. The reform programme was not accepted by the City Council, which considered the changes too harsh and feared that its implementation would lead to opposition or unrest. Only Undereyck's request to abolish the *Beichtpfennig* (confession penny), which he argued was a vestige of Roman Catholicism, was

the lower orders. In doing so, they would further the eternal and temporal welfare of their subjects, cf. Undereyck, *Der einfältige Christ* (Bremen: Hermann I. Brauer, 1681), pi2r. Undereyck dedicated his last work, *Der närrische Atheist*, to three rulers, Friedrich III of Brandenburg, Karl of Hesse and Georg Ludwig of Braunschweig-Lüneburg. He urged them to further the kingdom of Christ as rulers and to recommend the book as a means of combating atheism, cf. Undereyck, *Der närrische Atheist*, [)(2r]-[3)(8r].

[23] Cf. Kamp, *"auff bitte und einrahten …"*, 74.

[24] Undereyck would have classified believers and unbelievers according to his definition of true faith: the prevalence in an individual of love of God above love of the world. He acknowledges that true believers have their weaknesses. However, according to Undereyck the inner spiritual life should express itself in deeds: right prayer, the avoidance of *adiaphora* (things that are not sinful in themselves but become sinful under certain circumstances, e.g. extravagance in home furnishing, food, clothes and jewellery; dancing, theatre, card-playing, wigs, make-up), and in self-denial, wise conduct as a guest at wedding receptions and dinners, and avoidance of even the least sins, cf. Undereyck, *Christi Braut*; Undereyck, *Hallelujah*, 207–600. Nevertheless, Undereyck emphasised that he was not implying that man can make an entirely reliable judgement on the inward state of others: according to him, only God can do that. People have to judge the inward state by gauging the exterior. They are obliged to judge this through evidence provided in Scripture: the zealous attendance of church services, the use of the sacraments, the ability to live in peace with one's fellow men, a greater desire to talk about spiritual than about worldly matters, loyalty to those in authority over the church, edification of one's neighbours, and Christian charitable giving. Cf. Undereyck, *Christi Braut*, vol. 3, 165–171.

accepted by the council, and that only in 1684.[25]

From late March 1671 Undereyck's colleagues, acting collectively in the Ministerium and rallied by the second minister at St Martin's, Johann Hildebrandt, attacked Undereyck's devotional meetings. From 1674 until 1681 they brought other complaints against Undereyck. Firstly, they charged that Undereyck would not accept the authority of the Ministerium, nor did he yield to its decisions. Secondly, they criticized his devotional meetings, at which his wife, a handmaid, and a servant held examinations in preparation for participating in Holy Communion. According to the Ministerium, these large groups were causing a public sensation and leading to neglect of jobs and housekeeping, pride on the part of the participants, and condescension towards non-participants. Thirdly, Undereyck's colleagues condemned his maverick behaviour in regard to sacramental and liturgical forms: his independent selection of the Bible passages for days of prayer, his habit of not elevating the bread and wine at Holy Communion,[26] his odd manner of prayer, praying extempore without

[25] Undereyck also had partial success in the founding of a school in Rablinghausen, attached to St Martin's church, to mitigate the lack of local education in general and religious education in particular. Undereyck managed to raise the requisite funds and construction began. However, the city council claimed the right to oversee the construction process and Undereyck had to withdraw from the project, cf. Mai, *Die niederdeutsche Reformbewegung*, 109–110; Jou, *Theodor Undereyck*, 173–174.

[26] Gottfried Mai summarizes the minutes from the Ministerium as follows: "Er [Undereyck, JvdK] konsekriere nicht Wein und Brot, sondern lasse sie bei den Einsetzungsworten hinter seinem Rücken stehen", cf. Mai, *Die niederdeutsche Reformbewegung*, 102. In this case "not consecrating" probably refers to not elevating the elements of the Holy Communion. The reason that Undereyck did not elevate the communion bread and wine may have been that he viewed this custom as a Roman Catholic usage (the Adoration of the Host). Non-elevating the elements may have been practiced among some of the followers of Calvin and Melanchthon. According to Albrecht Peters, they feared the elevation of the elements because of their feared the adoration thereof. Instead they emphasized the spiritual character of the Holy Communion, cf. „Abendmahl III/4. Von 1577 bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts" (Albrecht **Peters**) – *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, vol. 1. Eds. Gerhard Krause and Gerhard Müller (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977), 131–145, there 132–133. In the Church of England the elements were not elevated (*The order of communion*, 1548), cf. „Abendmahlsfeier III. 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert" (Alfred **Niebergall**) – *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, vol. 1., 287–310, there 296. In the 17th century elevation of the elements was even dismissed in many German Lutheran territories, cf. „Abendmahlsfeier III. 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert", 300. See further for Protestant communion liturgies in Early Modern times: Irmgard **Pahl** (ed.), *Coena domini I. Die Abendmahlliturgie der Reformationskirchen im 16./17. Jahrhundert* (Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitäts-Verlag, 1983); „Die Eucharistie" (Hans-Christoph **Schmidt-Lauber**) – *Handbuch der Liturgik. Liturgiewissenschaft in Theologie und Praxis der Kirche*, 3rd rev. ed., Eds. Hans-Christoph Schmidt-

using the fixed service and changing the baptismal liturgy. Fourthly, they complained that he spoke publicly from the pulpit about his conflict with the Ministerium. Fifthly, they censured Undereyck's attraction of members of other parish churches away from their appointed ministers by expressing the opinion that everyone may attend the minister by whom he may be best served. Finally, Undereyck's colleagues denounced the distinction that Undereyck maintained between regenerate and unregenerate ministers, whose ministry he insisted would not be blessed. Undereyck's colleagues may also have feared social unrest. Undereyck's opponents blamed three tragic events in the community on the frightening effect of Undereyck's sermons. Two young people committed suicide out of terror at their own sinfulness, which the detractors alleged had been caused by Undereyck's sermons. They likewise claimed that a third person, a man who temporarily became mentally ill, had been terrified by Undereyck's preaching.

To have its complaints about Undereyck scrutinised, the Ministerium had to submit them to the City Council. The Council, however, found in the Pietist minister's favour or even defended his actions. The Councillors, presided over by the aforementioned Mayor Harmes, referred to the popularity and pious fruits of Undereyck's devotional meetings. The Ministerium should be reconciled to Undereyck and hold a fraternal communion with him. Undereyck, for his part, should temper his language so as to avoid arousing fresh distrust. The Ministerium expressed its annoyance that the Council was protecting and supporting a dissident minister such as Undereyck. It was ruled that both parties should reconcile. In 1681 the council indeed forced them to do so. Undereyck was required to yield to the authority of the Ministerium. He should not continue his devotional meetings unless they had been drawn up in accordance with the Ministerium's stipulation. The council gave Undereyck's wife permission to continue her meetings with those churchgoers who were members of her own parish church.

The parish of St Stephen's in Bremen had a vacancy in 1681 and a new minister was due to be appointed. At Undereyck's recommendation, the Pietistic wing of the congregation wanted to issue an invitation to Minister Jacob Lehnhoff from Wesel. The orthodox wing of the congregation resisted. Both parties sought the support of the City Council. This led to

Lauber, Michael Meyer-Blanck and Karl-Heinrich Bieritz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 207–246, there 221–227.

great quarrels and ultimately to the appeal of both parties to the Imperial Court (Reichshofrat) in Vienna. The dispute was only resolved in 1683. Undereyck continued his ministry in Bremen until his death on the 1st of January 1693.

DISCUSSION

The case of Theodor Undereyck shows that religious dissidence was not and is not universally opposed by ecclesiastical and political authorities. The manner in which these authorities reacted to Undereyck's dissident views, practices and proposals differed from one territory to another and depended on a range of factors.

In Mülheim, Undereyck's dissidence was opposed by Count Wyrich of Broich. The reasons for his resistance may be characterized as religious, political and social. As a Lutheran, the Count was no friend of the Reformed parish. He regarded the establishing of a consistory and its devotional programme to be dangerous novelties. Undereyck's request to set up a consistory to govern the congregation and exercise discipline was regarded by Wyrich as a threat to his own ecclesiastical authority. Finally, the count feared that Undereyck's dissident views would destabilize church and society.

The power struggle between the houses of Broich and Styrum ruled out Undereyck's candidacy as minister for some time. This does not, however, seem to have specifically concerned Undereyck's being a dissident minster; even Establishment-minded ministers would probably have found themselves entangled between these competing powers. Also, Undereyck was able to invoke the higher authority of the Government of Brandenburg at Kleve to force the lower-tier authority of the Count to concede.

The court at Kassel offered Undereyck refuge. The reason that Countess Hedwig Sophie invited Undereyck to become her minister might have been particularly religious, given her interest in English and Dutch Reformed devotional literature. While serving as a private chaplain gave Undereyck some relief, from the Countess's side it was probably the extraordinary nature of this clerical office that prompted her to offer it, for fear that his installation in a regular parish might have discredited her.

Bremen was the city in which Undereyck could most freely implement

his dissident views and practices. It was also where he met with the most resistance, at least from his ministerial colleagues (this was not the case in Mülheim). On the other hand, he was protected and supported by some members of the City Council. This fact was known to the public at large, and even to Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705), the initiator of German Lutheran Pietism.[27] There were, however, other members of the City Council who did not support Undereyck or his adherents.[28]

We will now examine the reasons for which ecclesiastical and political authorities in Bremen either resisted or supported Undereyck. The motivations of other groups within church and society and Undereyck's strategic means of garnering support fall beyond the scope of this article.

The reasons for which the Ministerium resisted Undereyck appear to have been both religious and social. Firstly, his opponents may have considered Undereyck's views, preaching and practices to be strange and heterodox due to their deviation from mainstream theological opinions and practices. Secondly, they may have feared that his activities, like his devotional meetings, might lead to divisions and conflicts within congregations between mainstream believers and Pietists, or even to schisms. Thirdly, events such as the two suicides and the episode of mental affliction may have caused Undereyck's colleagues to fear unrest within church and society. Fourthly, Undereyck's colleagues may have experienced severe competition from Undereyck and may have feared for their own offices within the church in Bremen: Undereyck and his adherents might (these detractors may have thought) have been able and minded to do their utmost to replace them with men of Undereyck's persuasions.

That the political authorities of a city – the council of Bremen – protected and even partially supported Undereyck as an ordinary minister in

[27] In 1677 Spener wrote in a letter to Caspar Hermann Sandhagen: „Ach wolte Gott! wir könten die sache in solcher freyheit und mit solcher erbauung thun / wie ich vernehme / daß der reformirte prediger in Bremen Herr Under Eyck seine übungen haben solle … So höre / daß er viele in dem Magistrat habe / so sein löblich vorhaben foviren / obwol seine Collegae nicht am besten mit ihm stehen …", cf. Wallmann, „Lutherischer und reformierter Pietismus in ihren Anfängen. Zwei unbekannte Briefe von Johann Jakob Schütz an Cornelius de Hase in Bremen" – *Standfester Glaube. Festgaben zum 65. Geburtstag von Johann Friedrich Gerhard Goeters*. Ed. H. Faulenbach (Köln: Rheinland-Verlag; Bonn: Habelt, in Kommission, 1991), 181–190, there 183–184.

[28] During the disunity over the calling of a new minister at St Stephen's in Bremen, some members of the City Council supported the Pietistic wing of the church, and others the orthodox wing: cf. Mai, *Die niederdeutsche Reformbewegung*, 244–247.

his conflict with the Ministerium seems remarkable when compared with the resistance of Count Wyrich at Mülheim. There may have been a combination of reasons for the City Council to protect and support Undereyck.

Firstly, the council's stance may be explained as the result of a power struggle between itself and the Ministerium. Both authorities contested the other's authority over the church. Undereyck's defiance of the Ministerium and of its sacramental and liturgical prescriptions may have been welcomed by the City Council, which might have seen an opportunity to use Undereyck as an instrument to extend its own control over the church. Undereyck could profit from the power struggle between two local authorities: he could appeal to the authority most favourable to him for help and support.

Secondly, Mayor Harmes and other councillors were in agreement with Undereyck's dissident notions. When in 1671 a new minister was due to be called to St Paul's Church in the new district of Bremen (Neustadt), it was candidates who were concordant with Undereyck's dissident notions who received most of the votes.[29] The fact that Harmes was mayor in the years when the conflict between Undereyck and the Ministerium was at its height was very favourable to Undereyck. One example is that Harmes as Mayor favoured the Pietistic wing of St Stephen's Church during the disputes about the vocation of a new minister.[30]

Thirdly, the council might have been motivated by economic considerations. Support for Undereyck, who had been influenced deeply by streams including English Puritanism, might have been a factor conducive to trade with England and with the English traders of the Merchant Adventurers' Company[31], which had staple towns in the nearby cities of Stade and Hamburg. The company's membership included Puritan traders.[32] The city of Bremen was keen to enforce its economic strength against

[29] Cf. Kamp, *"auff bitte und einrahten …"*, 72–73, 394–395.

[30] Cf. Mai, *Die niederdeutsche Reformbewegung*, 246–247.

[31] Cf. Wolf-Rüdiger **Baumann**, *The Merchants Adventurers and the Continental Cloth-trade (1560s–1620s)* (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1990).

[32] Cf. Hans-Jürgen von **Witzendorff**, „Bremens Handel im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert" – *Bremisches Jahrbuch*, 44 (1955), 128–174, there 145–147; Wilhelm **Lührs**, *Die Freie Hansestadt Bremen und England in der Zeit des Deutschen Bundes (1815–1867)* (Bremen: Dorn; self-published, 1958), 121; Prange, *Die bremische Kaufmannschaft*,

Hamburg and Stade, which were stronger trading partners of England.

Fourthly, social factors may also have driven the City Council to protect and support Undereyck. The council may have considered the devotional meetings and catechism classes that Undereyck and his wife organized as an instrument to keep young people from indolence and criminality and a means to make them committed members of church and society. In this way, Undereyck's meetings could have helped reinforce social stability.

Another social factor might have been Undereyck's high social class. Further research should be performed to investigate the social origin of the other ministers of Bremen to determine whether Undereyck had a higher social standing than them, but the fact that Undereyck was descended from a wealthy merchant family must have given him a favourable status among the patricians and traders who made up the city council. Research into the Dutch Further Reformation has shown that dissident ministers of high social origin who were connected with members of political authorities had the best chances of advancing their reformation aims. One example is the father of the Further Reformation, Willem Teellinck (1579–1629), who came from a patrician family and enjoyed the support of his brother Eeuwout (1571–1629) for his reform programme in Zeeland. Eeuwout held high offices in the States, the provincial government of Zeeland.[33]

Another example is the minister Jodocus van Lodenstein in Utrecht, whose devotional meetings Undereyck had attended as a student. Lodenstein was able to survive as a dissident minister because he belonged to the patrician class. This is all the more remarkable since Lodenstein's dissident views and practices were radical: he changed the order of service

37–38; Kamp, *"auff bitte und einrahten …"*, 61–62. One example of a Puritan trader of the Merchant Adventurers is Emanuel Thomson, who lived in Stade and translated Edmund Bunny's (1540–1619) *A Book of Christian Exercise, appertaining to Resolution* into German (1612): cf. Karl Josef **Höltgen**, „Die Lösung des alten Rätsels: Emanuel Sonthom, das Güldene Kleinod und das englische Original" – *Anglia*, 100 (1982), 257–272; Edgar C. **McKenzie**, *British devotional literature and the rise of German Pietism.* Dissertation. Manuscript in the Faculty of Theology at the University of St. Andrews (St. Andrews 1984), vol. 1, 177–181; Udo **Sträter**, *Sonthom, Bayly, Dyke und Hall: Studien zur Rezeption der englischen Erbauungsliteratur in Deutschland im 17. Jahrhundert* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), 67–76.

[33] Cf. Hof, *Eeuwout Teellinck. Leven, werk en betekenis* (Rumpt: De Schatkamer, 1999); Hof, *Willem Teellinck*.

for baptism and in the last years of his life refused to issue communion to his congregation, considering many members unworthy. Lodenstein was able to avoid dismissal from his office thanks to his powerful relations, who were able to protect him.[34]

A comparison with a Dutch dissident minister from the lower social orders bears out the class-differentiation hypothesis. The low-born minister Jacobus Koelman (1632–1695) had similar views and practices to Lodenstein's. He drew freely on the orders of service for baptism, Holy Communion and marriage, and rejected Christian holy days, considering them not to be divine ordinances. However, unlike Lodenstein, he suffered dismissal as minister of the town of Sluis in Zeeland-Flanders in 1675 by the States of the Province of Zeeland and the States-General of the Netherlands.[35]

W.J. op 't Hof points out two factors that brought about the situation that Dutch Further Reformation ministers who hailed from the higher social classes were protected from dismissal from office. First, these men were able to sense the nuances of the position and the mindset of the politicians. Second, their high social origin gave them more boldness in any confrontation with political authorities over controversial issues concerning the renewal of church and society.[36]

It should be emphasized in closing that the support of the ecclesiastical and political authorities for such dissident ministers was only partial. Only the minor points of Undereyck's reform programme of 1679 were accepted by the City Council.

[34] Cf. Pieter Jzn. **Proost**, *Jodocus van Lodenstein. Eene kerkhistorische studie* (Amsterdam: Brandt en Zoon, 1880); J. C. **Trimp**, *Jodocus van Lodensteyn. Predikant en dichter* (Kampen: De Groot Goudriaan, 1987); Carl J. **Schroeder**, *In quest of Pentecost. Jodocus van Lodenstein and the Dutch Second Reformation* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001).

[35] Cf. A. F. **Krull**, *Jacobus Koelman. Eene kerkhistorische studie* (Sneek: Campen, 1901, reprint Amsterdam: Bolland, 1972); F. A. van **Lieburg**, „Jacobus Koelman (1631–1695): jeugd en studietijd" – *Figuren en thema's van de Nadere Reformatie*, vol. 2. Eds. T. Brienen et al. (Kampen: De Groot Goudriaan, 1990), 57–62; C. J. **Meeuse**, „Jacobus Koelman (1631–1695): leven en werken" – *Figuren en thema's*, 63–93; Meeuse, *Koelman* (Kampen: De Groot Goudriaan, 2008); Hof, „De Nederlandse vertalers van het oeuvre van Christopher Love" – *Nederlandse liefde voor Christopher Love (1618–1651). Studies over het vertaalde werk van een presbyteriaanse puritein.* Ed. W.J. op 't Hof and F.W. Huisman (Amstelveen, EON Pers, 2013), 235–292, there 237–268.

[36] Hof, „Johannes Hoornbeeck als theoloog van de Nadere Reformatie", 43.

The ministry of Theodor Undereyck offers an appropriate case-study to determine how dissident religious views and practices were received by early modern ecclesiastical and political authorities. Undereyck held the view that only a few rulers and governors truly held God as their highest goal, and that few of the potentates were real Christians. Though they outwardly fulfilled their religious duties, they did not love God more than the world or themselves. Undereyck counted them as practical atheists.[37] There appears to be a tension between Undereyck's view of the majority of the political authorities and his strategic use of their support for his religious aims. Further research is needed to gain a fuller understanding of this tension and of the chances of success enjoyed by propagators of religious dissidence such as Undereyck. In terms of methodology, such an investigation should bring together the mapping of the religious, cultural, political, social and economic contexts in which religious dissidence manifested itself, as well as reconstructing networks of supporters and opponents[38] of propagators of religious dissidence from within ecclesiastical and political government and wider society.

[37] Cf. Undereyck, *Der närrische Atheist*, 596–612.

[38] I sought to begin this task by reconstructing the possible supporters and opponents of the vocation of Undereyck's adherent Johannes Duysing (1644–1673) in 1671 as new minister of Bremen's St Paul's Church, Kamp, *"auff bitte und einrahten …"*, 72–73, 394–395. Further investigation is needed to map out the social and genealogical connections of members of the Bremen city council to Undereyck and his adherents in the period from 1670 until 1693 and to determine the religious views of these city council members.

FOUR STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING SECULARISATION

Hugh McLeod

In mid-nineteenth-century Europe the fact, or at least the impending danger of secularisation was an ever-present reality. The complaints were loudest in France. Unless radical changes were made soon, a Parisian priest wrote in 1849, "religion is lost in Paris and in the neighbouring dioceses. In the present situation it is not a matter of conserving, but of reviving, but we are not even able to conserve".[1] As the priest indicated, the problems were not confined to the capital: Paris was surrounded by a substantially "de-Christianised" rural region.[2] Similar complaints were also frequently heard in German cities. In 1843 a Berlin preacher called his city a "second Sodom and Gomorrah".[3] And in England the national Religious Census of 1851, which suggested that about 40% of adults had attended church on the census day, caused considerable alarm among churchmen. The statistician, Horace Mann, in his famous commentary on the census, referred to an "alarming number of non-attendants", and claimed that they were drawn mainly from the working class: "it is sadly certain that this vast, intelligent and increasingly important section of our countrymen is thoroughly estranged from our religious institutions".[4] In many parts of Europe it was apparent that considerable numbers of people were failing to attend church or receive the sacraments. Moreover, already in the middle years of the century, and increasingly in the subsequent decades, it appeared that the church and even the Christian faith itself were under widespread attack.

1 Yvan **Daniel**, *La religion est perdue à Paris...* (Paris: Cana, 1978), 32.

2 Gérard **Cholvy** and Yves-Marie **Hilaire**, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine, 1800–1880* (Toulouse: Privat, 1990), 274.

3 Jürgen **Boeckh**, "Predigt in Berlin" – *Seelsorge und Diakonie in Berlin*. Eds. Kaspar Elm and Hans-Dietrich Loock (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 317; see also Hugh **McLeod**, *Piety and Poverty: Working Class Religion in Berlin, London and New York, 1870–1914* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996), 6–8.

4 E. R. **Wickham**, *Church and People in an Industrial City* (London: Lutterworth, 1957), 109–110.

The threats came from at least four directions.[5] *Governments* were confiscating church property (Spain), secularising education (France), restricting the activities of the clergy and expelling religious orders (Prussia), or simply intervening in church affairs in ways that some clergy thought unwarranted (the reform of the Church of Ireland). *Intellectuals* were reinterpreting the Bible in the light of new research (the Tübingen School) and proposing new scientific theories that threatened existing religious orthodoxies (Darwinism), while a range of new philosophies directly challenged Christianity, including Comte's Positivism and the materialism of Feuerbach and of Büchner. Many of the most powerful *popular movements* of the time, including French radicalism, British Owenism and the Marxist Socialism which spread from Germany to most other parts of Europe, were strongly anti-clerical, and some were militantly secular. In some ways, movements of this kind posed the biggest threat, both because of their mass appeal, and because they effectively offered a new faith, which could take the place of the old. Meanwhile massive *social changes*, including industrialisation, urbanisation and growing social segregation within the cities, presented the churches with huge logistical challenges, as well as more subtle problems, such as the difficulties of bridging social classes at a time of acute social conflict. Established churches were organised through a parochial system dating back to medieval times, which often reflected the distribution of population in that period. Now they were obliged to find the resources for a huge programme of church-building in fast-growing cities and industrial regions, and to recruit and pay the clergy who would staff the new parishes.

Church authorities, clergy, lay activists, religious intellectuals, all had answers to these challenges, and some new religious movements arose in explicit response thereto. In the1840s, for example, politically and theologically conservative German Protestants established an "Inner Mission" which, as the name suggested, would be directed not at the "heathen" in distant continents, but at the "heathen" in Hamburg, Berlin and other German cities. This mission would combine preaching with a large network of charitable institutions, and a recognition that the Christian

[5] For overviews, see Owen **Chadwick**, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 1975); Hugh **McLeod**, *Secularisation in Western Europe, 1848–1914* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

community had a responsibility for the material as well as spiritual condition of its members.[6] A second example is that of the Oxford Movement in the Church of England, which was initiated by a group of High Church academics in response to the dual threat to their church posed by government and by liberal intellectuals. The immediate occasion was the Whig government's imposition of a package of reforms on the Church of Ireland, including the abolition of ten episcopal sees. In his famous Assize Sermon (1833), John Keble dubbed this "National Apostasy" and the prelude to a despoliation of the church of the kind seen in France in the 1790s. The wider challenge was that of contemporary rationalism and the Protestant cult of private judgement, which in the view of the movement's leading thinker, John Henry Newman, would lead ultimately to complete unbelief. The Movement's answer to these threats was to make Anglicans aware of their true identity as the English branch of the universal Catholic Church, and heirs to a tradition going far beyond the Reformation and back to the Church Fathers.[7]

Here I will look at four characteristic responses to the threat of secularisation, taking examples both from the nineteenth century and from more recent times. These contrasting strategies stem from different diagnoses of the causes of secularisation, as well as differing traditions within particular churches, and the political and religious differences within countries.[8]

Strategy 1: re-Christianisation from above

This strategy involves working closely with governments and social elites to re-Christianise society from above. The premise of this strategy is that the threat of secularisation comes mainly from un-Christian govern-

[6] W. O. **Shanahan**, *German Protestants face the Social Question* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1954), 81–92.

[7] Owen **Chadwick**, *The Victorian Church, Part I, 1829–1859* (London: SCM Press, 1966), 56–79; Peter **Nockles**, "The Oxford Movement and the Legacy of Anglican Evangelicalism" – *The Dynamics of Religious Reform in Northern Europe: The Churches*. Eds. Joris van Eijnatten and Paula Yates (Leuven University Press, 2010), 53–67.

[8] A good case-study of Protestant responses to secularisation in one country is Ondrej **Matejka**, *Religious Construction of the 20th Century in a "Non-Believing" Country: The Protestant Milieu in Czech Society, 1900s to 1960s* (PhD thesis, Université de Genève, 2012).

ments and anti-Christian popular movements. The danger can be averted if the church is adequately financed and is given a major role in education and welfare; if the laws reflect the nation's Christianity; if those at the top of society are regarded as good Christians; and if, at the local level, landowners and employers set a good Christian example, as well as encouraging their dependents to attend church, take part in workplace prayers, observe Christian moral principles, and so on.

Strategy 1 was at a high point of influence on the leaders of established churches in the 1850s. The revolutions of 1848–1849 had been a traumatic experience for conservative churchmen. Catholics were shocked by the flight from Rome of Pope Pius IX in November 1848 and the establishment of the Roman Republic. French troops overthrew the Republic after only six months, and Pius was able to enjoy another twenty years as ruler of the papal states before the arrival of the Italian army in 1870, but he became for the rest of his life an unwavering opponent of all forms of liberalism. The revolutions and their aftermath led both the Catholic Church in France and the Protestant Church in Prussia to form conservative alliances with government and with social elites.

For French Catholics the turning-point was the working-class uprising in the June Days of 1848, during which the Archbishop of Paris, Mgr Affre, was shot dead at the barricades while trying to act as a mediator. Most of the clergy supported Louis Napoleon as the most conservative candidate in the presidential election in December of that year, and went on to support his coup d'état in 1851 and his subsequent self-designation as 'emperor'. The same period saw a "return to the church" by a large part of the upper bourgeoisie, and in these years the business elite was more generous than ever before in giving money to the church. The church was also rewarded with a modest increase in state funding, the dispatch of French troops to Rome to protect the pope, and most importantly a new education law facilitating the establishment of private schools. This was followed by the establishment of numerous primary and secondary schools staffed by religious orders. The period also saw increasing numbers of priests and nuns and the building of many new churches. The civil and military authorities gave their support to the church – sometimes in ways that were more revealing than they perhaps intended: the Mayor of Rouen, laying the foundation stone of a new church in 1857, compared it

to a new prison recently built nearby, stating that both were institutions "for the moralisation of the people". The support given by the emperor to the pope was much appreciated by Catholics. Admittedly relations cooled in the years 1859 to 1863, as Napoleon threw his weight behind the establishment of the new Kingdom of Italy, but they improved again in the later years of the Second Empire.[9]

This strategy has indeed been especially attractive at times when the church was recovering from periods of traumatic revolutionary change, persecution or threats of persecution. The most obvious examples would be Franco's Spain[10] and post-Soviet Russia. But another example is especially interesting, namely the enthusiasm of large numbers of Protestants for German's "National Revolution" in 1933. Alienated from the Weimar Republic with its alliance of Socialists and Catholics, and understandably terrified by the rise of the Communist Party – at a time when Stalin was pursuing a bloody repression of all forms of religion – many pastors hoped that the new regime would be respectful of the church and of traditional moral values. This alliance took its most extreme form in the movement of *Deutsche Christen*, who tried to synthesise Protestantism and National Socialism. But many Protestants whose theology remained more conventional and who distrusted attempts to impose a political agenda on the church nonetheless accepted Hitler's claims to piety and believed that friendly co-operation between church and state would be possible in the new Germany.[11] During his early months as Chancellor, Hitler still recognised the benefits of the church's support.[12] He was prepared to give his supporters in the *Deutsche Christen* movement a helping hand in the church elections, and of course he dealt effectively with the church's Communist and Social Democratic critics. The Protestant church benefited from the return of several hundred thousand former members who had left in the Weimar years when anti-clericalism had been à la mode and

[9] McLeod, *Secularisation in Western Europe*, 31, 40–43; Hugh **McLeod**, *Religion and the People of Western Europe, 1789–1989* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 104–105.

[10] Frances **Lannon**, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 198–223.

[11] Manfred **Gailus**, *Protestantismus und Nationalsozialismus* (Köln: Böhlau, 2001), 639–644 and passim.

[12] Richard **Steigmann-Gall**, *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 115–117.

even from the conversion of tens of thousands of former Catholics. Yet by 1937, if not before, it was clear that Hitler was no longer interested in working with the church, and in the years 1937–39 record numbers left.[13]

In the context of democracy, however, some of the same hopes influenced many church leaders in the aftermath of World War II, when hopes for the 're-Christianisation' of Western societies were high.[14] The examples of Nazi Germany and then – as World War turned to Cold War – of the Soviet Union, offered striking examples of the dangers of secularism. Thus in England and Wales the 1944 Education Act first made Religious Education a compulsory school subject and required schools to begin the day with an 'act of worship', while also increasing state funding for (and control of) church schools. Archbishop William Temple, who worked closely with the Education Minister, R. A. Butler, a committed Anglican, in the preparation of these measures, was hopeful that the schools could play a key role in what an Anglican report prepared the following year would call "The Conversion of England". According to Simon Green:

> Temple's ambition was to extend the influence of the Church of England over the whole of English society, more generally conceived. He regarded education as a vital instrument with which to do this. Yet he understood well enough that the kind of religious education he believed in – "education that is … itself religious" – made sense only if every child received its blessings. Accordingly for him the task lay partially in preventing "a wholesale transfer of Church schools to the state"; no less, in extending for the first time and to real effect distinct Christian principles to the organisation and ethos of state schools.[15]

Temple died prematurely in 1944. Butler lived much longer, and went on to hold many leading government offices. According to Green, however, it was only in the early 1970s that he came to recognise that the project of Christianising the nation through the schools had failed.[16]

[13] See statistics for each *Landeskirche* in Lucian **Hölscher**, *Datenatlas zur religiösen Geographie im protestantischen Deutschland*, 4 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001).

[14] Martin **Greschat**, *Die evangelische Christenheit und die deutsche Geschichte nach 1945* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2002), 310–314.

[15] S. J. D. **Green**, *The Passing of Protestant England: Secularisation and Social Change, c. 1920–1960* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 230.

[16] *Ibid*., 240.

At the local level, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the church often maintained close links with landlords and employers. In the early nineteenth century the French aristocracy were "returning to the church"[17] (a generation or two ahead of the grande bourgeoisie), and both in France and in many other countries pious aristocrats were working hand in hand with the parish clergy (often men whom they themselves had appointed) to provide 'fatherly' support for and control over the tenants and labourers on their estates. Often the close relationships with rural landowners were not so much a strategy as something that was taken for granted. According to Obelkevich in his study of Lincolnshire in the English midlands, "In their economic and social teachings the [Anglican] clergy encouraged paternalism in the rich and acceptance and resignation in the poor. It was the duty of the rich to be charitable to the poor and to give generously to the clergy the means with which to build churches and schools."[18] Meanwhile in the cities there were many "Christian employers", who combined "paternalist" welfare schemes with the encouraging, or even requiring, of religious practice by their workers. Herrlinger gives examples from St Petersburg and other Russian industrial centres in around 1900. More pious employers would provide a factory church: priests were officially part of the administrative staff; they conducted services weekly, or even daily; taught the workers' children in the factory school, and so on.[19]

These strategies of Christianisation from above have often had a polarising effect, however, alienating many from the church. The French church that had worked so closely with Napoleon III met its nemesis in the Paris Commune, when Archbishop Darboy, a strong supporter of the emperor, was among twenty-four priests executed by the Communards. Similarly, surveys in Berlin in the early twentieth century found many examples of migrants to the city from the rural eastern provinces, famous for their

[17] McLeod, *Religion and the People*, 14–15.

[18] James **Obelkevich**, *Religion and Rural Society: South Lindsey, 1825–1875* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 175; see also Robert **Lee**, *Rural Society and the Anglican Clergy, 1815–1914* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006), 197–198.

[19] Page **Herrlinger**, *Working Souls: Russian Orthodoxy and Factory Labour in St Petersburg, 1881–1917* (Bloomington, Indiana: Slavica, 2007), 81–82; see also Colin **Heywood**, "The Catholic Church and the Business Community in Nineteenth Century France" – *Religion, Society and Politics in France since 1789*. Eds. Frank Tallett and Nicholas Atkin (London: Hambledon Press, 1991), 78–81.

pious landowners, who had effectively been forced to go to church in the countryside, and who had used the freedom offered by the metropolis to break away.[20] This strategy tied the church too closely to a particular political and social order, rendering it highly vulnerable when that order fell.

Strategy 2: a Christian sub-culture

This involves building a tight-knit sub-culture within which church members will be partly protected from hostile forces. If Strategy 1 is a programme for aggressive counter-attack, Strategy 2 is primarily defensive.

This strategy is usually associated with sectarian forms of Christianity, which were all too conscious of being small minorities with the task of surviving and defending the true faith in a hostile environment. In the later nineteenth century, however, the above strategy was frequently adopted by Catholics, and sometimes by Protestants. It was most often a response to the perceived hostility of governments and powerful elites, but it could also be used in defence against popular social movements. In this period the erection of a "Catholic ghetto" was the predominant response of the Catholic Church to the hegemony of Liberal ideology and attacks by Liberal governments and Liberal social elites. The classic example was the Prussian *Kulturkampf*, which peaked in the 1870s. In the period from about 1870 to 1960, however, aspects of a Catholic "ghetto" or, to use a more neutral term, a "Catholic milieu", were to be seen in many European countries as well as the United States and Australia, though this method of Catholic defence reached its fullest development in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands.[21]

In his account of "The Path of Swiss Catholics to the Ghetto", Urs Altermatt shows how many a Catholic "was born in a Catholic hospital, went to Catholic schools (from kindergarten to university), read Catholic periodicals and newspapers, later voted for candidates of the Catholic Party and took part as a member in numerous Catholic societies," also being "insured against accident and illness with a Catholic benefit organisation,

[20] McLeod, *Piety and Poverty*, 16.

[21] Hugh **McLeod**, "Building the 'Catholic Ghetto': Catholic Organisations, 1870–1914" – *Voluntary Religion*. Ed. Diana Wood (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 411–444.

and placing his money in a Catholic savings bank".[22] The German Centre Party was the great prototype for separate Catholic political organisation, and Germany was also long the leader in religiously-based trade unions – though uniquely (and contrary to the wishes of some German bishops) they were "Christian", and thus non-confessional; in practice, most members were Catholics. The *Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland* (1891) provided an umbrella organisation for the growing numbers of Catholic associations. The initiative for these ventures came variously from bishops, parish priests, members of religious orders and Catholic laymen – there was no concerted plan, but rather a widespread recognition that in a society where most positions of power in politics, the economy and academic life were held by Protestants, many of whom were fervently anti-Catholic, and where the labour movement was dominated by anti-clerical and sometimes anti-religious Social Democrats, Catholics needed their own organisation that would fight for their interests and enable Catholic to spend their free hours in a Catholic environment. This strategy reached its extreme form in the housing associations that flourished in the Netherlands and Germany in the early twentieth century, enabling Catholics, Protestants and Social Democrats to live in an ideologically pure environment, where all of their neighbours attended the same church or voted for the same party.[23] It should be stressed here that 'ghettoisation' was not a uniquely Catholic phenomenon – though it was among Catholics that this process went furthest and was most widespread: it was also widely practised by Socialists and sometimes by Protestants when, as in the Netherlands, Calvinists too felt oppressed by the Liberal hegemony.[24]

The strength of this strategy lay in the powerful sense of shared identity and loyalty which flourished in the 'ghetto'. This was often reinforced by the high levels of endogamy that assisted in the socialisation of the younger generation. The high levels of Catholic practice from the later nineteenth century to the 1960s in such countries as Germany and the

[22] Urs **Altermatt**, *Der Weg der Schweizer Katholiken ins Ghetto* (Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1972), 21.

[23] Manuela du **Bois Reymond** and Agnes E.M. **Jonker**, "The City's Public Space and Urban Childhood" – *Working Class and Popular Culture*. Eds. Lex Heerma van Voss and Frits van Holthoon (Amsterdam: IISG, 1988), 50; McLeod, *Piety and Poverty*, 13–15.

[24] McLeod, *Religion and the People*, 17–18, 36.

Netherlands attest to the effectiveness of this strategy. For example, 64% of Dutch Catholics were estimated to attend mass on an average Sunday in 1966. A series of surveys in the 1950s had shown that 95% of Dutch Catholics belonging to organisations for women, young people or farmers belonged to specifically Catholic organisations; 90% of Catholic primary school children attended a Catholic school; 84% of Catholic voters chose the Catholic People's Party at the 1959 election; 79% of newspaper-reading Catholics subscribed to a Catholic daily newspaper; and 61% of Catholics belonging to a sports club were members of the Catholic federation. Moreover, 91% of Catholics marrying in 1957 chose a Catholic partner; and a study of friendship networks showed that 85% of practising Catholics included fellow Catholics among their closest friends – a majority had no non-Catholics on their list.[25] Meanwhile, in Germany in 1960, in spite of some decline during and after the Nazi years, 56% of Catholics were Easter Communicants and 48% regular church-goers.[26]

Since the 1990s, the Internet has emerged as a new and increasingly important means of preserving and extending a community of fellow believers within what is perceived as a hostile environment. Moreover, this community need have no geographical limits. Brown and Lynch, noting that many British Christians see themselves as living in "a newly dominant and hostile secular culture", and use websites, often originating in the United States, and video or audio downloads to sustain their separate identity. This is especially important for those with relatively specialised interests such as Christian heavy metal. Of course the Internet has proved an important resource for various different minorities. Nash discusses its importance for American atheists, especially those living in rural areas. As one correspondent told him: "I am now much more open regarding my atheism. Two things brought me out of my apathy: (1) The arrogant conservative-Christian atmosphere in the US, and (2) The presence of activist atheists on the Internet."[27]

[25] J. A. **Coleman**, *The Evolution of Dutch Catholicism, 1958–74* (University of California Press, 1978), 69–71, 75–77.

[26] Antonius **Liedhegener**, "Säkularisierung als Entkirchlichung" – *Umstrittene Säkularisierung*. Eds. Karl Gabriel, Christel Gärtner and Detlef Pollack (Berlin University Press, 2012), 508.

[27] Callum **Brown** and Gordon **Lynch**, "Cultural Perspectives" – *Religion and Change in Modern Britain*. Eds. Linda Woodhead and Rebecca Catto (London: Routledge, 2012),

Nevertheless, this strategy does nothing to spread the influence of the church beyond the 'ghetto'. For many people too, the 'ghetto' came to appear claustrophobic, as a result of which there was a considerable amount of suppressed anti-clerical feeling. Moreover, the rationale for constructing a self-contained sub-culture depended on fears of a hostile outside world. By the 1950s and 1960s these fears no longer seemed so plausible, as, for example, the Dutch Labour party sought to reach out to Christian voters, and in their Bad Godesberg Programme (1959) the German Social Democrats presented Christianity (as well as Marxism) as a key source of inspiration for Socialist ideas. Furthermore, Pope John XXIII, motivated especially by the fear of a possible nuclear war, emphasised the need for Catholics to join with non-Catholics and non-Christians in the field of peace and social justice. More generally, in societies that were increasingly affluent and also coming to place an overriding emphasis on the importance of individual freedom, the 1960s saw a progressive weakening of collective identities of all kinds – what Peter van Dam has called a move from 'heavy society' to 'light society'.[28] During the 1960s the Dutch Catholic 'pillar' that had been so sturdy only a few years before, would begin to collapse.

Strategy 3: embracing the Zeitgeist

This strategy involves identifying Christianity partly or even wholly with the forces of progress. Strategies 1 and 2 proceeded from the assumption that the ideologies and movements that were driving secularisation were bad and essentially anti-Christian. Strategy 3 proceeded from the assumption that there were at least some important elements of truth in the new ideas or movements, and that it was self-defeating for Christians simply to condemn them. Christians were thus partly to blame for the

342–343; David **Nash**, "Religious Sensibilities in the Age of the Internet: Freethought Culture and the Historical Context of Communication Culture" – *Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media*. Eds. Stewart M. Hoover and Lynn Schofield Clark (Columbia University Press, 2002), 281. See also Heidi **Campbell**, *When Religion meets New Media* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

[28] Hugh **McLeod**, *The Religious Crisis of the 1960s* (Oxford University Press, 2007), 73–79; Peter van **Dam**, *Religion und Zivilgesellschaft: Christliche Traditionen in der niederländischen und deutschen Arbweiterbewegung (1945–1980)* (Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 297–308.

problems they faced in contemporary society.

In 1848, for example, the English Christian Socialists were among the first of many Christian social reformers who complained that the church had not responded adequately to the "Social Question" or "The Condition of England", as they might have termed it, and that criticisms by social radicals, in this case Chartists and Owenite Socialists, were at least partly justified. Similarly, the French and Belgian Liberal Catholics who gathered in Malines in 1863 excoriated the political conservatism of their church and called on Catholics to adopt a Liberal political programme including freedom of the press and "a free church in a free state". Especially in Germany, but also in other countries such as England and the Netherlands, there were many Protestants in the second half of the nineteenth century who argued that Christian theology must evolve in the light of new knowledge. In England a significant turning-point came with the publication in 1860 of *Essays and Reviews*, by a group of "Broad Church" Anglican clergymen, and the failure of the prosecution of two of their number for heresy. Another member of the group, Frederick Temple (admittedly the author of a less controversial contribution) would be appointed to the episcopate in 1869, and he went on to become Archbishop of Canterbury. Meanwhile Dissenters, although relatively conservative in their theology, were often fervently committed to Liberal political goals. Edward Baines, Congregationalist, newspaper editor and Liberal Member of Parliament for Leeds from 1834 to 1841, was typical: in the words of his son and biographer he was "self-harnessed to the car of progress".[29]

The heyday of this strategy may have come in the 1960s. Liberal theologians like John Robinson or Harvey Cox proceeded from the premise that "modern man" had "come of age" and that Christianity had to modernise if it was to make any sense in the contemporary world. Robinson called for a "New Reformation" and a famous newspaper article in which he outlined his ideas was headlined "Our Image of God Must Go". In his best-selling *Honest to God* he made three main points. First, he wanted to update Christian language and imagery to make it more relevant to a scientific age. Second, he was very impressed by Dietrich Bonhoeffer's *Letters and Papers from Prison* and the concept of a "religionless Christianity". Robinson feared that instead of entering into every area of life, including

[29] Clyde **Binfield**, *So down to prayers* (London: Dent, 1977), 54.

those deemed "secular", Christianity had been separated off into a compartment labelled "religion", which had little relationship with the rest. Third, he advocated a "new morality" based on love and applied creatively to the needs of an actual situation, instead of being based on a legalistic moral code. He was fond of quoting St Augustine's injunction to "love, and then do as you will". At the same time, Christian student movements in particular were strongly attracted to the political radicalism of the later 1960s. For example, the French Catholic *Mission étudiante* defined itself in 1970 as an "association of believers and of communities of believers, situating itself within the revolutionary current". In the later 1960s and early 1970s the World Student Christian Federation was bitterly divided between radicals who saw themselves as part of a "global revolutionary movement" and moderates who believed that Christians must "join the struggle against economic injustice, neo-colonialism, racism, authoritarian systems and militarism", but insisted that this should be done through democratic socialist politics rather than armed insurrection.[30]

The differences between strategies 2 and 3 were often illustrated in different Catholic and Protestant responses to Communist totalitarianism. The Catholic Church tended to prioritise defence of the institution whose continuing ability to provide Catholic teaching and administer the sacraments was, according to Catholic theology, necessary for the salvation of the faithful. Protestants were readier to enter into dialogue with the regime, arguing that Christians had a responsibility to society and could not detach themselves from the existing social and political order. The most famous example was the "the Church in Socialism", the slogan adopted by the Protestant Church in East Germany as a means of safeguarding the church's position, while also providing a base from which to criticise the policies of the Communist government.[31]

This strategy can be quite effective in the short term. For example, nineteenth-century Britain was less secularised than France or Germany, partly because of the appeal of the free churches to many middle-class Liberals and working-class labour activists, and of Broad Church Anglicanism to many of the well-educated. This approach does, however, hold the danger that Christians may become so completely identified with the

[30] McLeod, *1960s*, 83–92, 148, 156–157.

[31] Mary **Fulbrook**, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 87–125.

Zeitgeist that they have nothing to say specifically as Christians, or that their Christianity may become subordinated to their political or intellectual concerns. Of course many progressive Christians would say that this does not matter: Christianity is to be lived and practised in "the world", and this is more important than defence of the institution. The results of such thinking were illustrated in the late 1960s, when conservatives came increasingly to dominate the Christian student movement, as the liberals and radicals were so preoccupied with politics and with their political differences that they tended to become detached from the wider church.[32]

Strategy 4: evangelisation from below

This strategy focuses less on ideological enemies and more on the impact of social change in rendering obsolete the church's established methods and machinery, and on the consequent need to find new ways of bringing the Christian message to the people. Unlike Strategy 1, this is evangelism from "below" rather than from "above". Unlike Strategy 2 it is aggressive rather than defensive. Unlike Strategy 3 it seeks to modernise not the *content* of Christianity, but the *methods* by which it is propagated.

Early Methodism was a classic example of this approach. The Methodist movement arose in eighteenth-century England as a response to the apparent fact that significant sections of the population, especially those living in industrial and mining communities, had little contact with the existing churches. The Methodists addressed this problem in a variety of ways. Open-air preaching was used to reach people who had seldom entered a church (or maybe were attending church, but one whose theology the Methodists regarded as inadequate or even heretical). The new evangelical commitment of those converted through such preaching was confirmed through small and intense "class meetings" at which members could talk about their religious experience, discuss difficult biblical passages and confess their sins. Newly-written hymns made church services more attractive, and were also used to highlight key doctrines. The use of preachers from the working class made the gospel more accessible to the uneducated mass of the people, and ordinary people (including women)

[32] McLeod, *1960s*, 211–212.

were able to assume positions of responsibility within the Methodist community. For several generations Methodist chapels became a key element in many English communities, especially in those parts of the industrial north and midlands where the Church of England was relatively weak.[33]

Similar ideas played a role in the resurgence of American evangelicalism in the 1970s and 1980s. In order to propagate their blend of conservative theology and conservative politics, Evangelicals sought new ways of reaching their audience (for example television and films), new styles of preaching, with preachers using popular language and sometimes dressing informally, with modern music and an enthusiastic embrace of aspects of popular culture, especially rock music and sport.[34]

American Evangelicals showed impressive growth in the 1970s and 1980s, when other churches in the United States and most churches in Europe were losing members. They also became a force in politics. In focusing on methods of propagating Christianity, however, evangelists from below may be especially vulnerable to social changes which render these methods less relevant. For example, the Methodists were very effective in gathering support in isolated communities, but as these communities became less isolated, Methodism found itself in competition with a range of other organisations – including the Church of England. In their efforts to popularise Christianity, movements such as Methodism may also be vulnerable to the social mobility of their members. Methodist values of literacy and hard work led the children and grandchildren of the early converts into white-collar jobs, and in the course of time Methodism lost a lot of its original working-class base and became much like other mainly middle-class churches.[35] Furthermore, in using particular taboos as hallmarks of genuine Christianity, these movements may be vulnerable to changing moral values. For example, the Methodist taboo on alcohol was quite attractive in the nineteenth century, but gradually came to be seen as "puritanical" in the twentieth. In the United States, it seems that the Evangelicals may now have passed their peak, partly because of

[33] David **Hempton**, *Methodism: Empire of the Spirit* (Yale University Press, 2005).

[34] Erling **Jorstad**, *Popular Religion in America: The Evangelical Voice* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press 1993).

[35] Clive **Field**, "The Social Structure of English Methodism, Eighteenth-Twentieth Centuries" – *British Journal of Sociology*, 28 (1977), 199–225.

over-identification with the 'Religious Right' and their politics, but also because of specific moral stances, notably their emphatic anti-gay stance at a time when increasing numbers of Americans are seeing a variety of sexual orientations as legitimate.[36]

CONCLUSION

Strategy 1 was understandable in the context of the nineteenth century, but became increasingly less viable with the shift towards a more democratic society – and it is liable to brutal retribution when a regime changes. The other approaches have a degree of continuing relevance. Strategy 2 offered an effective line of defence in the very difficult circumstances created by the totalitarian regimes that played such a large part in the history of the twentieth century, and in the light of which survival was a major concern. In more open societies, however, a combination of strategies 3 and 4 is likely to be more effective – selectively adopting some aspects of contemporary culture, while rejecting others, and continually adapting the methods of preaching Christianity to the needs of a changing society.

Since the eighteenth century, Europe and North America have seen sweeping social changes that often presented the churches with major challenges. For example, the rapid urbanisation that took place in the nineteenth century opened up many new possibilities, which were sometimes very damaging to the church. Their consequences were not, however, inevitable or uniform. Comparative studies have shown that a variety of factors, ranging from the conscious response of church leaders or other activists to the differing political context, could lead to remarkably different outcomes in different places.[37] The same period has seen an intense religious contest not only between rival versions of Christianity or between Christianity and other world-views, but between religion and secularism. The threat of secularisation, whether at the level of individuals or of social institutions, has always been present. Christians have not

[36] Robert **Putnam** and David **Campbell**, *American Grace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 120–132.

[37] For example see the essays in Hugh McLeod (ed.), *European Religion in the Age of Great Cities* (London: Routledge, 1995), especially Carl **Strikwerda**, "A Resurgent Religion", 61–88.

been passive victims, but have responded actively to the challenges this situation presents.

None of the strategies outline above has been completely successful. The simple explanation would be that there has been an inexorable process of secularisation, and that all attempts to stem the tide are doomed to failure.[38] When we look at the history of the past three hundred years, however, the picture is arguably much more complex. Rather than there being an ongoing process of secularisation, one can distinguish considerable differences between countries, as well as periods of religious revival and decline. During the last forty years the trend has indeed been towards greater secularisation. However, two of the greatest sins an historian can commit are either to interpret the past merely in terms of what it has contributed to the present or to extrapolate from the present a future which will be just like the present, but more so. Many of the strategies for resisting secularisation enjoyed success at least for a time, and in doing so shaped the lives of large numbers of people. As I have suggested, all of these contained inherent limitations. There is no strategy either for promoting or resisting secularisation that is free of all disadvantages. Moreover, one of the salient features of modern European and American societies has been a considerable degree of ideological pluralism. In a democratic society with freedom of religion, people will make a variety of religious and non-religious choices. Just as Christians have had to come to terms with secularity, political parties like the German Social Democrats and the Italian Communists, whose roots were militantly secular, found themselves having to come to terms with the continuing relevance of religion. Even Fascist and Communist states found that their power to coerce their people into a universal ideological conformity was limited. Most recently we have seen a remarkable example in a different region of the world, namely the revival both of Christianity and of other religions, such as Buddhism and Daoism, in China after the end of Mao's Cultural Revolution.

[38] For a lucid exposition of this argument, see Steve **Bruce**, *Secularization* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

ECUMENICAL PEACE ORGANISATION "THE WORLD ALLIANCE FOR PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIP THROUGH THE CHURCHES" AND RESISTANCE TO TOTALITARIAN REGIMES IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD[1]

Priit Rohtmets

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to describe and analyse the activities of one of the ecumenical organisations that emerged in the beginning of the 20th century and established the basis for the ecumenical movement as we know it today. More specifically, our intention is to focus on the resistance of the ecumenical movement to totalitarian regimes between the First and the Second World War, and particularly on the peace organisation "The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches" (The World Alliance).

Resistance can be armed, unarmed, spiritual, active or passive. In order to conduct further analysis, one must define resistance in a specific context, i.e. how narrowly or broadly the term should be understood. In the case of the ecumenical movement, a broad definition can be adopted. According to the broad concept defined by Hans Adolf Jacobsen, resistance comprises all that was done despite the terror and persecution of a totalitarian regime for the sake of humanity an in aid of the persecuted.[2]

[1] The research on which this article is based was supported by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, targeted financing project SF0180026s11 and the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence CECT).

[2] Hans Adolf **Jacobsen**, *Germans against Hitler. July 20, 1944* (Wiesbaden: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1969), 11–13.

The concept of resistance has most commonly been analysed in connection with National Socialist Germany. Ian Kershaw has stated that even over 50 years after the Second World War and despite much scholarly work, historians are still unable to define 'resistance'. There is even a lack of consensus regarding whether a precise definition should be sought.[3] Based on a broad definition, less dramatic types of activity against a regime have also been valued as forms of resistance. Martin Broszat has claimed that these forms of resistance, which were "often neglected in the traditional histories of resistance (*Widerstand*), were in fact types of subversion more capable of undermining the totalitarian dictatorship than efforts at fundamental opposition."[4]

In describing the resistance organised by the World Alliance, a three-level program can be constructed: on the broadest level it was resistance to totalitarian regimes based on ideological confrontation. The World Alliance offered totalitarian regimes an alternative and opposing ideology of Christian internationalism and peace. In describing that alternative ideology, one must assess the question of active and passive resistance and its response, i.e. how did the Alliance confront totalitarian regimes and how successful was the organisation in carrying its message to countries ruled by totalitarian regimes. The second level embodies the spiritual resistance that demanded basic human and religious rights in countries ruled by totalitarian regimes. At the third level, resistance among the representatives of the World Alliance living in countries ruled by totalitarian regimes should be analysed in greater detail.

At all three levels, the World Alliance and its members resisted the ideologies of totalitarian regimes and the persecution of minorities, believers, etc. The fact that the resistance was organised by an international organisation on an international level is an exceptional aspect of the resistance organised by the World Alliance. At the first two levels, the resistance included resistance from both outside and inside countries ruled by totalitarian regimes, while at the third level it was resistance that was based on an ideology of the Alliance but came from representatives inside countries

[3] Ian **Kershaw**, *The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2000), 183.

[4] Martyn **Housden**, *Resistance and Conformity in the Third Reich*. Routledge Sources in History. (London: Routledge, 1997), 162.

ruled by totalitarian regimes. The main focus of this article is on two of the most influential regimes of the 20th century – National Socialism in Germany and Communism in the Soviet Union. In Germany all three levels of resistance can be perceived, whereas in the case of Communist Russia resistance at the first two levels can be observed and described.

THE STRUCTURE, WORKING METHODS, AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE WORLD ALLIANCE

One must first briefly examine the structure and main objectives of the World Alliance in order to understand the organisation's possibilities and means of organising its activities against the regimes that shaped the history of the 20th century. Secondly, the ideology of the World Alliance as the basis for resistance should be analysed.

The World Alliance was established in 1914 as a successor to an Anglo-German organisation founded after mutual visits by British and German church leaders in 1908 and 1909 to promote friendly relations between the two nations.[5] The aim of the World Alliance was not only to develop friendly relations between churches and denominations in different countries – this was of course a precondition – but to promote peace in their respective societies with the help of the churches, i.e. *through* the churches, as declared in the official name of the World Alliance, which was first and foremost a peace organisation established to promote peace. In the context of the first decades of the 20th century this meant the desire to overcome the national interests and prejudices of different nations. The Alliance valued nations and national culture, but opposed nationalism. Nations were regarded as historical phases of collective consciousness, and although nations of course possessed rights and were in principle not criticised, the loyalty of a citizen to his national community should not be placed above the individual's moral welfare. The organisation promoted Christian values and ethics, recognising the freedom of individuals as well as international and Christian society. This principle has been called

[5] Keith **Clements**, "The Anglo-German Churches' Exchange Visits of 1908–1909. A Notable Anniversary" – *Ecumenical Review*, 2/3/59 (2007), 257–283.

"ecumenical internationalism".[6] The organisation was less concerned with the theological interpretation of the church as peacemaker.

As an instrument for the promotion of peace and friendship, The World Alliance was interested in general problems involving global political order. Among ecumenical organisations, it was certainly the most political and politically orientated organisation. There was an understanding among the representatives of the Alliance that the organisation was the spiritual equivalent and soul of the League of Nations. As Lord Willoughby Dickinson, General Secretary (later President and Honorary Secretary) and one of the leaders of the World Alliance, stated in 1920, the League of Nations was based on the principles of international Christian fellowship whose recognition the World Alliance was formed to encourage.[7] The League of Nations was seen as a valuable piece of machinery for the peaceful resolution of international disputes. As the Alliance stated, however, popular will was needed to help the machinery to function peacefully. Only a spirit of Christian friendship could ensure its ultimate success.[8]

The World Alliance focused on political issues, which promised to become problematic and might therefore have influenced the international political balance. Most of these problems were connected with the outcomes of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles. At the forefront lay the question of disarmament. As a representative of Christian and humanistic values and principles, the Alliance emphasised the defence of national minorities and refugees, opposition to religious persecution and the struggle for religious freedom.[9] In its criticism of totalitarian regimes, the World Alliance focused on the violation of human rights. Hence, although the Alliance itself was quite political and possessed political ambitions, it mainly engaged in one form of unified resistance,

[6] Daniel **Gorman**, "Ecumenical Internationalism: Willoughby Dickinson, the League of Nations and the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches" – *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1/45 (2010), 51–52.

[7] *The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Handbook of the World Alliance 1920* (London: The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches, 1920), 12–13.

[8] *The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Annual Report and Handbook 1932* (Geneva: Central International Office, 1932), 15.

[9] Darill **Hudson**, *The Ecumenical Movement in World Affairs. The Church as an International Pressure Group* (Washington D.C: The National Press Inc, 1969), 67–69.

namely the resistance to state manipulation of religious affairs in particular and human rights in general. In discussing political matters, the World Alliance usually expressed its support for the League of Nations.

According to historian John S. Conway, the methods of the World Alliance were generally similar to those of nineteenth-century campaigns for such causes as the abolition of slavery. The aim was to influence public opinion on key issues to the extent that governments could no longer ignore the voice of the people. To gain such support, debates were initiated in which declarations, petitions and appeals were passed. One cornerstone of the Alliance was the organising of events promoting peace, such as Peace Sundays. In addition to these events, material on peace work was printed. Another working method included the establishing of relations between representatives of churches and politicians. As the representatives of the Alliance were often leading clergymen, these relations were established in practice. Several leading members of the Alliance were themselves politicians. Over the years, work with young people, seen as the future leaders of public opinion, gained more and more attention.[10] Financially the Alliance was supported by the Church Peace Union, established after the initiators of the Alliance met industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, who donated two million dollars to promote peace through cooperation between all Christian churches.[11]

The most significant positive outcome of the Alliance's activity, which is also its most oft-mentioned episode, is related to the strained relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The conflict between the two countries was resolved with the help of the Alliance, after two Orthodox Church leaders, Archbishop Stefan of Sofia and Bishop Irenei of Novi Sad, had exchanged visits, and government leaders and heads of state – King Alexander of Yugoslavia and King Boris of Bulgaria, soon followed.[12]

The ideological basis, especially the lack of theological discussion, was criticised by some members of the World Alliance. A statement by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, an active representative of the Alliance's youth work,

[10] *The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Annual Report and Handbook 1931* (London: Central International Office, 1931), 13.

[11] Hudson, *The Ecumenical Movement in World Affairs*, 31.

[12] Ruth **Rouse** and Stephen Charles **Neill** (eds.), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement. Volume I. 1517–1948* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2004), 562.

is worth mentioning here. In 1932, after presenting a paper in Czechoslovakia and trying to outline the Alliance's theological underpinnings, he criticised the absence of theology in the ecumenical movement, and argued that without it the "movement risked being at the whim of political trends".[13]

The criticism presented by Bonhoeffer was accurate and justified. For ten years after the First World War the methods of the Alliance seemed to work, but firstly due to the financial crisis beginning from 1929 and the increasingly tense international political situation, namely the World Disarmament Conference from 1932 to 1933, at which no agreement was reached between the leading military forces, the Alliance began to lose its clarity of vision and enthusiasm for its activities. The same kind of confusion was characteristic of the League of Nations. Although by the end of the 1930s the World Alliance had in practice lost its significance, it was only dissolved in 1948, after the Second World War.

The first head of the Alliance was Randall Davidson, the Archbishop of Canterbury, at that time Lord Dickinson, followed by Bishop Valdemar Ammundsen from Denmark and William P. Merill, a Presbyterian reverend from the United States. The clergy who took part in the Alliance also played a leading role in the Life and Work movement. In 1931 Henry Louis Henriod became the general secretary of the World Alliance, simultaneously serving as the general secretary of the Universal Council for Life and Work. The two organisations had a common periodical entitled "Churches in Action".[14]

The World Alliance united seven evangelical communions and the Orthodox community, apart from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), although some exiled members of the ROC participated in the work of the Alliance. The organisation had international, management, executive and national committees. The conferences of its largest body, the international committee, took place every three years, and the management and the executive committee met at least once a year. At the beginning of the 1930s, during the peak of the Alliance, there were nearly 40

[13] Stephen **Plant**, "The Sacrament of Ethical Reality: Dietrich Bonhoeffer on Ethics for Christian Citizens" – *Studies in Christian Ethics*, 3/18 (2005), 76–77.

[14] *The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Handbook 1935* (Geneva: International Office, 1935), 9–10.

national committees, so that in practice the Alliance had the largest network of working committees of the ecumenical organisations. In 1932 the Alliance's central office was moved from London to Geneva, which at that time was the most important international centre.[15] The League of Nations reached its zenith in 1935, when it had 58 member states.[16] Especially in smaller states, for example in Eastern Europe and in the Baltic States, the committee was considered to be the most important ecumenical body in the country and usually brought together the leading churchmen. In some countries, for example Britain, the national committee was the official representative of the local member churches. The Alliance was not as popular in Germany and several other influential European states as in Eastern Europe. As the Catholic Church did not take part in its activities, the Alliance's position in Catholic countries, e.g. Spain and Italy, was considerably weaker. Some individual Catholics maintained links to the ecumenical movement that had been established before the First World War.[17]

The fact that the World Alliance distanced itself from establishing official relations with churches and implemented the policy of integrating clergy in a more private and individual manner, i.e. through national committees, proved to be a drawback in the long run. Even though other ecumenical organisations, e.g. the Life and Work or Faith and Order movements, also faced difficulties in the 1930s, when totalitarian regimes became increasingly aggressive, the decision to unite the churches on an official level proved to be a more successful strategy to carry their message and survive during the Second World War.[18] At the same time, the World Alliance, as a promoter of relations between different denominations, made a significant contribution to the ecumenical movement. An example from Eastern Europe, namely from Estonia, can be offered here. As the Free Churches (Methodists, Baptists etc.) became active in Estonia

[15] *The World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches. Handbook 1938* (Geneva: International Office, 1938), 9, 29.

[16] *Essential Facts about the League of Nations.* Eighth Edition (Geneva: Information Section, 1937), 35–36.

[17] Gorman, "Ecumenical Internationalism", 57.

[18] Julian **Jenkins**, "A Forgotten Challenge to German Nationalism: The World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches" – *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 2/37 (1991), 287.

at the end of 19th century, there was a considerable tension between the majority Lutheran Church and the Free Churches. The influence and the experience of cooperation in the World Alliance proved to be one of the reasons for the progress in the cooperation between religious communities and their leaders. In the 1930s an amendment was made to invite a representative of the Free Churches to the Estonian national committee of the World Alliance.[19]

The working methods and objectives of the World Alliance naturally applied to its attitude and policy towards two of the most dangerous totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. As mentioned above, the focus of the Alliance was on demanding basic human rights and rights for believers and religious minorities. The Alliance represented and advocated an ideology that was in opposition with national socialist or communist ideologies.

In addition to international conferences, the Alliance organised regular regional conferences to discuss each area's minority problems and issues of religious freedom in the hope that rational men would agree. The Alliance's delegates usually did; their statesmen, however, did not. The Alliance's activities in connection with totalitarian regimes did not only include resolutions in defence of human rights and peace, but many practical questions were also raised, e.g. the training of clergy to satisfy the future need in countries ruled by totalitarian regimes, and the issue of refugees and the financial support that was extended to them.

The circumstances involved with the organising of work connected with the Soviet Union and Germany differed. Firstly, although the Alliance was not extremely popular in Germany, and even during the 1920s it had to fight to be recognised by the country's churches, the German national committee was nevertheless one of the founders of the World Alliance. No national committee was established in Russia. Secondly, although in both countries the ruling system tried its best to force the churches under its control, the amount of force used differed – in Germany the attitude was not as hostile as in Soviet Russia. The attitude towards international movements and the Alliance's ideology was, however, common to both

[19] Priit **Rohtmets** and Veiko **Vihuri**, "The Ecumenical Relations of the Lutheran Church" – *History of Estonian Ecumenism* (Tartu, Tallinn: Tartu Ülikool, Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu, 2009), 53.

regimes. International organisations were regarded as a means to protect and promote regimes' political, cultural and national interests at the international level. It is significant that neither of the two regimes considered it important enough to protect and promote their views in the Alliance. After 1933 the Alliance continued to exist in Germany, but its activities were curtailed and to some extent even overlooked.[20] The Soviet Union at the time distanced itself from almost any kind of international ecumenical cooperation between churches. This policy only changed after the Second World War.

Although the following conclusion is not entirely accurate and inclusive, it is nevertheless fair to say that the political and social ambitions of the ecumenical movement during the inter-war period were shaped by the pragmatic and sometimes even cruel reality of international politics, which mostly rested upon national interests. Therefore one might safely conclude that the initiative of the ecumenical movement was meant to fail. This is, however, a retrospective view of the World Alliance and the ecumenical movement. A contextual analysis gives a more diverse and fluid picture of the Alliance, and the political environment in the inter-war period. It is fair to say that although idealists by nature, the representatives of the Alliance had a realistic understanding of the problems the world faced and the limits to their own actions. Together with the League of Nations, the Alliance was established to prevent war and develop an ideology based on mutual understanding between different nations. After failing to do so, the two organisations were dissolved after the Second World War and soon forgotten. At the same time, it should be remembered that the contacts established in the 1920s and 1930s formed the basis for cooperation after the Second World War. In this way the Alliance contributed to the establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948. Considering the message the ecumenical movement promoted after the Second World War and post-war ecumenical relations, e.g. between international ecumenical organisations and the Soviet Union, the ideology of the World Alliance and its resistance to totalitarian regimes between the two world wars should be thoroughly analysed and assessed.

[20] Jenkins, "A Forgotten Challenge to German Nationalism", 296.

THE WORLD ALLIANCE AND RESISTANCE TO SOVIET RUSSIA AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY

The inclusion of Russia in the World Alliance was already topical in 1914, when a representative of the Alliance, a Quaker by the name of Benjamin Battin, visited Russia in order to spread the idea of the Alliance.[21] After the Bolshevik revolution and the end of the First World War, several other attempts were made. The question arose after the Orthodox delegation, consisting mostly of delegates from South-Eastern Europe, participated in the Alliance meeting in 1920 and decided to join. The question of establishing a committee in Russia was on the agenda of the management committee meetings in 1921, where it was decided to trust Russia's neighbours, i.e. the Estonian and Latvian delegates, and a representative of the Swedish Lutheran Church, to find a way of making contact with the Russians.[22] At the beginning of the 1920s the Alliance sincerely hoped that it would be possible to promote the Alliance's ideals in Russia through unofficial channels. This would have led to the establishment of a national committee in Soviet Russia. In reality, this would have enabled the committee to take a stand against human rights violations. In August 1921 Swedish Archbishop Nathan Söderblom wrote to Willoughby Dickinson and claimed that the Minister for Cults in Ukraine had promised him permission to establish a national committee in Ukraine. A representative was even appointed to take part in the Alliance's meeting in 1922.[23]

By 1922 contacts had been established between the representatives of the Alliance and Russian clerics. Eduard Tennmann, the secretary of the Estonian national committee, wrote to Archbishop Conrad Freifeldt, a senior Baltic German reverend responsible for Lutheran congregations in Soviet Russia, who like most Lutheran clerics working in Russia had

[21] Harjam **Dam**, *Der Weltbund für Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen 1914–1948. Eine ökumenische Friedensorganisation* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2001), 83.

[22] WCCA (World Council of Churches Archives), 212.001, World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Minutes, documents, reports and correspondence. Minutes of various committees: August 2, 1914–April 16, 1923. Minutes of the Management Committee, April 14–15, 1921; September 14–15, 1921.

[23] UUB NSB (Uppsala Universitetsbibliothek. Nathan Söderbloms brevsamling), Söderblom to Dickinson, 6.8.1921.

studied at the University of Tartu (Dorpat), where Eduard Tennmann now worked as an assistant professor of comparative religion. According to Tennmann, Freifeldt had welcomed the ecumenical initiative and in principle expressed his readiness to work with the World Alliance. In a letter to Knut Bernhard Westman, Archbishop Söderblom's secretary for international affairs, Tennmann remained cautious when describing the possibilities for cooperation with religious communities in Russia. He declared that in practice it was highly unlikely that the Russian delegation would participate in the next international conference of the World Alliance. Based on the description presented by Freifeldt, the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church was also considered improbable.[24] Soviet authorities gradually began to set ever more rigid restraints on religious communities. In 1922 the churches were forced to hand over all of the precious items possessed by their congregations. Patriarch Tikhon of the Russian Orthodox Church, who strongly opposed the authorities' actions, was forced to settle in Donskoy Monastery, and died there in 1925. The lack of priests in Protestant churches left congregations in a state of uncertainty. The situation became even worse when the campaign to close down congregations began at the end of 1920. Many priests and their families were arrested in that period.[25]

The situation in Russia led to the decision made in 1924 by the management committee of the World Alliance to postpone the establishment of a national committee to facilitate the work of the Alliance in Russia.[26] In practice, the establishment of a national committee as a platform for resistance proved to be impossible, and the idea was abandoned. This did not, however, mean that contacts ceased to exist between the members of the Alliance and Russian clergy, but it did mean that resistance to Communist rule was inevitably forced beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. The plan to establish a committee in Ukraine also failed. The desire to establish a national committee in Soviet Russia as well as in Ukraine was

[24] UUB NSB, Tennmann to Westman, 15.3.1922.

[25] Mihhail **Škarovskij**, "Vähetuntud fakte Eesti luterlike koguduste ajaloost Nõukogude Venemaal 1917–1945" – *Usuteaduslik Ajakiri*, 1/50 (2002), 75.

[26] WCCA, 212.002. World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Minutes, documents, reports and correspondence. Minutes of various committees: April 16, 1923–April 29, 1930. Minutes of the Management Committee, April 2–4, 1924.

replaced by resolutions that were presented at regular intervals over the following years by different Alliance committees. The Alliance usually expressed its deepest sympathy with those who suffered in the Soviet Union. Most importantly, these messages were spread by all of the Alliance's national committees to influence public opinion in their resident countries in demanding religious freedom in the Soviet Union.

In addition to drafting resolutions, the World Alliance focused on practical issues. For example in 1927 it initiated a campaign and applied for financial help from the Central Bureau for European Relief and the Rockefeller Institute, in order to offer 12 students (9 Lutheran, 3 Reformed) scholarships to be trained for the Protestant Churches in Russia. The plan specified that the training should take place in countries neighbouring Russia, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These young men were to become priests in the Baltic countries, but would later have to be prepared to begin their service in the Soviet Union.[27] In 1922 the congress of Estonian Lutherans in Soviet Russia discussed the possibility of training clergy in either Estonia or Finland. The plan was unrealistic, because in practice it was impossible for clergy to successfully apply for a permit to leave the country.[28] In 1928 the conference of the international committee of the World Alliance held in Prague decided to include the training of Orthodox students as well.[29] The latter became a priority – the Alliance initiated a campaign to support the Russian Orthodox Institute in Paris. The Alliance also began to support exiled Russians.[30] The plan to train protestant ministers was later dropped. To promote the ideas of the Alliance among Russians, in 1929 the Alliance decided to publish its Handbook in Russian.[31]

Although the question of demanding religious freedom in Soviet Russia was on the agenda of nearly every meeting of the World Alliance in the 1920s, the campaign intensified considerably in the early 1930s, when

[27] WCCA, 212.002, Minutes of the Management Committee, July 29, 1927.

[28] Škarovskij, "Vähetuntud fakte Eesti luterlike koguduste ajaloost Nõukogude Venemaal 1917–1945", 66.

[29] *Minutes of the International Committee held at Prague, Czechoslovakia August 25, 28 & 30, 1928* (London: The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches, 1928), 36.

[30] WCCA, 212.002, Minutes of the Management Committee, September, 19–21, 1929.

[31] *Ibid*.

the Soviet Union was in the process of being accepted as a full permanent member of the League of Nations. The Alliance, together with the Life and Work movement, sent a resolution to the League requesting that "it be made clear to the Soviet Union that League membership involved an undertaking of freedom of conscience and worship".[32] The Alliance also requested firmer action from its national committees to influence public opinion in countries all over the world. In 1931 it was proposed that radio be used for spreading the principles of the World Alliance amongst the peoples of the Soviet Union.[33] The resolutions of the ecumenical movement were acknowledged, and several delegates at the League who were opposed to the Soviet Union being accepted as a permanent member mentioned the problem in their speeches. Despite the criticism and the resolutions, however, not a single official statement was made, and in September 1934 the Soviet Union was accepted as a permanent member of the League.[34] The demand for religious freedom in Russia clearly was not an important criterion for the League of Nations in deciding whether or not to admit Russia as a member of the League.

This proved to be the moment of truth for the Alliance in the organising of its activities. At the management committee's 1935 meeting it was decided that, in addition to declarations about the violation of religious freedom, a different kind of action was needed. Based on international experience, the Alliance proposed establishing a delegation and organising a visit to the Soviet Union to meet and negotiate with the Soviet authorities, to observe the situation in the USSR and to demand religious freedom to spread its message of peace. Archbishop Söderblom had already presented the same proposal to Henry Atkinson, the General Secretary of the Church Peace Union, in March 1930.[35] Söderblom died the following year, and the visit he had proposed never took place.

[32] WCCA, 212.004. World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Minutes, documents, reports and correspondence. Minutes of various committees: January 10, 1934–September 4, 1937. Minutes of the Management Committee, August 24–29, 1934.

[33] WCCA, 212.003, World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Minutes, documents, reports and correspondence. Minutes of various committees: August 22, 1930–November 3, 1933. Minutes of the Management Committee, September 4–5, 1931.

[34] Hudson, *The Ecumenical Movement in World Affairs*, 143.

[35] UUB NSB, Söderblom to Atkinson, 19.3.1930.

In 1935 the situation in Russia was thoroughly discussed at the Alliance's Baltic regional conference, with delegates from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Sweden. The central office of the Alliance was represented by its international secretary, Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze. In addition to the suggestions to demand freedom of conscience and human rights through diplomatic channels, and the description of the strategy of organising a public campaign against human rights violations, the delegates proposed a visit to the Soviet Union.[36]

In 1936 more thorough discussions concerning the visit took place at meetings of the World Alliance. Some members of the Alliance praised the idea, while more pragmatic members expressed their doubts. They claimed that the Soviet authorities would not welcome the delegation, and even if the group of clergy and Christian politicians had been welcomed, the only winners would have been the Soviet authorities themselves. The committee was aware that they would have been taken to carefully selected places, and the same applied to clergy they would have met. It was even feared that the visit might cause trouble for churches in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the committee decided to go ahead with the preparations for the visit.[37] The priority was to establish some sort of contact with the Soviet authorities, and with the international public eye focused on the Soviet Union, to take a stand against its human rights violations.

Bishop Ammundsen had been suggested the idea of addressing Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet foreign secretary, on this issue during the latter's visit to Denmark. Litvinov refused to negotiate with Ammundsen or other representatives of the Alliance. The same response was given by the ambassadors in London and Paris. As the Russian authorities had no desire to accept the delegation, no visit took place, and the question was removed from the agenda in 1938.[38] At the end of the 1930s the Alliance once again turned to its main activity and suggested the Soviet authorities

[36] EELKKA, (Eesti Evangeelse Luterliku Kiriku Konsistooriumi arhiiv), Maailma Liit Rahvusvahelise sõpruse edendamiseks kirikute kaudu 1921–1936. Die Baltische Regionalkonferenz, I. Die kirchliche Lage in Russland.

[37] WCCA, 212.004. World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Minutes, documents, reports and correspondence. Minutes of various committees: January 10, 1934–September 4, 1937. Minutes of the Management Committee, August 1936.

[38] Dam, *Der Weltbund für Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen 1914–1948*, 311.

and the international community be addressed through national councils regarding the human rights violations being perpetrated in the Soviet Union. In 1938 a declaration was passed by the Alliance calling upon the national councils to influence the public and governments to publicly condemn rights violations in the Soviet Union.[39]

In 1933 the question of forming a delegation and organising a visit was also raised in connection with Germany. The leading representatives of the World Alliance had coincidentally gathered for a meeting in Berlin, at the time Adolf Hitler was appointed the new Chancellor by President Paul von Hindenburg on 30 January 1933. Three days earlier Henry Louis Henriod, the secretary of the Alliance, had given a lecture at the University of Berlin, in which he referred to National Socialism not only as a new form of nationalism but also as a religion. Although the statement by Henriod was farsighted and left very little doubt regarding the character the new rule would take, the meeting decided to wait for further steps by the new government.[40]

The work of the Alliance in Germany had already faced some difficulties and opposition during the Weimar Republic period. The German National Council only received support from the German churches in matters that offered a prospect of furthering the German national cause, e.g. war guilt, the revision of the treaty of Versailles, etc. In addition to the lack of support from churches, there was a struggle for power inside the German national committee. In 1929 Friedrich Spiecker, and Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze, leaders of the German Council, were removed from the group's leadership.[41] Siegmund-Schultze had been one of the Alliance's founders, leaders and ideologists. The struggle was for power as much as for ideology and principles. In 1931 theologians Paul Althaus and Emanuel Hirsch publicly attacked the World Alliance and the Life and Work movement and accused other nations of imposing unfair restrictions on Germany.[42]

[39] WCCA, 212.010. World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Minutes, documents, reports and correspondence. Conference: 1938. – 1. Larvik (International Council), August 23–29, 1938. For the Russian Christians.

[40] Dam, *Der Weltbund für Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen 1914–1948,* 272.

[41] Jenkins, "A Forgotten Challenge to German Nationalism", 296.

[42] Wolfram **Weisse**, *Praktisches Christentum und Reich Gottes. Die ökumenische Bewegung Life and Work 1919–1937* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 477.

In May 1933 the Alliance's management committee discussed a request from the Dutch national council concerning anti-Semitism in Germany, and decided to contact the German national committee regarding the matter, but made no decision concerning the situation in Germany.[43] The question of whether to send a delegation to Germany or to present a statement demanding religious freedom and human rights as well as opposing the implementation of the Aryan Paragraph was on the agenda of all of the meetings of the Alliance that took place in 1933. In September Bishop Ammundsen reported conversations with German colleagues and, describing a recent speech made by Hitler on the topic of higher and lower races, stated that he considered the situation in Germany to be very serious.[44] In November, during a joint meeting with the representatives of the Universal Council of Life and Work, George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, gave an overview of his actions, namely a letter addressed to Bishop Ludwig Müller of the German Evangelical Church, an ally of the new regime. After a discussion, it was agreed not to send a formal delegation to Germany until definite and new elements arose from the existing situation.[45] It seemed as if the Alliance was waiting for some sort of conformation that religious and human rights had in fact been violated.

The situation in Germany was complex. One can be critical of the Alliance's ability to act, when it was still possible to make a difference with resolutions. The Alliance, however, decided to stay humble in its actions, applied a wait-and-see policy, and declared that it would not interfere in church-state relations in Germany. No resolution was passed concerning the implementation of the Aryan paragraph either. The same kind of passive attitude was characteristic of the German national committee of the World Alliance. This shaped the policy of the World Alliance in addition to the behaviour of the Evangelical Church in Germany.

In spring 1933, after visiting Germany, Henry Louis Henriod claimed that the work of the Alliance was not considered friendly and necessary by the new regime. That was probably the reason why the Alliance did not implement a strategy to actively oppose the new order, but instead

[43] WCCA, 212.003, Minutes of the Management Committee, May 8–9 1933.

[44] WCCA, 212.003. Minutes of the Officers' meeting, September 5–6 1933.

[45] WCCA, 212.003. Minutes of the First Meeting of the "consultative group" of the World Alliance and Life and Work, November 3, 1933.

focused on supporting the preservation of the Alliance's national committee in Germany, emphasising the need to stay in contact with the committee.[46] The committee survived and continued its work, but Siegmund-Schultze, the former head of the German committee, who had been publicly critical about the new German regime, was already forced by the Gestapo to emigrate from Germany in 1933.[47] At the same time, it must be mentioned that even Siegmund-Schultze and Adolf Deissmann, both senior ecumenical figures, had recommended that the Bishop of Chichester remain quiet about the Church's internal matters in Germany. Bell, a close friend of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, had held conversations with Bonhoeffer after he moved to London in October 1933. Bell was said to have been made aware of Germany's prospects under National Socialist rule.[48] At the same time, it has been mentioned that the clergy, in opposition to the National Socialist regime, had already informed Bishop Ammundsen in September 1933 that it would be regarded as a calamity if the relations between the Alliance and the German Evangelical Church, i.e. that ruled by the German Christian Movement, were to be severed.[49]

With the rise of the German Confessional Church (*Die Bekennende Kirche*) uniting the opposition to the German Christian Movement (*Die Deutsche Christen*) in the Lutheran Church, as well as National Socialist rule in Germany, the World Alliance would in theory have gained a supporter to its cause, but in practice relations between the two remained distant. The representatives of the Confessional Church, e.g. Karl Koch, Martin Niemöller and Karl Barth, had previously had almost no relations with the ecumenical movement, because they did not value the latter highly.[50]

As the World Alliance and the Confessional Church shared the same attitude towards National Socialist rule, Dietrich Bonhoeffer raised the question of inviting the representatives of the Confessional Church to the Alliance meeting in 1934. After negotiating with Niemöller and Koch,

[46] WCCA, 212.004. Minutes of the Executive Committee, January 25–26 1934.

[47] Jens **Wietschorke**, "Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze – ein biographisch-bibliographischer Abriss" – *Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze (1885–1969). Ein Leben für Kirche, Wissenschaft und soziale Arbeit,* Ed. Jens Wietschorke (Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2007), 148.

[48] Dam, *Der Weltbund für Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen 1914–1948*, 276–277, 293–294.

[49] WCCA, 212.003, Minutes of the Officers' Meeting, September 5, 1933.

[50] *Dam, Der Weltbund für Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen 1914–1948,* 295.

who had agreed to participate in the Alliance's August 1934 conference if they received an official invitation from the Alliance, he addressed the Alliance's General Secretary. Louis Henriod unfortunately took the position of not recognizing the Confessional Church, and claimed that there was still only one official church in Germany, which is why the representatives of the Confessional Church were not invited to the conference. Bonhoeffer himself was present and gave a passionate speech at the youth commission meeting. Theodor Haeckel, a representative of the ecumenical and foreign affairs department of the German Evangelical Church, was also present but refused to take part in the discussion of church matters in Germany, which was on the conference's agenda. Eventually the Alliance passed a resolution affirming the demand for freedom, and although in reality the Alliance supported the Confessional Church, the conference distanced itself from passing a political statement concerning the National Socialist order or its support for the Confessional Church.[51]

As a result of these statements, the management and executive committees of the Alliance in reality placed themselves in almost the same position as opposing the communist regime in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in Germany the national committee of the Alliance continued its work. In a report presented in July 1937 at the meeting of the management committee of the Alliance, a representative of the German committee claimed that regardless of the hindrances to freedom of speech, intensive work had been done in connection with the conference in Oxford entitled "Church, Community and State". Even the German media had published articles on international ecumenical work.[52] The German committee held its meetings regularly, i.e. once a month. In 1938 a representative of the committee, describing the work of the national committee, emphasised the theological efforts that at the time were characteristic of the Alliance and the ecumenical movement in general. The report suggested that the work of the Alliance not only needed courage and enthusiasm, but also personal experience and contacts. In this respect the death of several leading members of the German committee, e.g. Adolf Deismann and Prof Wilhelm Lütgert, had hampered the work of the Alliance in the late 1930s. To intensify the work of the German national committee, the members of

[51] *Ibid.*, 296.

[52] WCCA, 212.004. Minutes of the Management Committee, July 31–August 2, 1937.

the committee suggested organising a regional conference, and in order to consolidate the relations between the central board and the national committee, it was suggested that visits of the leading representatives of the Alliance should be organised. That meant that relations between the Alliance and the national committee in Germany which were not as close as they had been before the 1930s, needed to be revived. The national committee was essentially working on his own. Some leading members of the Alliance had nonetheless managed to visit Germany. For example, W. H. Drummond, a member of the Executive Committee, visited Germany in 1937 and met with Dr Adolf Deismann just shortly before his death.[53] Siegmund Schultze, the international secretary of the Alliance, had also visited Germany, but had been forced to cut his visit short after a couple of days.[54]

In connection with Germany, from 1934 the central office and bodies of the Alliance mostly dealt with the issue of organising schools for non-Aryan children from Germany and organising financial support for German refugees. The Alliance managed to organise fundraising among the national committees.[55] The relations between the Confessional Church and the Alliance remained distant in subsequent years. Relations with the German Lutheran Church were non-existent.[56]

The fact that the national committee in Germany carried on with its work and even at some level managed to publicly promote the ideology of the Alliance and bring its message to society was as important as the influence National Socialism in Germany had on the Alliance and the ecumenical movement at large. It is fair to say that during the last years of the 1930s the totalitarian regimes and the international political situation began to influence the Alliance more than the latter could affect society, including resistance to totalitarian regimes. The confrontation with totalitarian regimes required a different set of methods, which neither the Alliance nor the League of Nations possessed. The international situation

[53] *Handbook of the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches 1935–1938* (Geneva: International Office, 1938), 85.

[54] *Ibid*., 95, 127–128.

[55] WCCA, 212.004, Minutes of the Executive Committee, August 12–17, 1935; Minutes of a Consultative Group meeting of the World Alliance, February 16, 1937; Dam, *Der Weltbund für Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen 1914–1948*, 399.

[56] Dam, *Der Weltbund für Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen 1914–1948,* 302–303.

had a profound effect on the Alliance's identity. The Alliance's power to oppose totalitarian regimes and organise its work to promote the ideals and principles the Alliance represented was in fact paralysed. More specifically, the downfall of the German national council has been regarded as the precursor of the collapse of the World Alliance as a whole.[57]

The central question raised in the late 1930s concerned the relationship between the church, the people and the state. The churches increasingly identified themselves as churches. This development naturally raised the question of whether the churches were themselves the best promoters of peace. One clear sign of change was the fact that even the national committees, e.g. in Scandinavia and United Kingdom in the 1930s, had established closer relationships with the Churches. Although the Alliance began to place increasing emphasis on the theological meaning of peace in the late 1930s and adjusted its activities in order to match those of the society, it did not establish formal relations with churches.

In 1938, looking back on its 24 years of work, the Alliance declared that it should secure the closest possible cooperation with the World Council of Churches, facilitate exchange visits of individuals and groups from different national councils, and promote youth cooperation. In a report presented in 1938, Henry Louis Henriod mentioned that faith and courage would be required in order to achieve understanding and peace. According to Henriod, the activities of the most important part of the Alliance – the national committees – had been brought to a standstill. Only a few councils mention communicating with their governments. There were also financial problems that had an impact on the publication of printed material.[58]

The leading position in the ecumenical movement was seized by the Life and Work movement, which together with the Faith and Order movement, announced in 1938 a plan to establish a World Council of Churches. In its member states, the Alliance slowly lost its position and the ability to fulfil its objectives. Although after the Second World War the message of the Alliance was once again promoted, the Alliance itself

[57] Jenkins, "A Forgotten Challenge to German Nationalism", 296.

[58] WCCA, 212.010. World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Minutes, documents, reports and correspondence. Conference: 1938. – 1. Larvik (International Council), August 23–29, 1938. The World Alliance and its Task.

was overshadowed by the World Council of Churches, and was therefore dissolved in 1948, the same year the Council of Churches was officially established.[59]

CONCLUSION

The World Alliance for Promoting Friendship through the Churches was established with the aim of promoting peace among nations. The Alliance's ideological basis was the recognition of basic human rights and the acknowledgement of freedom of conscience and religion. The Alliance declared that Christianity made it possible to overcome hatred between different nations and guaranteed individual freedoms.

The ideology of the Alliance and its implementation were in opposition to the ideologies of the totalitarian regimes that existed in the period between the two world wars. Every step taken in demanding human rights and condemning the violation of those rights in countries ruled by totalitarian regimes was manifested as an act of resistance to those regimes. The Alliance's ideology lacked theological foundation and was therefore considerably weakened by totalitarian regimes.

Although the Alliance was an international ecumenical organisation, its success and achievements depended on work done at the national level. Nearly 40 national committees enabled the Alliance to promote its global activities. At the same time, the ideology was reinterpreted and discussed at international conferences and brought back to national committees.

Through personal contacts between the Russian clergy and the Alliance's representatives in countries neighbouring the Soviet Union, the Alliance sought to establish a national committee for Soviet Russia and Ukraine. These attempts coincided with international petitions and by national committees' calls for respect for the right of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. All attempts to establish a committee in the Soviet Union failed, and the Alliance was forced to organise its work related with the Communist regime at an international level outside the Soviet Union. The Alliance initiated campaigns and resolutions that were passed on to national committees to influence the public and politicians in member

[59] Dam, *Der Weltbund für Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen 1914–1948*, 397–398.

countries and to take a stand against the violation of human rights in the Soviet Union. To promote its ideology, counter Communist ideology and influence the policies of the Soviet Union, in the 1930s the Alliance attempted to organise a visit to Russia. It was thought that the international intervention of the leading clergy would have a positive effect. As with the establishment of the national committee, the attempt to organise a visit failed.

The German national committee of the Alliance was one of the founders of the Alliance. The committee had, however, already faced some opposition and criticism in the 1920s. The activities of the Alliance were interpreted by several German theologians as part of international politics. It was regarded as hostile to German national interests, which had suffered because of the First World War.

After 1933 the German committee continued its work, although some leading members of the committee left Germany. In the following years the work of the committee was hindered by the limitations on freedom of speech and action, as well as by the death of several members of the committee. Because of the situation in Germany, the relations between the national committee and the central bodies of the Alliance were weakened. Nevertheless, with limited resources the national committee managed to promote its ideology. Like the churches, the Alliance in Germany focused more on theological issues.

At the same time, National Socialism had a major effect on the efficiency of the Alliance's work, the aim of which was to influence the public to the extent that governments could not ignore the voice of the people. The Alliance's working methods required goodwill between nations and churches, as well as a more or less democratic society. Developments in Germany after 1933 paralysed the Alliance. It tightened its relationship with the nascent World Council of Churches, but decided to remain independent. Like the League of Nations, the Alliance did not possess the ability and methods to successfully counter the ideology, policy and national interests advanced by totalitarian regimes.

THE ATTITUDE OF BELIEVERS TO THE CONFESSIONAL POLICY OF THE SOVIET REGIME IN LITHUANIA IN THE PERIOD 1944–1953

Regina Laukaitytė

In the summer of 1944 Lithuania became one of the republics of the Soviet Union in which radical political and social reforms were to be carried out. These reforms gradually began to change the activities of all the churches existing in the country. The latest Lithuanian historiography has comprehensively revealed the scope of the persecution of Lithuania's churches in the Stalin era – a lot is known about the methods by which the Soviet regime carried out its anti–church policies.[1] In analyzing this apparently exhausted problem, however, one is justified in asking whether the faithful did not oppose such policies from the outset, and did not defend their repressed clergy, but instead passively observed the closing of churches? In historiography the opposition of the faithful to the Soviet regime in the USSR is usually associated with the activities of the bishops and clergy. In Lithuania such resistance did not generally begun until the 1960s and 1970s, when underground organizations appeared and "The Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania" began to be issued.[2] Believers did,

[1] Vardys Vytautas **Stanley**, *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania* (Columbia University Press, 1978), 62–79; Regina **Laukaitytė**, "Attempts to Sovietize the Catholic Church in Lithuania, 1944–49" – *Lithuanian Historical Studies*, 3 (1998), 110–135; Kazys **Misius**, "Bažnyčių uždarinėjimas Lietuvoje pokario metais" – *LKMA Metraštis*, 12 (1998), 75–101; Arūnas **Streikus**, *Sovietų valdžios antibažnytinė politika Lietuvoje (1944–1990)* (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų genocide ir rezistencijos centras, 2002), 88–154; *Krikščionybės Lietuvoje istorija* (Vilnius: LKMA, 2006), 462–475; Darius **Petkūnas**, *The Repression of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Lithuania during the Stalin Era* (Klaipėdos universiteto leidykla, 2011), etc.

[2] Михаил **Шкаровский**, *Русская Православная Церковь при Сталине и Хрущеве* (Москва: Издательство Крутицкого подворья, 2005), 217–261; Pranas **Dauknys**, *The Resistance of the Catholic Church in Lithuania against Religious Persecution* (Rome, 1984), 48–54; **Streikus**, "The Resistance of the Church to the Soviet Regime from

however, try various methods to circumvent the constraints on religious life, and to resist the policies of the regime in the Stalin era (1944–1953). In reality, they did not have many alternatives.

In this paper we would like to discuss more specifically and in greater detail two episodes concerning the attitude of believers to the actions of the Soviet authorities: 1) parishioners' efforts to use legal methods – demands and requests – to put pressure on government institutions, and in this way to defend the repressed clergy and to prevent churches from being closed, and 2) the "moving" of the faithful to the underground, efforts to maintain the traditions of religious life, ignoring the discriminatory Soviet laws and the demands of the local authorities. In the first case the authorities completely ignored the protests, and the believers failed to halt the wave of repressions against the priests. However, in the second case the officials of the Soviet regime had to retreat and reopen a majority of the churches that they had put on the list of churches marked for closure in 1948 and 1949.

The research is based on the sources contained in the Lithuanian archives – the correspondence of government officials, the complaints and requests sent to the offices of the Soviet authorities (to Moscow and Vilnius, to the Council for Religious Cults at the LSSR Council of Ministers (CRC); this institution appeared in Vilnius in September 1944), as well as on an analysis of the existing data in criminal cases involving members of the clergy. Thus the analysis sought to embrace the characteristic occurrences that reflected the "voice of the people" and the regime's view of those occurrences. The object of the research is the people, the moods of believers, and their expressions.

* * *

In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania is a mono-ethnic Catholic state. In fact, Lithuania was the only Catholic region in the Soviet Union. At the beginning, the middle, and the end of the 20th century, an absolute majority of the inhabitants – more than 80% – were Catholic Lithuanians. This situation encouraged the Soviet regime to pay particular attention to the Catholic Church in Lithuania. Due to its universality, its subordination to the Vatican and the latter's clear hostility to the atheistic Bol-

1944 to 1967" – *The Anti–Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States* (Vilnius: Pasauliui apie mus, 2006), 84–112.

shevik regime, the Catholic Church was completely distrusted by the Soviet authorities. The most painful and fateful blows against the Catholic Church in Lithuania were struck in the years 1948–1949. Having dealt with disloyal Ordinaries and priests in this brief period, and having completed the registration of the country's churches, clergy and parishes and the nationalization of church property, having liquidated all religious orders, leaving only one state-controlled seminary, etc., the structure of the Catholic Church in Lithuania changed radically, and the autonomy of the Ordinaries' functions was undermined.[3]

The churches of Lithuania's religious minorities also encountered the regime's persecution. The Soviet authorities sought to centralize the management of the churches and religious communities functioning in the USSR, in order to simplify their administration and control by establishing councils representing them, and centres[4] (even for those faiths that had traditionally never had such a church organization). In Lithuania this principle was only partially observed, because the authorities concentrated only on the larger religious communities. The tactic of ignoring the smaller denominations was maintained, with the expectation that their scanty members disperses, after which the community itself would rapidly disappear. There were very few religious minorities in Lithuania: during the 1923 census 30 religions were identified in the country, but only seven of them had more than 1,000 followers (Catholics 85.7%, Jews 7.65%, Lutherans 3.28%, Old Believers 1.59%, Orthodox 1.13%, Protestants 0.53% and Muslims 0.05% of the total population). All of the other religious communities combined had only 998 members.[5] The quantitative proportion of minorities changed little over two decades, except for the Jewish community, which was eliminated during the German occupation.

Only the Orthodox Church in Lithuania consolidated its structure in the post–war period (in contrast to the total weakening of all of the

[3] Laukaitytė, "Attempts…", 134–135.

[4] Михаил **Одинцов**, Совет по делам религиозных культов при СНК СССК в 1944–1945 гг.: обязанности и сфера компетенции, организационная структура и основные направления деятельности. http://www.rusoir.ru/president/works/186 January 18, 2013.

[5] *Lietuvos gyventojai. Pirmojo 1923 m. rugsėjo 17 d. visuotino gyventojų surašymo duomenys* (Kaunas: Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, [1924]), XL.

other creeds). Just as in the Ukraine, in 1944–1948 the Council of the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Council of Ministers of the USSR demanded that the Lithuanian Orthodox bishop begin a campaign against Catholicism, to criticize its dogmas, discredit its doctrine, etc. In order to strengthen the prestige and structure of the Church (there were only 44 Orthodox parish churches and 48 priests), a theological seminary was founded, the Orthodox churches damaged in the war were rebuilt and repaired, the relics of saints were returned from Moscow for adoration by believers, two Orthodox monasteries were permitted in Vilnius, while Catholic monasteries were closed throughout the country, accompanied by continuous discrimination against the scattered monks and nuns. However, Soviet support for Orthodox communities was not welcomed by the local authorities in the Lithuanian SSR, who in many cases opposed the privileges granted to the Orthodox diocese. By the autumn of 1948 the local authorities had succeeded in convincing the Soviet central government not to base its struggle against Catholicism on the potential of the Orthodox Church.[6]

Thus the Catholic Church was the main target of the Soviet regime's confessional policies in Lithuania, and not just because of the regime's fanatical atheism. Lithuanian Catholics then considered and today still consider Catholicism to be one of the most important components of their national consciousness. From the times of the national revival in the nineteenth century in tsarist Russia, successive generations of Lithuanians realized that their small nation could only survive by opposing the influences of foreign cultures and religions.[7] One of the most prominent events in Lithuania's history is connected with the resistance of Catholics to the restriction of the freedom of their church activities, as symbolised by the events in Krazhiai (a small city in the depths of Lithuania) at the end of the 19th century, when the people did not allow tsarist government officials to close one of the churches in their town. For several months the people stood watch in the church, not allowing the ostensory containing the Blessed Sacrament to be removed and resisting the Cossacks who had

[6] **Laukaitytė**, "The Orthodox Church in Lithuania during the Soviet Period" – *Lithuanian Historical Studies*, 7(2002), 92–93.

[7] Tomas **Remeikis**, *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania,1945–1980* (Chicago: Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980), 16.

been dispatched to restrain them. The events in Krazhiai were followed by the public trial that found broad resonance in Lithuania and throughout the world. It became entrenched in popular memory as the terrible "Krazhiai Massacre", which raised national consciousness and developed a sense of national solidarity and self-determination.[8]

After 1944, however, when the losses of Lithuania's Catholic Church were significantly greater (it lost not only many churches and chapels, but also cathedrals, seminaries, and all of its monasteries) there was no "second Krazhiai". What had changed over the intervening 50 years? Was it the consciousness of the people or the country in which the crude policy of discrimination against believers was repeated? What defensive measures were the people able to take in the middle of the twentieth century?

* * *

It must be emphasised that in the Stalin era neither the various ranks of the clergy nor believers were passive observers of the destruction of religious life. In the years 1944–1947, when the registration of churches and priests had not yet been completed, and almost all of the Catholic bishops and heads of other churches had been arrested, the clergy persistently defended its rights. Bishops and the clergy of various confessions wrote complaints to government institutions in which they protested against the banning of religious publications, the teaching of religion and group catechising in churches, and also drew attention to the impropriety of the large church taxes; parish pastors and monasteries protested the confiscation of church buildings and land, and bishops reacted to the more frequent arrests of members of the clergy. In 1948 the situation changed greatly – both the new people in the leadership of the churches and the clergy, although still at liberty, lived in an atmosphere of observation and terrorization. However, after the lessening of the dissatisfaction expressed by the clergy, believers began to defend their rights more actively – there was most likely not a single church whose parishioners did not protest against the discriminatory activities of the government directly affecting them in the years 1948–1953.

[8] *Kražių skerdynės.* Ed. Leonas Mulevičius (Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidykla, 1993), 151; Abas **Stražas**, "Lithuania 1863–1893: Tsarist Russification and the Beginnings of the Modern Lithuanian National Movement" – *Lituanus*, 42/3 (Fall 1996). http://www.lituanus.org/1996/96_3_03.htm January 18, 2013.

In the Stalin era in Lithuania, hundreds of members of the clergy were arrested (in 1944–1953, 365 were convicted).[9] In 1946–1947 four of the five bishops remaining in Lithuania suffered repression. In 1944–1946 the main scheme for the repression of Lithuania's Catholic clergy, which was essentially maintained later, became clear – they were charged with relations with the partisan underground or anti–Soviet propaganda. When evidence for this was insufficient, they were charged with anti–Soviet activities that had allegedly been committed in still independent Lithuania (more active political and social activity from 1918–1940, especially work in youth organizations, would serve as proof), anti–Soviet agitation and "collaboration" in the years of the German occupation.

In the first post–war years, people could have had an influence on the fate of arrested priests if their criminal cases came to trial – usually at the military tribunal of the Lithuanian SSR NKVD/MVD. At least two defence strategies became clear at the trials. First of all, the distinctive circumstances of the investigation were made public at the trial – the accused priests and witnesses often renounced their testimony, declaring that the interrogators had obtained it by force or deceit. On the other hand, the priests being tried and their lawyers would undertake an effective defence, demanding that the witnesses they called be heard, and these witnesses "neutralized" those chosen by the interrogators (there was an effort to declare them to be biased and politically unreliable), collected certificates about how those being tried rescued Jews during the years of the German occupation, interceded for former Soviet activists, etc.

For example, the court returned the case of Reverend Vladas Pozhela three times for additional investigation. During the German occupation he had served as the chaplain of Shiauliai prison, and former political prisoners testified and wrote statements to various institutions about how V. Pozhela had helped the prisoners and had collected food products for them, etc.[10] Even though the court failed to prove his guilt, V. Pozhela

[9] Vytautas **Tininis**, *Sovietinė Lietuva ir jos veikėjai* (Vilnius: Enciklopedija, 1994), 72.

[10] December 20, 1946 interrogation transcript of V. Pozhela; statements signed by 16 and three persons to the Lithuanian MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs] tribunal (in the latter, in which persons were testifying against V. Pozhela – thieves and recidivists are discredited; the May 30, 1947 statement signed by 7 persons to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Council Justas Paleckis; statement of Petras Zhivoltas to the Lithuanian SSR MIA prosecutor (for this statement he was fired from his job at the editorial staff of the "Tiesa" newspaper), Lithuanian Special

was sentenced to 25 years in a labour camp by the Special Council of the USSR NKVD/MGB "for betraying the homeland". In 1946, after arresting Bronius Matusevichius, the pastor of Dotnuva, the chairman of the Kedainiai district security service received at least three statements in which people affirmed that they had escaped repression by the Germans due to this priest. As many as 93 persons signed one of the statements.[11] Probably the most signatures on a statement sent to the Lithuanian SSR Interior Affairs and Security Ministers, however, were collected by the inhabitants of Betygala – 296 of them testified that their arrested 75 year old pastor Pranas Janulaitis was "a good man who never fought against the Soviet authorities and never became involved in political matters, but only carried out his direct duties as a servant of the faith".[12]

In the defence strategy used by the Russian Orthodox and Old Believers, a noticeable role was played by the testimonies of former Soviet partisans regarding the fact that during visits to the clergy they would receive food and moral support or at least not be betrayed, even though the clergy knew a lot about them.[13]

However, politicized trials did their work. After looking over the multitude of criminal cases involving members of the clergy, there were only a few in which the arrested person was released, whereas all of the others (even those cleared by the above-mentioned trial) failed to regain their freedom. Their cases would increasingly often be sent to Moscow – to the Special Council of the USSR NKVD/MGB, which issued uniform

Archive (Lietuvos ypatingasis archyvas, LYA), fund K 1 (Lithuanian SSR division of KGB), inventory 58, file P 14208, l. 187–188, 209–210, 211, 1–37, 1–38 et al.

[11] Statements to head of Kedainiai district security service: on November 22, 1946 Bronislovas and Edvardas Daugela, on November 23, 1946 Feliksas Mikutavichius, statement of citizens of the Dotnuva district, *Ibid*., file 9324/3, l. 152–1, 152–5, 152–6.

[12] June 3, 1948 petition, *Ibid*., file 36078/3, l. 200–202.

[13] Statement signed by four former partisans about the loyalty of the Ibenai Old Believer parish clergyman Joanikij Abramov and addressed to the Soviet government, *Ibid*., file 25345/3, l. 139; June 15, 19, 21, 1950 testimonies of four former partisans in the case of Jurgelishkiai Old Believer clergyman Josif Marzuto, *Ibid*., file 17932/3, l. 64–65, 67, 70–72, 73–74; January 13, 1950 statement of former partisan Luka Kudrashov to USSR Interior Affairs Minister, Fyodor Kudrashov – LSSR Interior Affairs Minister in the case of Old Believer Epifan Rybakov, *Ibid*., file P 12100, l. 120, 122–123; November 14, 1944 statement of former partisan Aleftina Maimusova to the head of the Lithuanian SSR NKGB in the case of Orthodox priest Luka Golod, Ibid., file 4012, l. 36; April 6, 1951 testimony of Vera Reznikova in the case of Orthodox priest Aleksandr Nesterovich, *Ibid*., file P 12162, l. 70 et al.

verdicts involving various lengths of incarceration in labour camps or prisons.

In the cases of priests Antanas Rukas and Kazimieras Pukenas, the Special Council of the USSR NKVD/MGB issued a verdict after the LSSR NKVD/MVD war tribunal found them not guilty. The latter pastor of Kazokine K. Pukenas was acquitted twice! The court discussed the case of pastor of Vidishkiai A. Rukas three times; after an acquittal verdict was reached, like K. Pukenas, he was not freed, but the case was returned to the war prosecutor for additional investigation. The Special Council sentenced K. Pukenas to 10 years, and A. Rukas to 7 years in labour camps.[14]

As mentioned above, various parishes' believers defended against the closure of churches much more effectively. The great campaign of closing Lithuania's churches began during the time of their registration. According to Soviet law, clergymen of all confessions could work in their parishes only after they had received a certificate of registration from the CRC of the LSSR Council of Ministers; religious communities (parishes) could function (and their corresponding buildings could be used for cult purposes) when the local Soviet executive committee registered the so–called twenty–parishioner board with its executive and inspection committees. The executive committee of the parish had to conclude a contract with local Soviet authorities to place at its disposal the church's nationalized property, to pay taxes for its use, to perform repairs, etc. The long delayed registration of Catholic churches and "servants of cults" took place in 1948. During this period about 200 churches, i.e. almost one–third of the total, were closed or planned to be closed in the immediate future.[15]

The cessation of such a radical decrease in the number of active churches was probably the only clear victory achieved by believers in Lithuania. The resistance of the residents of smaller cities was especially determined. They showed great solidarity, collecting hundreds of signatures. It is interesting that the lowest-level Soviet officials, i.e. collective

[14] December 26, 1945, September 14, 1946 verdicts of the LSSR NKVD army war tribunal court in the case of K. Pukenas. *Ibid*., file P 5483, l. 102–103, 135–136; the verdicts of the decisions of the same court in the case of A. Rukas: March 7, June 29, September 26, 1947 verdicts, *Ibid*., file 36133/3, l. 125–128, 200–203, 244.

[15] 1952 second quarter informational report of B. Pushinis, Commissioner of the CRC to the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, Central State Archive of Lithuania (Lietuvos Centrinis Valstybės Archyvas, LCVA), fund R 181, inventory 3, file 32, l. 51–52.

farm (*kolkhoz*) chairmen and district deputies, who probably had illusions about the Soviet regime's religious policies, participated actively in protests against the closure of churches.

In 1948 twenty local district and village deputies signed a petition addressed to Lithuanian SSR Supreme Council Chairman Justas Paleckis demanding that the church in Sheshtokai not be closed, and that its outbuildings not be confiscated;[16] analogously, the leaderships of three collective farms and about 60 parishioners signed a petition demanding permission for a priest to visit the church in Upyna in the Luoke district at least once a month;[17] the chairmen of three *kolkhozes* signed a statement requesting that a priest be assigned to the church in Kontauchiai;[18] after learning about the order to the Chairman of the Alytus District Executive Committee to expel the pastor of Punia parish, three people's deputies and 122 believers opposed it;[19] the statement of the Parish Committee for the appointment of a priest to Skardupiai church was signed by the chairmen of two *kolkhozes*;[20] when the Prienai Executive Committee was transferring the pastor of Ishlauzhas, the local *kolkhoz* chairman signed a "mercy plea" addressed to the CRC Commissioner including 15 pages bearing the signatures of 1057 parishioners (the request was nonetheless disregarded and the pastor was transferred)[21] et al.

Disappointed with Lithuania's government institutions, believers often appealed to the Soviet government, addressed requests to the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and to Stalin himself. Their argumentation was essentially one and the same. Their demands most often based on the freedoms granted in the Stalin-era constitution, stressing the deep roots and importance of religious values. The believers emphasised that the churches built with their funds and hands and in which their parents and

[16] July 16, 1948 statement of the deputies to J. Paleckis, *Ibid*., inv. 1, file 26, l. 194.

[17] Statement of the "Ginteniai", "Upyna", "Kirkliai" collective farm leaderships and collective farm workers to the CRC Commissioner, *Ibid*., file 44, l. 33.

[18] June 18, 1950 statement of the "Sauletekis", "Galybe", "Naujoji vaga" collective farm chairmen to the CRC Commissioner, Ibid., l. 41.

[19] September 1, 1949 statement of the Punia neighbourhood deputies, church committee and believers to the CRC Commissioner, *Ibid*., file 33, l. 103.

[20] Skardupiai parish committee statement to the CRC Commissioner signed by the chairmen of the "Gulbinishkiai" and "Skardupiai" collective farms, *Ibid*., file 33, l. 61.

[21] June 25, 1950 "Mercy plea" to the CRC Commissioner, *Ibid*., file 44, l. 42–43.

ancestors had prayed for centuries were being encroached upon. However, their requests contained no shortage of the new Soviet rhetoric – stressing that the petitioners were conscientiously carrying out their obligations to the state, and that collective farm workers, employees or old people ("Soviet peasants", "working class Catholics", "believing workers") were seeking justice. It was argued that when travelling to distant churches on Sundays, they were unable to participate in the lectures, meetings, etc. organized by Soviet officials. The believers easily integrated the priests into their changed life (according to the faithful of one parish, on holidays the priest had to serve the religious needs of his parishioners, while on work days he can "help strengthen our young collective farms"[22]).

In many petitions the declared trust in the government sounded like a demand to accept responsibility for freedom of conscience. Nevertheless, direct dissatisfaction with the regime only rarely slipped into the texts of such petitions. It could hardly be otherwise. The anti–religious policies of the Soviet regime in 1948–1953 were carried out against the background of collectivization, the suppression of resistance by armed partisans and large scale deportations. In such a situation the declared loyalty of the faithful was essentially only an expression of preliminary self–defence and accommodation to the real conditions of life. After the war the critical situation that occurred in Krazhiai at the end of the 19th century, when the faithful not only sent delegates to the tsar, but also did not abandon the church that was to be closed, was avoided. This time life was being destroyed from its very foundations, and dealing with dissidents had become an everyday matter. There were no opportunities to attract the attention of the broader society by publicizing events in the country or abroad.

The Soviet government always tried to avoid publicity about its anti–church activities. The press was absolutely silent about the registration of churches and priests – "cult servants" in 1948, and related information regarding the scale of the closure of churches and arrests of members of the clergy. No explanation of Soviet laws on church matters or comment about their implementation was ever made public. In other words, the implementers of church policies carefully avoided "mobilizing the

[22] Statement of Skardupiai parish committee to CRC Commissioner (in 1949), *Ibid*., file 33, l. 61.

attention of the faithful to the struggle with religion".[23] Their target was to neutralize the unavoidable dissatisfaction and opposition of the believers. When conflicts arose, therefore, an effort was made to ascertain and frighten the most active, and to channel events towards fruitless correspondence with higher institutions. Positive changes could only take place in cases in which the opinions of the representatives of the Soviet central government and the government of the Lithuanian SSR differed, or a clear violation of the law had taken place.

Although the Soviet system declared that it represented the interests of the "people", government institutions were not inclined to adjust their decisions, especially ideological ones, and thus the complaints or demands of the faithful were usually not heard. In the worst cases, those who resisted Soviet anti–religious policies had to wait for reciprocal actions. The security services would seek to find out who had initiated the collection of signatures, while the local authorities tried to minimize the level of dissatisfaction. One should note that the highest institutions in the Soviet Union did not become directly involved in the details of religious policy – all of the petitions of the faithful were normally returned to the direct executors of religious policies (the Commissioner of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults) in Vilnius, who would also reply to the petitioners.

* * *

Although the conditions for church activities changed drastically during the decade of Stalin's rule, they did not initially have a great effect on the religiosity of the people, especially in smaller towns. As could be expected, the religious life that was not tolerated by the Soviet regime began to function underground, and was expressed in illegal forms. The USSR's annual religious statistics showed a declining trend in the number of persons taking part in rites, but as in other areas of Soviet public life, the official statistics had implications and did not reflect the real situation. On the contrary, the Soviet government had to look for methods to fight the continuously arising new forms of religious expression, observing the peculiar "globalization" of the problem. For example, as a result

[23] April 9, 1954 statement of B. Pushinis, Lithuanian Commissioner of the CRC, to Ivan Polianskii, Chairman of the CRC at the USSR Council of Ministers, *Ibid*., file 80, l. 48.

of the closure of Catholic churches on a massive scale in Belarus, and by not allowing the opening of Orthodox churches and other churches in the Kaliningrad region, during the major church holy days or even on ordinary days the faithful inundated the shrines on the border of Lithuania as well as those of the Catholics, Orthodox and Old Believers in Vilnius and Kaunas.[24] The believers of other religions most likely resorted to similar "migration" tactics. In Lithuania there was a widespread phenomenon in which people tried to carry out the most important religious obligations (the sacraments of confession, baptism, marriage, etc.) in places where they hoped not to be recognized.

No special sacred space was needed for many religious minority cults (religious services usually took place in ordinary halls or apartments), and the services could be conducted by persons who had no special spiritual education but had impeccable moral qualifications and had mastered religious practices, and some communities even did without them. These factors greatly increased the possibilities for the survival of the religious minorities in the USSR under the Soviet regime.

Religious minorities were eliminated from Lithuania's major cities – in 1948–1951 even previously registered churches and houses of worship were consistently closed, until there were only one or two left (except for the Old Believers, Orthodox, Lutherans and Reformed Evangelicals). The communities of religious minorities whose houses of worship the Soviet government did not register or whose networks were completely uprooted (Jews, Baptists, Adventists, Methodists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Muslims and Karaites) continued to exist underground. The faithful would gather in a conspiratorial manner in each other's homes and cemeteries, and "illegal" (i.e. unregistered) clergy also appeared.[25]

In 1948 the Lithuanian SSR registered only two Jewish communities – in Vilnius and Kaunas – but stubbornly ignored applications for the registration of communities that existed in other cities, so they acted "illegally".[26] In 1951 the Commissioner was alarmed that the Old Believers

[24] July 17, 1952 statement of Commissioner B. Pushinis to I. Polianskii, *Ibid.,* file 58, l. 91–92.

[25] Secret statement of April 7,1954 of Commissioner B. Pushinis to Antanas Sniechkus, First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, *Ibid.,* inv. 3, file 35, l. 44.

[26] 1952 IV quarter informational report of Commissioner B. Pushinis, *Ibid.*, file 32, l. 130.

were distancing themselves from the Supreme Council of the Old Believers formed by the Soviet government – they were creating new parishes with unregistered clergy.[27] Of the 56 houses of worship of the Evangelical Lutherans that had operated before the war, only 33 remained in 1951,[28] and only five of the 14 Reformed communities remained registered in 1953.[29] Only one of the six Lithuanian Muslim mosques was registered, but the faithful would gather in officially closed mosques and adjacent cemeteries and performed rites in homes.[30] After 1948 the Soviet regime successively closed down communities of Baptists (in 1948 eight communities were registered), Methodists (6) and Seventh Day Adventists (6), but they survived even though, due to their small number, they were forced to unite and operate illegally.[31] The Soviet security services had added some Protestant, Old Believers and Jewish branches to the list of extremely dangerous sects. In 1951, for instance, it was planned to move 48 Jehovah's Witness families from Lithuania to the depths of the USSR.[32] The repressions are not known to have helped the regime to deal with this religious community or with other underground church denominations.

Catholics and believers of the more numerous religious minorities had more opportunities to satisfy their religious needs, and thus the scale of their transfer to the underground was relatively smaller. Nevertheless, the efforts of the authorities to regulate religious life through permits/prohibitions forced believers to carry out many of their traditional rituals secretly, violating prohibitions. The liquidated church structures and especially persecuted activities (Catholic monasteries, religious brotherhoods,

[27] Statement of Commissioner B. Pushinis [1951] to I. Polianskii, *Ibid*., inv. 1, file 49, l. 42.

[28] Secret report of I. Polianskii "Information about religious cults in the USSR in 1951" at Bureau of Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Russian Federation State Archive (Государственный архив Российской Федерации, GARF), fund R 6991, inv. 3, file 85, l. 161.

[29] 1953 fourth quarter informational report of Commissioner B. Pushinis, LCVA, fund R 181, inv. 1, file 36, l. 102.

[30] Report of Commissioner Pushinis "List of registered mosques as of January 1, 1952", *Ibid*., file 58, l. 3.

[31] 1952 fourth quarter informational report of Commissioner B. Pushinis, *Ibid*., inv. 3, file 32, l. 131–133, etc.

[32] Михаил **Одинцов**, *"Совет Министров СССР постановляет: 'Выселить навечно!'"* (Москва, 2002). https://religiophobia.appspot.com/jw/smspvn.html January 20, 2013.

the propagation and distribution of religious literature, teaching of the catechism to children, etc.) went underground.[33] All chains (central and local) of the Soviet authorities knew that the underground church existed and fought against it. "Unmasked" individuals usually suffered, but the authorities failed to significantly weaken the underground. On the contrary – after 1953, as the regime became less severe, the trend of its growth and proliferation became clear.

CONCLUSIONS

As it began to implement anti–church policies in Lithuania, the nascent Soviet regime encountered visible opposition from Church leaders and believers. In the first post–war years the opposition initiative was led by the clergy and church leaders. They reacted to the regime's efforts to eliminate churches from public life, confiscate church property, etc. In 1948, after the registration of churches and priests that was accompanied by the terrorization of the clergy and arrests was completed, the clergy's opposition weakened, but believers began to defend their rights more actively.

The attack against the churches in 1948 and 1949 coincided with the terror against the "kulaks", partisan families and their supporters during the period of mass deportations. In such circumstances the resistance organised by believers was not only peaceful, but in a certain sense even "pro–Soviet" – they did not mount an uprising against the authorities, but declared that they were obedient citizens of the Soviet state. The anti–religious policies were opposed while not avoiding the new rhetoric about the rights guaranteed by the Stalinist constitution, i.e. the defence of church interests was not linked with criticism of the regime. The Soviet regime successfully stifled the scope of the opposition: dissatisfaction was directed at fruitless correspondence with higher institutions, and due to the information blockade all cases of dissatisfaction remained local and thus did not have any social consequences.

Confronted with the evident hostility of the government representatives and being unable to legalize their communities and houses of

[33] Streikus, *Sovietų valdžios antibažnytinė politika...,* 128; Laukaitytė, *Lietuvos vienuolijos: XX a. istorijos bruožai* (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos institutas, 1997), 152–158.

worship in accordance with Soviet laws, the believers of various denominations (especially the religious minorities) continued their religious life illegally, underground. This underground movement was established in the Stalin era, and helped churches to ensure the continuity of their activities and structure.

The inertia with which the faithful of Lithuania encountered the confessional policies of the Soviet regime and their efforts to ignore, circumvent or resist the constraints on religious life slowed the process of making society atheistic. The situation later began to change to the detriment of religion, when the generation that had matured under Soviet indoctrination grew up.

UNDERGROUND HINDU AND BUDDHIST-INSPIRED RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN SOVIET RUSSIA

Maria Petrova

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to describe the historical background of the presence in Russia of religions of Indian origin, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, and a number of spiritual / religious teachings, movements and groups that were in one way or another related to or inspired by them. This historical survey will be placed in the context of the tsarist and Soviet governments' policies towards the peoples practicing these religions and teachings (focusing mostly on the Soviet period). It should be noted that the situation with the Eastern, and particularly Indian religious movements and groups in Russia has always been ambiguous. On the one hand, they have always aroused great interest on the part of certain circles of society, including intellectual elites. At other times they often faced the resistance of the authorities and/or the mainstream religions, in particular the Orthodox Church. This resistance sometimes took the form of outright persecution.

In accordance with the governmental policies on nationalities and religions and the political interests of the state throughout Russian history, there were periods when attitudes towards religions of Indian origin were somewhat tolerant (for example the pre-revolutionary period, the first years of Soviet rule, the period of the Great Patriotic war and for some years after that, and finally Gorbachev's perestroika), and there were periods in which persecution escalated, such as Joseph Stalin's repressions of the 1930s, Nikita Khrushchev's antireligious campaign of the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the aggravation of censorship and "toughening campaigns" which took place in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s (under Yuri Andropov).

THE TSARIST PERIOD

The interaction between Indian religions and Russian society has a long history. Russia's geographical position was conducive to the establishment of contacts between Indian and Russian traders even in medieval times. Thus Afanasy Nikitin, a merchant from Tver, reached India in 1446 and spent three years there. The account of his travels was recorded in an unrevised manuscript: "*Khozhenie Za Tri Moria*" (A Journey Across Three Seas). It is a well known fact that there were Indian communities in the South of Russia from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. The largest settlement (*podvor'e)*, was concentrated around the Hindu temple in the city of Astrakhan and reached its peak under Peter the Great, who extended his patronage to the community. This policy of religious tolerance was continued in the eighteenth century by Catherine I, who ordered that the sacred book of Vaishnavism Bhagavad Gita be translated from English into Russian. In the course of the nineteenth century the publication of books and translations of ancient Sanskrit texts in Russia continued unabated. These included translations from the Vedas and great Hindu epic poems Ramayana and Mahabharata. At the beginning of the twentieth century the teaching and practice of yoga also came into fashion in Russia and Europe.

Buddhism

Of all religions of Indian origin that have come to Russia, Buddhism has grown the deepest roots. The incorporation into Russia of peoples that practiced Buddhism and the territories they inhabited played an important role in the formation of Russia's Empire in Asia. Within Russia's borders, Buddhism spread through Buryatia, Kalmykia, Tuva and the Chita and Irkutsk regions and was represented mostly by the Gelugpa school, which originated in Tibet in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Kalmyks, a western Mongolian people, were incorporated into Russia in 1655. The Buryats, a northern Mongolian people, were incorporated into the Russian Empire at the end of the seventeenth century. Much later, in 1914, a Russian protectorate was established over Tuva.

The policies of the tsarist government were quite tolerant. Thus in 1741 Elisabeth I issued a decree acknowledging the existence of the "Lamaistic faith" in Buryatia. This was the official date of the recognition of Buddhism in Russia. By the end of the nineteenth century the knowledge of Buddhist doctrine had already spread widely among educated circles in the main European capitals: London, Paris, Rome, Berlin and Vienna. This revival of interest in the Orient was particularly strong in Russia. The rising popularity of Buddhism in European Russia was also accompanied by the development of Oriental Studies (including Buddhist and Indian) as an academic discipline. From the 1850s, St. Petersburg became one of the most important centres of Oriental scientific research in Europe. The history of Russian Buddhist and Indian studies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is connected with the names of Ivan Minaev (1840–1890), Aleksei Pozdneev (1851–1920), Sergey Oldenburg (1863–1934), Theodor Stcherbatsky (1866–1942), Otto Rosenberg (1888–1919) and many others.

At the end of the nineteenth century a Buddhist community began to develop in St. Petersburg. This consisted mostly of "traditional adherents" (Buryats and Kalmyks), foreign businessmen, diplomats and representatives of the foreign legations and, finally, Russian converts. The attitude towards Buddhism among certain groups in Russian society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was generally quite sympathetic. In contrast, the attitude of the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church to Buddhism was openly hostile. Being the state religion, it regarded Buddhism as a dangerous competitor, especially when it drew in people who did not belong to communities that traditionally practiced Buddhism. The revolutionary situation in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century forced the government to modify its religious policy. The tsar's edict of 12 December 1904 prohibited any manifestations of religious oppression or discrimination.

In discussing the history of Buddhism in Russia, one should not neglect the construction of the Buddhist temple in St. Petersburg, which is closely connected with the life and activities of Agvan Dorzhiev (1853–1938), an outstanding political leader, scholar and propagator of Buddhism. Dorzhiev was born in Buryatia and studied in the Aginsk *datsan*. He was educated at the famous Buddhist centres in Urga in Outer

Mongolia and in Tibet, and finally became first a tutor and then the inseparable attendant and closest political advisor of the thirteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet (1876–1933).

At that time Tibet was facing the possibility of British colonial expansion and dependence on China. The Dalai Lama, seeking Russia's support, sent Dorzhiev to St. Petersburg as his official representative in 1898 and again in 1900, with the secret mission of convincing the Russian government to establish a protectorate over Tibet.[1] He became quite close to Russian ruling circles, and after negotiations with Tsar Nicholas II, was officially appointed the Tibetan diplomatic representative in Russia in 1901. From that time on, he persistently sought to promote the construction of a Buddhist temple in the Russian capital. The construction of the temple was temporarily blocked for various reasons, including resistance from the Russian Orthodox Church, which proclaimed it to be a den of heathens and pagans. However, work on the temple began in 1908 and was completed in 1913, with the first public worship coinciding with the three-hundredth anniversary of the House of the Romanovs.[2]

THE SOVIET PERIOD

Buddhism

After the February Revolution of 1917, Dorzhiev devoted himself to political, religious and reformatory activities, including propagating Buddhist knowledge in Buryatia and Kalmykia. These activities were permitted for two reasons. Firstly, the Bolshevik nationalities policy at the time actively promoted distinct national identities and the national self-consciousness of the non-Russian populations. This resulted in a commitment to support national territories, national languages, national elites and national cultures.[3] Thus non-Russians had a better chance to preserve their reli-

[1] John **Snelling**, *Buddhism in Russia. The Story of Agvan Dorzhiev, Lhasa's Emissary to the Tsar* (Shaftsbury, Dorset: Element Books Limited, 1993); **Александр Андреев**, *Тибет в Политике Царской, Советской и Постсоветской России* (Санкт-Петербург: Издательский Дом Санкт-Петербургского Университета, 2006).

[2] Aleksandr **Andreev**, *The Buddhist Shrine of Petrograd* (Ulan-Ude: Eco-Art, 1992).

[3] Terry **Martin**, *The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet*

gions as part of their national culture than did ethnic Russians, whose culture was stigmatized as a culture of oppression.[4] Secondly, Dorzhiev's activities coincided with the foreign policy objectives of the Bolsheviks and their interest in the Buddhist East, above all in Tibet.

In the early 1920s, Dorzhiev, together with Buddhist leaders in Buryatia, made an attempt to prove the fundamental similarity between the tenets of Buddhism and communism, urging people to return to the ancient ideals of purity, morality and unselfishness. They called themselves Modernisers (*Obnovlentsy*), and interpreted Buddhism as an atheistic doctrine related to Marxism-Leninism. The first Congress of Soviet Buddhists, which took place in January 1927, consolidated the victory of *Obnovlenchestvo* and its reforms over conservatives.[5] In his efforts to protect Buddhist teachings against the background of the state's policy of atheism, Dorzhiev used various methods, even claiming that Lenin, Zinoviev and other Bolsheviks were all Buddhists, and that the Buddhist faith would in due course be adopted throughout the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that from the 1920s a general policy of restrictions against religious organizations was pursued. In the early 1930s the attitude of the authorities towards Buddhism changed radically, a fact that could be attributed both to the anti-religious campaign launched by Stalin and a general alteration of the nationalities policies, which became far more restrictive.[6] Campaigns against religion in general and Buddhism in particular were also connected with Stalin's collectivization drive; the attack on Buddhism was linked to the suppression of the rebellion against collectivization in Buryatia and Kalmykia. Under these new circumstances, the *Obnovlenchestvo* made no sense.

Apart from the condemnation of Buddhism from the ideological perspective, the communists focused on the political and counterrevolutionary activities of Buddhists. To justify the brutal destruction and ruin of the trans-Baikal and Kalmyk monasteries, they stigmatized them as hotbeds

Union, 1923 –1939 (Cornell University Press, 2001), 13.

4 *Ibid.*, 31–74.

5 „Протоколы Заседаний Первого Всесоюзного Собора Буддистов СССР от 20–29 января 1927", Архив Востоковедов ИВАН СССР (The archive of oriental scholars, the Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR), fund 2, inventory 1, file 373.

6 Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, 311–393.

of imperialism, support for the White Army and scheming against the Soviet people. Active struggle against the Soviet power was also attributed to them. Thus the Soviet press declared that in the 1920s, during the *Tsagalgan* and *Dugzhuba* festivals, when the enemies of faith had to be symbolically pierced with an arrow, the lamas of the Gusinoozerskii datsan allegedly launched arrows towards the district committee of the Communist party. At the same time in this very monastery the traditional *Sansariin Hurde* (wheel of life) picture, which demonstrated the causes of human suffering, was enriched with new subjects, namely a plane, a plant and a school with a red flag. In 1934, during an epidemic of typhus in Buryatia, the lamas supposedly assured the people that only mass withdrawal from collective farms could stop the spread of the disease. Most of all, however, the Soviet authorities were irritated by prophesies about the advent of the Buddha *Maitreya*, the Buddha to be, under whom joyful life was to be established.[7]

At the beginning of 1935, a large group of lamas was arrested, and all of them were charged with counterrevolutionary activities in Buryatia, Kalmykia and Leningrad, and with espionage on behalf of Japan. Within the course of 18 months this second wave of repressions completed the devastation of the Buddhist community in Leningrad. Lamas, doctors and scholars who lived in the temple were arrested and executed. Dorzhiev himself was arrested. At his first interrogation he supposedly confessed to membership in a "counterrevolutionary, pan-Mongolist, terrorist, insurgent, spy organization that intended to overthrow the Soviet government." The next day Dorzhiev was transferred to a prison hospital, where he died in January 1938. His death inevitably led to the closure of the temple in Leningrad. By 1938 all *datsans*, monasteries and schools had been closed, and almost all of them had also been demolished or burnt to ashes; sacred books and other items were destroyed. The majority of the priesthood was subjected to severe repressions.[8]

Clearly few Buddhist groups could survive under such circumstances. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of the existence of a number of

[7] Keston Archive, N. Teodorovich, Буддийская Церковь, как Орудие Коммунистической Политики, 1963.

[8] Александр **Андреев**, *Храм Будды в Северное Столице* (St. Petersburg: Nartang, 2004), 158–162.

itinerant lamas who continued to lecture illegally and perform religious rites, attracting masses of believers.[9] By the end of 1941, after a series of defeats suffered by Soviet troops in the war with Germany, the state modified its nationalities policy and somewhat alleviated the pressure on religion. Under war conditions, any tool promoting mobilization was exploited, including the appeal to religion and nationalism amongst Russians and non-Russians alike. The Buddhist communities that had survived the repressions of the 1930s contributed to the defence of the Soviet Union, raising large sums of money from their supporters for that purpose. These patriotic endeavours were appreciated, and Buddhism was once again tolerated, though only in the trans-Baikal region. In 1945 Buryat Buddhists were permitted to restore their Dharma (faith, truth and eternal law) and two *datsans*: the Ivolginsk near the Buryat capital of Ulan Ude and the Aginsk in Chita. In 1946 the Central Buddhist Board of the USSR was established in Ulan Ude.[10]

Now that Buddhism was once again legal, it was actively used to meet the needs of Soviet foreign policy and to demonstrate the "freedom of conscience in the USSR" to the countries of Asia. In addition to legal Buddhist centres, a small number of lamas in various Buddhist regions who had by then been released from prison performed Buddhist ceremonies and preached unofficially. Some of them attracted disciples from non-Buddhist areas. The most famous group formed spontaneously around Buddhist teacher and scholar Bidiya Dandaron. Dandaron was born in Buryatia in 1914 into the family of a lama, and was recognized as an incarnation. In 1933 he moved to Leningrad, where he studied the Tibetan language at Leningrad State University. Dandaron was arrested twice, in 1937 and 1947, on charges of counterrevolutionary conspiratorial activities. Paradoxically, the years of imprisonment, which he spent in the company of renowned scholars, historians and philosophers, equipped Dandaron with valuable knowledge and skills. There were also lamas amongst the prisoners, and under their guidance Dandaron continued his Buddhist education, improved his knowledge of Oriental

[9] Галина **Чимиторджин**, *История Иволгинского Дацана*. http://www.datsan.buryatia.ru/iid.html December 7, 2009.

[10] Владимир **Пореш**, "Тибетский Буддизм в России" - *Современная Религиозная Жизнь России.* Под редакцией Сергея Филатова и Майкла Бордо, Том 3 (Москва: Логос, 2006), 236.

languages and studied Buddhist philosophy and yoga.

After Stalin's death in 1953 and the eventual appointment of Nikita Khrushchev to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party, the process of "de-Stalinization" gradually began. Many prisoners were rehabilitated and released from labour camps. Dandaron was released and rehabilitated in 1956. Paradoxically, one aspect of Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" was his rejection of Stalin's more quiescent policy towards religion that had been implemented during the war, and his return to active persecution. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, over half of Orthodox parishes were disbanded, and around ten thousand churches and monasteries were destroyed or closed. Nor did other religions (including Islam and Buddhism) escape this change in policy, which also affected Buddhist scholarship.

After Khrushchev was deposed in 1964 and replaced as General Secretary by Leonid Brezhnev, a partial re-Stalinization and a crackdown on cultural freedom began. Some members of the intelligentsia responded to these repressive policies by urging the Party to observe the human rights stipulated by the Soviet constitution, such as freedom of speech, information and conscience, the latter being another term for freedom of religion. A dissident movement emerged, its activists engaged in underground publishing (*samizdat*) defending human rights, protesting against political persecution and informing the foreign mass media about specific cases of human rights abuses in the USSR. These dissidents consisted of people with a range of different political views and religious beliefs. Hence it can be said that from the mid-1960s an embryonic civil society began to develop in the Soviet Union.[11]

This period can generally be characterized by the "explosion of interest in various cultural and intellectual pursuits based on the experience of a faraway 'elsewhere'", such as Oriental philosophies and religions, including Buddhism, which took place in the 1960s.[12] Popular books about Eastern spirituality began to appear in bookshops; at the same time, various *samizdat* publications on Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Shamanism and

[11] Joshua **Rubenstein**, *Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights* (London: Wildwood House, 1980); Mark **Hopkins**, *Russia's Underground Press: the Chronicle of Current Events* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

[12] Alexei **Yurchak**, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More* (Princeton University Press, 2006), 150–160.

esoteric Christian teachings were read, copied and passed around among friends. These included translations of material by foreign authors, such as Japanese Buddhist scholar Daisetsu Tietaru Suzuki's writings on Zen. The works of the Russian mystic George Gurdjieff, Jorge Luis Borges and, several years later, Carlos Castaneda, also appeared in *samizdat.* In due course a relatively small but active circle of people interested in mystic and philosophical matters was formed in Leningrad. These included both scholars and students from the Oriental Faculty of Leningrad State University. Similar groups were created in Moscow and other cities in the USSR.

In 1965 two young people, Aleksandr Zhelezno and Iurii Alekseev, went to the Pamirs with the intention of reaching India illegally and practicing yoga there. The attempt failed, and Zhelezno went to Buddhist monasteries in Ulan Ude instead, where he met Dandaron and became his first disciple. This was the beginning of a Buddhist religious movement amongst citizens of the USSR who lived outside traditional Buddhist regions. Young people reached out to Dandaron as a teacher who could answer what they considered to be vitally important questions. They came to Buryatia from Leningrad, Moscow, Ukraine, Estonia and other parts of the country to see him. Among his visitors were talented Muscovite Buddhist scholars Oktiabrina Volkova and Alexander Piatigorsky and Estonian scholar Linnart Mäll.[13]

By the early 1970s, Dandaron's had some thirty to forty disciples. Dandaron taught them traditional methods of *tantra* and the theory and practice of Buddhist meditation. His teaching was characterized by syncretism, as it combined various schools of Buddhism, including Gelug, Nyingma and Sakya. Dandaron's independent character, his popularity, and the fact that he had never made his religious convictions secret caused increasing concern on the part of the Buryat authorities, who were determined to silence him. The resulting ruthless crusade against the group was most likely caused by the local Buryat authorities' desire to show their efforts and vigilance and even to compete with the central authorities in the suppression of religion.

[13] **Владимир Пореш**, "Русский Буддизм, как это возможно?" – *Религия и Общество.* Под редакцией Сергея Филатова (Москва, Санкт-Петербург: Летний Сад, 2002), 386.

At approximately the same time, in 1972, the Teacher's Newspaper published a lengthy anti-Buddhist article, in which the author expressed her concern about the persistence of the Buddhist faith in Buryatia, and that many people, especially school children, are attracted by Buddhism and its rituals, and attend *datsans*. It also claimed that Buddhism was not as innocent as it may seem, but on the contrary very dangerous, as it distracted people from their main goal – the construction of communism. The article ended with the conclusion that anti-religious propaganda was somewhat weak in Buryatia, and something had to be done in that regard.[14] In the same year, Dandaron was arrested for the third time. The Buryat Public Prosecutor's Office planned a show trial involving not only Dandaron but also eight of his followers; they were charged with being members of a savagely cruel sect that performed bloody rites, carried out obscene orgies, and made human sacrifices. The case of Dandaron and his disciples concurred with the new policy of repressions against dissidents and religious believers pursued by the Soviet authorities; since freedom of conscience and of association were guaranteed by the constitution, they could not openly be charged with engaging in religious practices, and thus were instead accused of the trumped-up charges referred to above. A slanderous campaign against Dandaron was also launched in the press, in which he was described as a confirmed drunkard, profligate, blackmailer, thief and fraudster. Although many of the charges against him were dropped during the course of the trial, Dandaron was still convicted and died in prison two years later. Some of his disciples were declared insane and forcibly confined in mental hospitals, while others lost their jobs.[15]

Yoga, ISKCON and other forms of India-inspired religious activities

As mentioned above, after Stalin's death, modest political liberalization led to the revival of old groups and the appearance of new, mostly underground, ones. The main feature of the religious thinking of that period

[14] **В. Галкина**, "Вокруг Дацана" – *Учительская Газета*, 12/12, (1972).

[15] *Delo Dandarona* (Firenze: Edizioni Aurora, 1974); Keston Archive, Transcript of the Trial of the Buddhist Scholar B. D. Dandaron, 1972; Stephen **Batchelor**, "The Trials of Dandaron: Buddhist Perseverance in Russia" - *Tricycle*, 1/ 3 (Spring 1992), 12–21.

was syncretism, which is a mixture of different forms of Eastern and Western spiritual traditions and practices. Members of these groups, practicing different disciplines of Hindu and Buddhist yoga, combined traditional ideas with the teachings of Helena Blavatsky, Nicholas and Helena Roerichs and Gurdjieff, flavouring them with different types of magic, shamanic and Christian techniques, partly borrowed from *samizdat* or books brought from abroad or received through instructions from various amateur gurus. Among Christian esoteric practices, *umnaia* or *iisusova molitva* should be mentioned. Some features detected in this ancient inner prayer, which must be repeated together with inhalation and requires concentration and slow breathing, parallel the practices of meditation and yogic breathing techniques.[16]

It can be concluded that the socio-historical situation that developed in the USSR between the 1960s and the 1980s, gave rise to a unique generation of spiritual seekers. The lack of information was accompanied by an extraordinary amount of creative activity that resulted in the development of new "ingenious methods", practices and styles. In search of teachings, people went to Buddhist *datsans* and remote villages of the trans-Baikal region and Altai and the republics of Central Asia. The few living bearers of the tradition could not, however, satisfy all of the seekers, who, while acting on their own, at times found themselves in dangerous and tragic deadlocks. Experiments with various practices and techniques, which aimed at obtaining maximum results in a very short time, were often based on untested, dubious sources and could be dangerous for both body and mind. In his book *Khroniki Rossiiskoi Saniasy* (The Chronicles of Russian Saniasa), Vladislav Lebed'ko mentions cases of death, health damage and mental disorders caused by the excessive enthusiasm of spiritual seekers and the unskilled guidance of amateur gurus.[17]

Among the prominent groups in the 1970s was one connected with *Kunta* yoga. After the long period of underground spiritual quest (the study of Christianity, Roerich's books as well as various *samizdat* sources on Hatha-yoga), a group of Leningrad university students developed

[16] **Архимандрит Михаил Козлов**, "Рассказ Странника, Искателя Молитвы" – *Символ*, 7 (1992), 7–75.

[17] **Владислав Лебедько**, *Хроники Российской Саньясы* (Санкт-Петербург: Тема, 1999).

their own *Kunta* ("spear" in Sanskrit) yoga of magic symbols and *mantras* (phrases). This system was allegedly developed in India in the second century A.D. by the sage Maharama Kunta and his disciples, although there is no scholarly proof of this statement. In fact, *Kunta* yoga represents a combination of various yogic and meditation techniques and practices, experiments on the "restructuring" and "broadening of the consciousness" (sometimes with the use of psychedelic drugs), healing practices etc. The focus on magic symbols supposedly enabled the adepts to contact divine energy called *Shakti* in Sanskrit (many of the terms used in *Kunta* yoga are derived from Sanskrit), enter other worlds (through shamanic-like practices), heal people and in general fulfil any possible task. Meditation around a certain group of symbols was allegedly able to set the mind free from all limitations. It is hardly a surprise that the activities of the group were constantly monitored by KGB agents. Thus the leaders were repeatedly called in for interrogation, temporarily imprisoned or placed in special mental hospitals. It should be mentioned that the majority of the followers of *Kunta* yoga died at a young age under questionable and tragic circumstances that could partly be explained by the permanent psychological pressure to which they were subjected.[18]

Over time, some sources of information began to appear legally. Due to the expansion of cultural relations between the Soviet Union and India, a number of Soviet specialists worked in India from the mid-1960s. Some of them studied yoga and other practices there, and brought home complexes of yogic exercises. By that time, an interest in yoga among Russian society had already been hastened by the publication of Ivan Efremov's adventure novel *Ostrie britvy* (The Edge of a Razor) in 1964, and by the appearance of a popular science film *Indiiskie Iogi, Kto Oni?* (Indian Yogis, Who Are They?) in 1970. In his novel, Efremov discussed some principles of yoga and psycho-training and defined yoga as a "constant connection between the conscious and the unconscious in the human mind, an iron rod supporting the strength of spirit and body and giving energy for lofty deeds, fulfilment and struggle". On the whole, *Ostrie britvy* reflected a great interest in "the East" and various para-psychological phenomena in Soviet society. The documentary film "Indian Yogis, Who are They?"

[18] Elias **Beliaev**, *Tausha: The Life and Teachings of a Russian Mystic* (New York: Station Hill/Barry Town, 2001).

for the first time provided the Soviet audience with a relatively objective description of Hatha yoga and demonstrated the celebrated "miracles" of yogis, such as eating glass or being buried alive, and this was a revelation for many people, who responded to it by scrutinizing *samizdat* instructions on yoga and including the "lotus pose" in their everyday morning exercises.

One of the most prominent propagandists of yoga in the USSR in the early 1970s was Anatolii Zubkov, a philologist, who had worked in India for several years. He began to popularize yoga, giving public lectures and publishing articles in popular magazines, such as *Sel'skaia Molodezh* and *Nauka i Tekhnika*. Adhering to the principle of moderation, Zubkov helped many people to move away from extremes and self-damage in yoga. Emphasizing the therapeutic effect of yoga rather than its spiritual role, he successfully avoided conflicts with the authorities, whereas some other groups and their leaders continued to be prosecuted.[19] In the early 1980s, the method of shallow breathing, similar to the yogic *pranayama* (breathing practice), developed by physician Konstantin Buteiko back in 1950, also became widespread in Russia. Despite the fact that the method was intended as a medical treatment for asthma, some seekers used it as a means of reaching "enlightenment" and special psychological and physiological effects.

The mixture of some ancient yogic ideas with contemporary physics and psychology gave rise to the psychics and alternative healers who tried to fill in the gaps in human knowledge using various unusual activities and techniques. It should be mentioned that there were some officially approved organizations that were engaged in parapsychology and extrasensory perception, such as the Department of Bioinformation, attached to the Popov Research Society of Radio-Engineering, Electronics and Communications, which was established in 1965. The authorities' positive attitude to this body can be explained by the fact that the KGB was interested in the methods of psychological influence over people and manipulations with human consciousness, and thus tried to keep all such activities under control.[20]

[19] **Виктор Бойко**, *Зубков Анатолий Николаевич*. http://www.realyoga.ru/classic/history/341/ March 7, 2011.

[20] Лебедько, *Хроники*, 197.

The History of the Hare Krishna movement in the USSR can be traced back to 1973, when Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, the founder of ISKCON, made an official visit to Moscow. Shrila Prabhupada was eager to lecture to interested academics about his worldview, but was immediately informed that that would be impossible in the Soviet Union. He did, however, manage to convey the main ideas of the philosophy of Krishna Consciousness to a young man called Anatolii Piniaev, whom he accidentally met, and who became the first propagator of the new faith in the USSR. During the next ten years Anatolii was visited by a few members of the Hare Krishna movement. He also travelled extensively to different parts of the country, where he preached and taught what he had learnt from his spiritual masters. The underground groups functioned not only in the main Russian cities, such as Moscow and Leningrad, but in different parts of the country, including Siberia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and the Baltic republics.

In 1980, two Hare Krishna leaders, Shri Vishnupada and Kirtiraga Dasa, came to Russia and attempted to organize a *kirtan* (ritual Hare Krishna chanting) and a lecture in Riga. The believers were dispersed by the police and KGB agents, and the foreign guests were advised to leave the country. The first publicity Hare Krishna followers received was an article in the journal *Communist*, in which a KGB agent stated that "the three greatest threats to the Soviet Union were Western Culture, pop music and Hare Krishna". Later this was followed by a number of negative articles about the movement in the Soviet press, including the newspapers *Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia*, *Izvestiia*, *Nedelia* and *Nauka i Religiia*. In 1981 the Hare Krishna congregation in Moscow, led by Vladimir Kritskii and Sergei Kurkin, made an attempt to register as an official religious group. Their application was, however, denied by the Council of Religious Affairs on the grounds that the Hare Krishna movement was an "ideological deviant" and that "there was only one ideology permitted in the Soviet Union, and that was Marxism-Leninism." Both Kritskii and Kurkin were soon arrested and charged under article 227 of the criminal code of the RSFSR (Infringement of the person and rights of citizens under the appearance of performing religious ceremonies).[21]

[21] Keston Archive, David Jacupko, The History of the Hare Krishna Movement in the USSR, 1988.

In the early and mid-1980s, several dozen Hare Krishna followers were imprisoned and confined to mental hospitals (the exact number varies in different documents and in different periods, but it is clear that it was not less than 50, or maybe even more).[22] The followers themselves attribute these repressions to the rule of Yuri Andropov, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party, who toughened religious persecution. Among the offences ascribed to Hare Krishna followers was the propagation of vegetarianism, which allegedly had a detrimental effect on the health of the converts, luring the people away from socialist realities and the Soviet way of life to an illusory world of mysticism, anti-Soviet activities, parasitism etc. Sometimes much more absurd accusations took place. Thus during one of the trials against Hare Krishna followers, the prosecution was seriously considering the claim of a mentally retarded woman that the believers (who practiced vegetarianism and the principle of *ahimsa* – causing no harm to any living being) wanted to sacrifice her underage child.[23] It should be mentioned that Hare Krishna followers suffered immensely in prison because of their religious beliefs and special diet.

The Keston Archive at Baylor University in Texas contains numerous records of beatings, torture, force-feeding (with raw eggs and other forbidden products) through a tube, psychiatric abuse, back-breaking labour and other violations of human rights. A few "mental patients" died from huge doses of administered psychotropic drugs and insulin. One must consider that the overwhelming majority of Soviet Krishna followers were relatively young people, and belonged to intellectual circles; many of them had university educations. This was probably one of the reasons for the strength of the state's animosity towards them. Soviet ideology put forward the idea that religion was a kind of anachronism and correspondingly the prerogative of elderly, ignorant people. Many of the imprisoned followers had children, who were used to exert a psychological pressure on their parents. One of the victims, Olga Kiseleva, a 37-year-old mother of two, a poet and Moscow university graduate, was put on trial and sentenced when she was nine months pregnant. She gave birth in prison, and

[22] Keston Archive, Psychiatric Abuse of Hare Krishna Devotees in the USSR, an Information Bulletin from CVSHK, 1987.

[23] Keston Archive, Protocol of the Interrogation of Hare Krishnas' trial, 6–9.

the baby died soon afterwards in an orphanage.[24] This outrageous case caused resentment among human rights advocates in the USSR and raised public concern abroad, as evident from the numerous publications in the press (in the Daily Mail and Sunday Morning Herald, for instance), Radio Liberty reports etc.

It is also worth mentioning that despite severe prosecution Hare Krishna followers felt that they were empowered as the descendants of the ancient tradition Gaudiya Vaishnava as well as the members of the global neo-Hinduist Hare Krishna movement. The prisoners of consciousness and their families and comrades were willing and able to fight back, alerting the public and writing numerous letters of complaint to various authorities in the USSR and abroad, including President Gorbachev, President Reagan and his wife, Indian President Rajiv Gandhi, the Pope, the Roman conference for the investigation of psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union, etc.

From the late 1980s through the early 1990s, when the liberalization of religion began, the situation gradually and slowly began to change. One by one the prisoners were released and rehabilitated. In 1988 the first Hare Krishna group was officially registered in Moscow. Finally, in 1989, a large group of former detainees even went on a pilgrimage to India, something that would earlier have been quite unthinkable.

CONCLUSION

The article demonstrates that Indian religions have been present on Russian territory since the seventeenth century, and the first contacts can be traced to even earlier times. They have always aroused both great interest among the population and fierce opposition from the official state ideology and from church circles. During the Soviet era, the period between the early 1960s and the late 1980s could be characterized by a surge of interest towards Eastern, particularly Indian, religions and philosophy in the USSR. On the one hand this can be explained by the desire to escape from the realities of the Soviet way of life with its egalitarianism and oppressive control over spiritual and religious spheres to some bright exotic "faraway

[24] Keston Archive, The List of the Arrested Hare Krishna Followers, Open Letter, 1985.

elsewhere." On the other hand, this interest could be part of a worldwide trend, as the infatuation for non-mainstream, unusual, sometimes even seemingly bizarre religious ideas, swept across Europe and the US in that period. It is important to mention that the specific underground character of the Soviet religious groups and movements caused by the state's overall policy of atheism and the lack of sources, materials and spiritual guidance gave them a unique indigenous flavour, and paradoxically enhanced the creativity of the spiritual seekers who developed new, mostly syncretic teachings, methods and practices.

It should be mentioned that the tendency to attack non-mainstream religions (including Eastern religions) continues in Russia even today. The period of religious freedom in Russia after *perestroika* and especially after the passing of the liberal law "On Freedom of Consciousness" in 1990 was rather short-lived and soon gave way to concerns about destructive "sects" and "cults" that allegedly posed a threat to the society and state. Among the main objectors to non-mainstream religions in Russia are the Russian Orthodox Church and the representatives of the so-called anti-cult movement, represented by both Orthodox priests and laypersons (public figures, intellectuals and politicians).

SUMMARIA – IN ENGLISH

Robert N. Swanson, *„Lollardy", „orthodoxy", and „resistance" in pre-Reformation England*

Conflicts between „orthodoxy" and „heresy" within the medieval church are generally understood as instances of authoritarian repression, with „resistance" being treated as the prerogative of the heretics. Drawing on the history of relations between Lollards or Lollardy (loosely-defined) and the ecclesiastical authorities in England between the 1370s and 1530s, this paper argues that that specific confrontation should be understood as an instance of mutual or reciprocal resistance, with each side on the defensive – and on the attack – against the other, yet generally challenged and weakened by the imprecise definitions and understandings both of what they were defending, and what they were resisting. It suggests more generally that „resistance" should be treated as an ambivalent concept when analysing conflicts within or between religions, where both sides may in fact be engaged in resistance to each other.

Jan van de Kamp, *Religious dissidence both resisted and protected by power: the case of the German Reformed Pietist minister Theodor Undereyck (1635–1693)*

It might normally be expected that political authorities would oppose the voice and influence of religious dissidence. However, recent research into Dutch dissident religious subcultures in the Early Modern era reveals that authorities protected or even supported propagators of religious dissidence due to particular social and political factors. This seems also to have been the case in regard to a propagator of religious dissidence in Germany: the minister Theodor Undereyck (1635–1693), who was the key founder of German Reformed Pietism. Until now, his biography has primarily been viewed from a theological perspective, with social and political historical aspects being neglected.

Undereyck served as minister at Mülheim an der Ruhr (1660–1667), Kassel (1668–1670) and Bremen (1670–1693). In his first and last congregation, he introduced a range of renewals and launched proposals for reform in the church, such as the intensification of faith education and discipline, the introduction of a church government board consisting of ministers and members of the congregation that was intended to be independent of the

political authorities, and devotional meetings for youth.

Ecclesiastical and political authorities variously opposed or supported Undereyck; their reasons for so doing were variously religious, political or social in nature. At Mülheim, the Count opposed Undereyck: himself a Lutheran, he may have feared a decline in his control over the church and even social unrest. The Countess of Hesse-Kassel offered Undereyck a refuge; it appears she may have had an inclination towards Pietism. Undereyck's ministerial colleagues at Bremen opposed him, because they may have feared that Undereyck would spread heretical doctrines, and that he would cause division and conflicts within the church or even the separation of certain groups from the church. They, too, may have been anxious that his activities would lead to social unrest. Some members of the city council protected and supported Undereyck; in the first instance, they may have had religious views concordant with Undereyck's. Secondarily, their protection or support may also have been due to the fact that Undereyck was of a similarly privileged social standing as themselves. This factor also seems to have been decisive in determining whether propagators of Dutch dissident religious subcultureswere supported in or dismissed from the ministry. Thirdly, those city councillors who were favourably disposed may have considered Undereyck's devotional meetings as an instrument to maintain social stability among the young. Fourthly, support for Undereyck might have been a tool for the city council to enhance its own control over the church, in which it competed with the board of city ministers. Finally, support for Undereyck might have been seen politically as furthering Bremen's trade relations with England, a country and people to which Undereyck had religious connections.

Hugh McLeod, *Four strategies for resisting secularisation*

From at least the mid-19th century churches in Europe have continuously felt threatened by secularisation, whether through government policies, new intellectual developments, popular radical movements, or the effects of social change. This article examines four typical strategies for resisting this threat, taking examples both from the 19th century and from more recent times. Strategy 1 is to rechristianise society from above through an alliance with governments and social elites. A classic example is the French Catholic church in the mid-19th century, but there are many more recent examples, especially in the aftermath of war or periods of persecution. Strategy 2 is to form a tight-knit church-based sub-culture. A good example is the Prussian

Catholic church in the wake of the *Kulturkampf*. But in the period c. 1870–1960 this strategy was used by the Catholic church in many countries, and sometimes by Protestants too. Strategy 3 is more typically Protestant. It is to identify the church with the forces of political and/or intellectual progress. It was at its apogee in the 1960s, when progressive theologians were calling for a 'New Reformation' and Christian student movements warmly embraced the 'Spirit of '68'. Strategy 4 focuses on evangelisation from below. It tends to combine a conservative theology with innovative methods of preaching the gospel. A classic example would be Methodism, which became a powerful popular movement in 18th and 19th-cenutry England. Each of these strategies has had its successes, but each also has its limitations. There has been no completely successful strategy for resisting secularisation. But neither has any of the secularist movements which played such a big part in the history of the 20th century been entirely successful.

Priit Rohtmets, *Ecumenical peace organisation "The world alliance for promoting international friendship through the churches" and resistance to totalitarian regimes between the two world wars*

The aim of this article is to describe and analyse the resistance of the ecumenical movement to totalitarian regimes between the First and the Second World War, focusing on a peace organisation "The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship Through the Churches".

The ideological basis of the Alliance was the recognition of basic human rights, the acknowledgement of the freedom of conscience and religion. This was in opposition with the ideologies of totalitarian regimes of the period between the two world wars. Every step taken in demanding human rights and condemning the violation of those rights in countries ruled by totalitarian regimes manifested itself as an act of resistance to those regimes. Although the Alliance was an international ecumenical organisation, its success and achievements depended on the work that was organised in more than 30 national committees.

To promote its ideology, counter the Communist ideology the Alliance initiated campaigns and resolutions that were passed on to national committees to influence the public and the politicians in member countries and to take a stand against the violation of human rights in the Soviet Union. Through personal contacts between the Russian clergy and the representatives of the Alliance in the neighbouring countries of Soviet Union the Alliance tried to establish a national committee to Soviet Russia. In 1930s the

Alliance tried to organise a visit to Russia. Both attempts failed.

The German national committee of the Alliance was one of the founders of the Alliance. After 1933 the German committee carried on with its work, although some leading members of the committee left Germany. In the following years the work of the committee was hindered by the limitations set to freedom of speech and action, as well as by the death of several members of the committee. Still, with limited resources the national committee managed to promote its ideology. Like the churches, the Alliance in Germany focused more on theological issues.

At the same time National Socialism had a major effect on the efficiency of the Alliance´s work. The working methods required a good will between nations and churches, as well as a more or less democratic society. The developments in Germany after 1933 put the Alliance in a paralysed state. Similar to the League of Nations the Alliance did not possess the ability and methods to successfully counter the ideology, policy and national interests introduced by totalitarian regimes.

Regina Laukaitytė, *The attitude of believers to the confessional policy of the Soviet regime in Lithuania in 1944–1953*

The article analyzes the reaction of Lithuania's Catholics and believers of religious minorities to the anti-religious policies of the Soviet regime in the Stalinism period (1944–1953). The largest campaigns of persecuting the Churches coincided with the apogee of the terrorization of the whole society – the large-scale deportations, the suppression of the partisan resistance, the establishment of collective farms and the nationalization of property in 1948–1949. Therefore, the intimidated faithful tried to defend their interests by peaceful methods – tried to put pressure on the government institutions with various requests, demands, that emphasized the rights guaranteed in the Stalinist constitution. The methods with which the parishioners tried to defend the arrested clergy and to save the churches designated for closing are investigated in greater detail.

Confronted with the obvious hostility of government representatives and being unable to legalize their communities and houses of worship according to the requirements of Soviet laws, the faithful of various confessions (especially, the small religious minorities) continued their religious life illegally in the underground. Such an underground had already been formed in the years of Stalinism and helped the churches to ensure the continuity of their activities and structure. The inertia, with which the Lithuanian faithful

encountered the confessional policies of the Soviet regime, their efforts to ignore the constraints of religious life or to circumvent them, to resist slowed the process of making society atheistic.

Maria Petrova, *Underground Hindu and Buddhist-inspired religious movements in Soviet Russia*

The paper deals with the activities of the underground religious/ spiritual movements, whose teachings are largely influenced or contain the elements of Eastern (in particular, Indian) religions and philosophies, in the Soviet Russia. Special attention is paid to Buddhist and Hindu-inspired movements (the group of Bidiia Dandaron, ISKCON and yogic groups, *Kunta* Yoga adherents etc). Although the research mainly focuses on the period between the late 1950s and the late 1980s (characterized by the return to the active persecution of religion) it is also placed in the historical context of tsarist and especially Soviet governments' policies towards the people, practicing Eastern religions.

Ironically, the attempts of the Soviet authorities to impose a ban on all the manifestations of religiosity or at least to keep them all under control led to quite an opposite result. The members of the underground groups of that time mention that the 'meaninglessness and suffocating monotony' of their existence required some kind of compensation, which obviously could be found only in spiritual sphere. Thus, the situation which developed in the USSR in the above-mentioned period gave rise to a unique generation of spiritual seekers, whose protest against the lack of freedom and information developed into specific forms. It included both the individual/inner form, aimed at spiritual self-improvement and self-education, and collective/outer forms, such as joining religious groups, participation in seminars and lectures, publishing and spreading of the *samizdat* literature, copying and translating of western literature, occasional contacts with foreigners – fighters for human rights and other forms of underground dissident activity. The paper examines the particular explosion of interest in Asia and Eastern religions in the 1960–1980, which could be explained by the desire to withdraw from the realities of the Soviet regime and to experience the exotic faraway 'elsewhere', but at the same time is part of the worldwide trend, which could be characterized by the deviation from traditional mainstream religions and an increase of attention towards unusual, sometimes even bizarre ideas and teachings.

SUMMARIA – EESTI KEELES

Robert N. Swanson, *„Lollardlus", „ortodoksia" ja „vastupanu" reformatsioonieelsel Inglismaal*

„Ortodoksia" ja „hereesia" konflikte keskaegses kirikus seostatakse üldiselt teisitimõtlejate autoritaarse allasurumisega ning „vastupanu" on käsitatud ainult hereetikutele omase tegevusena. Vaadeldes lollardite või lollardluse (avaras tähenduses) ja Inglismaa kirikuvõimude suhete ajalugu 1370. kuni 1530. aastatel, väidetakse käesolevas artiklis, et seda konkreetset vastasseisu tuleks mõista pigem vastastikuse vastupanuna, kus mõlemad pooled olid teise suhtes nii kaitse- kui ka ründepositsioonil. Samas nõrgestasid mõlema argumente ebatäpsed määratlused ja segane arusaam sellest, mida kaitsti ja millele vastu seisti. Üldisemalt võib sellest järelduda, et usundite sees või vahel esinevate konfliktide analüüsimisel tuleks „vastupanu" käsitada ambivalentse mõistena, mille kohaselt mõlemad pooled võivad teise suhtes üles näidata vastupanu.

Jan van de Kamp, *Võimu vastuseis religioossele dissidentlusele ja selle samaaegne kaitsmine: Saksamaa reformeeritud pietistliku õpetaja Theodor Undereycki (1635–1639) juhtum*

Üldjuhul võiks eeldada, et poliitiline võim suhtub religioosse dissidentluse esindajate sõnavõttudesse ja mõjusse vastuseisuga. Siiski on Hollandi varase uusaja religioosse dissidentluse hiljutised uuringud näidanud, et teatud ühiskondlike ja poliitiliste asjaolude tõttu sealsed võimud kaitsesid või lausa toetasid teisitimõtlejaid. Sama näib kehtivat ka ühe Saksamaa teisitimõtleja, õpetaja Theodor Undereycki (1635–1693) kohta, kes oli üks pietistliku liikumise tähtsamaid alusepanijaid Saksamaa reformeeritud kirikus. Kuni viimase ajani on tema elulugu käsitletud vaid teoloogilisest aspektist, jättes tähelepanuta selle ühiskondlikud ning poliitilis-ajaloolised tahud.

Undereyck teenis kirikuõpetajana Mülheimis (1660–1667), Kasselis (1668–1670) ja Bremenis (1670–1693). Ta tegi oma esimeses ja viimases koguduses mitmeid uuendusi ning esitas ettepanekuid kiriku reformimiseks, näiteks süvendatud usuline õpe ja rangem distsipliin, õpetajatest ja koguduseliikmetest moodustatav kirikunõukogu, mis pidi olema poliitilisest võimust sõltumatu, ning noortepalvused.

Mõned kiriklikud ja poliitilised võimuinstantsid olid Undereycki ideedele vastu, samas kui teised toetasid neid. Mõlemal juhul võisid selle põhjused olla usulised, poliitilised või sotsiaalsed. Mülheimis oli krahv Undereycki ettepanekutele vastu: kuna ta ise oli luterlane, võis ta karta kontrolli vähenemist kiriku üle ning isegi ühiskondlikke rahutusi. Hessen-Kasseli krahvinna aga pakkus Undereyckile varjupaika ning näib, et tema võis kalduda meelsuselt pietismi poole. Bremenis olid Undereycki kolleegid kirikus talle vastu, kuna nad võisid karta, et Undereyck hakkab levitama valeõpetusi ning põhjustab kirikus lõhesid ja konflikte või sunnib teatud rühmitused isegi kirikust lahkuma. Ka nemad võisid olla mures selle pärast, et Undereycki tegevus võib kaasa tuua ühiskondlikke rahutusi. Samas mõned Bremeni raeliikmed toetasid ja kaitsesid Undereycki. Esiteks võisid nende usulised vaated olla lähedased Undereycki omadele. Teiseks võis nende kaitse ja toetus olla tingitud asjaolust, et Undereyckil oli sarnaselt nendega kõrgem sotsiaalne seisund. Nimetatud asjaolu näib olevat olnud ka Hollandis kõige tähtsam tingimus, mis määras selle, kas usulisi teisitimõtlejaid toetati või vabastati ametist. Kolmandaks võisid soosivalt suhtunud raeliikmed pidada Undereycki korraldatud palvusi vahendiks, mis aitas säilitada noortes ühiskondlikult rahulikku meelsust. Neljandaks võis Undereycki toetamine olla rae jaoks vahend, millega suurendada kontrolli kiriku üle, kuna selles osas konkureerisid nad linna vaimulike kolleegiumiga. Viiendaks võidi Undereycki toetamist käsitada poliitiliselt kasulikuna, kuna see aitas parandada Bremeni ja Inglismaa kaubandussuhteid, sest Undereyck oli selle riigi ja sealsete elanikega usuliselt seotud.

Hugh McLeod, *Sekulariseerumisele vastuseismise neli strateegiat*

Hiljemalt 19. sajandi keskpaigast on Euroopa kirikud pidevalt tunnetanud sekulariseerumisest tulenevaid ohte, olgu selleks uued riiklikud poliitikad, uued vaimsed arengud, radikaalsed rahvaliikumised või ühiskondlike muutuste mõju. Käesolevas artiklis vaadeldakse sellele ohule vastuseismiseks kasutatavat nelja tüüpstrateegiat ning tuuakse näiteid nii 19. sajandist kui ka hilisemast ajast. Esimene strateegia seisneb ühiskonna taasristiusustamises, milleks sõlmitakse liit valitsuse ja ühiskonna ladvikuga. Selle klassikaline näide on Prantsusmaa katoliku kiriku tegevus 19. sajandi keskel, kuid leidub ka rohkesti hilisemaid näiteid, mis ilmnevad tihti sõdade või tagakiusamisperioodide järel. Teine strateegia on luua suletud kiriklik subkultuur. Selle heaks näiteks on Preisimaa katoliku kirik pärast kultuurivõitluse (*Kultur-*

kampf) algust. Kuid aastatel 1870–1960 kasutas sama strateegiat veel paljude teiste riikide katoliku kirik ning mõnikord ka protestandid. Kolmas strateegia on omasem protestantismile. Selles samastatakse kirik poliitiliselt ja/või intellektuaalselt edumeelsete jõududega. Strateegia saavutas haripunkti 1960. aastatel, kui edumeelsed teoloogid soovisid läbi viia „uut reformatsiooni" ning kristlikud üliõpilasliikumised võtsid „68. aasta vaimsuse" meelsasti omaks. Neljas strateegia keskendub alt lähtuvale evangeliseerimisele. Tihti kombineeritakse selles konservatiivne teoloogia uuenduslike jutlustamismeetoditega. Selle klassikaline näide on metodism, mis kasvas tugevaks liikumiseks 18. ja 19. sajandi Inglismaal. Kõigi nende strateegiatega on mõnel juhul edu saavutatud, kuid neil kõigil on oma piirid. Sekulariseerumisele vastuseismisel igas mõttes edukat strateegiat ei ole leitud. Teisalt ei ole täielikku edu saavutanud ka ükski sekularistlik liikumine, kuigi nad on mänginud 20. sajandi ajaloos väga suurt rolli.

Priit Rohtmets, *Oikumeeniline rahuorganisatsioon "Maailmaliit rahvusvahelise sõpruse edendamiseks kirikute kaudu" ja selle vastupanu totalitaarsetele režiimidele kahe maailmasõja vahelisel perioodil*

Artiklis käsitletakse kahe maailmasõja vahelisel perioodil tegutsenud oikumeenilise maailmaorganisatsiooni, 1914. aastal asutatud Maailmaliit Rahvusvahelise Sõpruse Edendamiseks Kirikute Kaudu panust võitlemisel kahe suurima totalitaarse režiimi – natsionaalsotsialistliku Saksamaa ja Nõukogude Liidu vastu.

Maailmaliit toetas Rahvasteliidu eesmärke ja tegevust, juhindudes tõsiasjast, et religioon võimaldab süvendada rahvuste vahelist usaldust, eesmärgiga hoida ära pingeid ja sõjalisi konflikte ning seista vähemuste, sh usuvähemuste õiguste eest. Oma tegevusega nii rahvuslikul kui rahvusvahelisel areenil vastandus Maailmaliit totalitaarsete režiimide ideoloogiale.

1920. aastate alguses kavandas Maailmaliit Eesti ja Läti kirikutegelaste vahendusel rahutöö teostamiseks rahvuskomisjoni asutamist Nõukogude Venemaale. Selle ebaõnnestumisel jätkus töö kommunistliku režiimi vastu liidu rohkem kui 30 rahvuskomisjoni vahendusel, et eri riikide valitsusi ja üldsust mõjutada hukka mõistma inimõiguste, sh usuvabaduse rikkumisi Nõukogude Venemaal. 1930. aastatel otsiti võimalusi kõrgete kirikutegelaste delegatsiooni läkitamiseks Nõukogude Liitu. Suhetes Nõukogude võimudega läbimurret ei saavutatud.

Saksamaal asuv rahvuskomisjon oli seevastu Maailmaliidu üks asuta-

jatest. Samas põrkus Maailmaliit juba 1920. aastatel Saksa kirikutegelaste rahvuslike seisukohtadega, mistõttu oli komisjoni tegevus 1933. aastaks, mil natsionaalsotsialistid võimule tulid, juba läbi teinud mitu mõõnaperioodi. Maailmaliidu keskorganite strateegia nägi ette ideoloogilise vastupanu osutamise Saksa rahvuskomisjoni kaudu, kuid et komisjoni juhtivad liikmed lahkusid kas Saksamaalt, surid või sunniti komisjoni koosseisust lahkuma, muutus komisjon vastupanu organiseerijana passiivseks. Nii nagu opositsiooniline luterlik tunnistuskirik, pühendas ka Saksa rahvuskomisjon vastupanu osutamisel kõige suuremat tähelepanu teoloogilistele küsimustele ja tegeles vähem Maailmaliitu üldiselt iseloomustanud inimõiguste kõvahäälse nõudmisega.

Natsionaalsotsialistliku Saksamaa mõju Maailmaliidule oli suurem kui liidu mõju totalitaarsetele režiimile. Vahendid, nagu avalikkuses teavitustöö tegemine, ei olnud totalitaarsetele režiimidele vastupanu osutamiseks piisavad ja tõid esile liidu suutmatuse totalitaarsetele režiimidele vastu astuda. Seetõttu muutus Maailmaliit sarnaselt Rahvasteliiduga 1930. aastatel oma tegevuses passiivseks ja lõpetas Teise maailmasõja järel oma töö.

Regina Laukaitytė, *Usklike suhtumine nõukogude režiimi religioonipoliitikasse Leedus aastatel 1944–1953*

Artiklis analüüsitakse Leedu katoliiklaste ja vähemususundite järgijate reaktsiooni stalinistlikul perioodil (1944–1953) valitsenud nõukogude režiimi usuvastasele poliitikale. Suurimad kirikuvastased kampaaniad langesid kokku kogu ühiskonna terroriseerimise tippajaga, kui toimusid suurküüditamised, suruti maha partisaniliikumisi, rajati kolhoose ja riigistati vara (aastatel 1948–1949). Seetõttu püüdsid hirmutatud usklikud kaitsta oma huve rahumeelsete vahenditega: püüti valitsusasutustele mitmesuguste taotlustega survet avaldada ning esitati nõudmisi, milles rõhuti stalinistliku konstitutsiooniga tagatud õigustele. Üksikasjalikumalt vaadeldakse meetodeid, millega koguduseliikmed püüdsid kaitsta arreteeritud vaimulikke ning päästa sulgemisele määratud kirikuid.

Kuna riigi esindajate suhtumine oli selgelt vaenulik ning kogudusi ja pühakodasid ei õnnestunud nõukogude seaduste kohaselt legaliseerida, jätkus paljude konfessioonide esindajate (eriti väiksemate vähemususundite puhul) usuelu illegaalselt põranda all. Selline põrandaalune liikumine oli tekkinud juba stalinismi aastatel ning aitas kirikutel säilitada oma tegevuse ja struktuuri järjepidevust. Leedu usklike loidus nõukogude režiimi

religioonipoliitika järgimisel ning nende püüded usuelule seatud piiranguid ignoreerida, neist mööda minna või neile vastu seista aeglustasid ühiskonna ateistlikuks muutumise protsessi.

Maria Petrova, *Hinduismist ja budismist inspireeritud põrandaalused religioossed liikumised Nõukogude Venemaal*

Artiklis käsitletakse Nõukogude Venemaa põrandaaluseid religioosseid/vaimseid liikumisi, mille õpetus oli tugevalt mõjutatud idamaade (eriti India) usunditest ja filosoofiast. Erilist tähelepanu pööratakse budismist ja hinduismist inspireeritud liikumistele (Bidija Dandaroni rühm, ISKCON ja joogarühmad, *kunta* jooga harrastajad jne). Kuigi uurimuses keskendutakse põhiliselt 1950. aastate lõpu ja 1980. aastate lõpu vahelisele ajale (mida iseloomustab religiooni aktiivse tagakiusamise tagasitulek), paigutatakse see ka laiemasse ajaloolisse konteksti, mis hõlmab keisririigi ja eriti nõukogude riigi poliitikat idareligioonide järgijate suhtes.

Saatuse irooniana tõid nõukogude võimu katsed kõiki religiooni ilminguid keelustada või neid vähemalt kontrolli all hoida kaasa hoopis vastupidise tulemuse. Tolle aja põrandaaluste rühmituste liikmed on öelnud, et nende elu „mõttetus ja lämmatav monotoonsus" vajas mingisugust vastukaalu, mida oli mõistagi võimalik leida ainult vaimsest sfäärist. Nii tekkis tänu nimetatud perioodil NSVLis kujunenud olukorrale ainulaadne vaimsete otsijate põlvkond, kelle protest vabaduse ja teabe puudumise vastu omandas teatud kindlaid vorme. See hõlmas nii individuaalseid/sisemisi vorme, mille eesmärk oli vaimne enesearendus ja -harimine, kui ka kollektiivseid/väliseid vorme, näiteks usuliste ühendustega liitumine, seminaridel ja loengutel osalemine, põrandaaluse trükisõna väljaandmine ja levitamine, lääne kirjanduse kopeerimine ja tõlkimine, aeg-ajalt aset leidnud kohtumised inimõiguste eest võitlevate välismaalastega ning põrandaaluse dissidentliku tegevuse muud vormid. Artiklis uuritakse täpsemalt aastatel 1960–1980 plahvatuslikult kasvanud huvi Aasia ja idamaade usundite vastu, mida võib seletada sooviga põgeneda nõukogude režiimi reaalsusest ning kogeda midagi kauget ja teistsugust, kuid mis oli samal ajal ka osa ülemaailmsest suundumusest, mida iseloomustas traditsioonilistest peavoolureligioonidest kõrvale kaldumine ning suurem huvi ebatavaliste, mõnikord lausa pentsikute ideede ja õpetuste vastu.

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